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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: EFFICIENCY OR ETHICS

BY

STEPHEN K. MA ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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Abstract

It is widely accepted that modernization may cause severe change. Samuel Huntington discerns an inevitable gap between mobilization and institutionalization in the process of modernization. In his view, this gap creates disorder and instability in society. Fred Riggs identifies a second gap when modernization leads to a lack of balance between the political structures that make policy and bureaucratic structures that implement it. He claims that this institutional gap results in a bureaucracy which overshadows policy makers and acts without sufficient political supervision.

China's modernizing efforts under Deng Xiaoping's sponsorship suggest a third gap caused by modernization. This gap is labelled the "behavioural gap" in this dissertation. The behavioural gap refers to the gulf between efforts to upgrade administrative efficiency and efforts to bring about ethical bureaucratic behaviour in the process of modernization.

This dissertation examines this behavioural gap in China's modernization. It argues that the behavioural gap stems from several factors. These include the nation's cultural heritage, the ruling party's approach to government and the absence of trusted and full-fledged academic groups assigned to advise on administrative reform.

The dissertation then probes one of the gravest consequences of the behavioural gap -- "reform corruption," a phenomenon which seems to be a mixed blessing of modernization.

Acknowledgment

For the completion of this dissertation I owe a personal and intellectual debt of gratitude to Jeremy Paltiel, who has guided almost every step of my intellectual growth since we met in 1985. My special thanks go to Allan Tupper, whose composure has helped me to overcome the frustration I experienced in the course of finishing this project. Robert Gilsdorf and Fred Englemann have been unsparing in giving me suggestions and encouragements.

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Introduction: Modernization and Administrative Reform

More than ten years have elapsed since Deng Xiaoping inaugurated his ambitious programme to modernize China. China scholars have examined these developments in post-Mao China, but have dealt only generally with the nation's movement away from the era of Mao Zedong.[1] A key component of Deng's modernization programme was his attempt to reform the nation's administrative system. Such administrative reform has not been discussed thoroughly in the literature on post-Mao China.[2]

This dissertation explores the role of administrative reform in the modernization policy of post-Mao China. It explores whether China's administrative structures and processes can adequately implement programmes of rapid modernization, and, whether in the course of rapid development, Chinese administration has adapted to the swiftly changing environment of policy making and implementation.

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[1] These studies include, for example, A. Doak Barnette and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform and Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1987), David M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove, eds., Reforming The Revolution: China in Transition (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Chinese Politics From Mao To Deng (New York: Paragon House, 1989), Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., China: Modernization in the 1980s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), Carol Lee Hamrin, China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

[2] Several articles have discussed administrative reform in post- Mao China. See Hong Yung Lee, "Deng Xiaoping's Reform of the Chinese Bureaucracy," Journal of Northeastern Studies, June 1982; Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," Asian Survey, May 1983; Hong Yung Lee, "Evaluation of China's Bureaucratic Reform," ANNALS, AAPSSS, November 1984; and John Burns, "Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress Proposals,"China Quarterly, December 1989.

Modernization in post-Mao China

In the fall of 1976, after Mao Zedong's death and the subsequent arrest of the "Gang of Four" (Mao's widow Jiang Qing and three other top radical leaders from Shanghai), developments in China took a new direction. The conflict between various political forces ultimately resulted in the triumph of the reformers headed by Deng Xiaoping.

More than a year earlier, Deng demonstrated his commitment to economic development. In March 1975, he categorically dismissed as "utterly wrong" a refusal to promote production.[3] He was, however, soon attacked for the "rightist wind for the reversal of verdicts." Later, Deng was purged after being accused of masterminding the Tiananmen Incident in spring 1976 when one hundred thousand people gathered at the Tiananmen Square, singing the praises of the late Premier Zhou Enlai and Deng and criticizing Mao and the radical elements in the leadership. As a result, Deng's views on national development were not adopted until the Third

---

[3] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p.14.

Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.

This meeting ushered in Deng's era by establishing his role as the nation's paramount leader and by switching the Party's focus from class struggle to economic development. Deng thus became the architect of China's modernization programme in the post-Mao era. He was anxious to "quicken the pace" of his "Long March" toward prosperity.[4]

In discussing the pressures for change in China in the late 1970s, Harry Harding mentioned "the unfavourable comparison between China's economic growth and that of the rest of East Asia."[5] The stark contrast between China and the rest of the region raised many questions for Chinese leaders and citizens. The search for answers to these questions has been painful and protracted. The restoration of China's economy was an urgent priority.

The Party's decision in December 1978 to make modernization a basic political goal was certainly not the first attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to modernize. Since 1949 the Chinese government has called for the nation's "Four Modernizations" respectively in 1954, 1963, and 1964.[6] But Deng Xiaoping's modernization efforts differ conspicuously from Mao Zedong's.[7] First, Mao "neglected the development of the productive forces"[8] and instead underscored social transformation and preached "constant socialist revolutionary struggle and socialist education."[9] Deng aimed at "highly developed productive forces and overwhelming material wealth."[10] He and his associates conceived modernization (the "four modernizations" as they are called in China) as catching up to the technological and productive levels of the advanced industrial countries and narrowing the gap in standards of living between China and them. As Deng said, the "goal of achieving the four socialist modernizations" was to overcome "China's economic and technological backwardness."[11] He perceived modernization mainly as economic growth and a rising standard of living. For example, in January 1980 Deng interpreted modernization as "a per capita value of output of US$1,000," which was to be reached by the end of the century.[12] Hu Yaobang, the late General Secretary of the CCP, announced at the Party's Twelfth

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[4] Ibid., p.165.

[5]. Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.38.

[6] Renmin Ribao (RMRB), December 19, 1985.

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[7] Deng's modernization emphasizes economic development although modernization actually involves changes not only in economic but also in political and social fields.

[8] Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues in Present-day China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), p.55.

[9] Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), Vol.V., (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1977), p.404.

[10] Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues, p.54.

[11] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.146.

[12]. Ibid., p.244.

National Congress in 1982 that China would quadruple the value of its industrial and agricultural production.[13]

The 1980s witnessed improvement in China's standard of living. From 1978 to 1988, the total output value of production rose by 123 per cent. The annual average growth in industrial output value has been 11.8 per cent; and in agriculture -- 6.5 per cent. Output has increased rapidly and so has the living standard of the Chinese people. The average per capita urban income in 1978 was 316 yuan. Ten years later it was 916 yuan. The average annual increase was 7.1 per cent, after adjustment for inflation.[14] Deng's economic efforts have therefore yielded results.

Mao blamed bourgeois ideology for hampering economic growth. He saw as secondary the bureaucratic tendency of Chinese cadres and the defects in the state administrative system.[15] Deng maintains, on the other hand, that as economic policies were adjusted, the administrative system also had to adjust. He argued that:

> Since [modernization's] goal is to transform the present backward state of our productive forces, it inevitably entails many changes in the relations of production, the superstructure and the forms of management in

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[13]. Beijing Review, Vol.25, No.37, September 13, 1982, p.15.

[14]. Gao Shangquan, "China's Economy After 10 years of Reform," China Reconstructs, Vol.XXXVIII, No.1, January 1989, p.13. Gao is Vice Director of the State Economic Structural Reform Commission.

[15]. Mao Zedong, Xuanji, Vol.V., p.374.

> industrial and agricultural enterprises, as well as changes in the state administration over these enterprises so as to meet the needs of modern large-scale production.[16]

With these changes in mind, Deng led China into a new era of modernization. He found fault with unsound organizations and institutions, which "resulted in grave misfortunes for the Party, the state and [Mao] himself."[17] Deng claimed that:

> Some of our current systems and institutions in the Party and state are plagued by problems which seriously impede the full realization of the superiority of socialism. Unless they are conscientiously reformed, we can hardly expect to meet the urgent needs of modernization ....[18]

Public administration and modernization

Deng was interested in using Weber's "ideal type" of bureaucracy as a model for China's administrative system. The main components of this "ideal type" include hierarchy, unity of command, specialization of labour, employment and promotion based on merit, full-time employment, decisions based on impersonal rules, written communications, and bureaucratic employment totally separate from the bureaucrat's private life.[19] This "ideal type" emphasized efficiency, achieved through merit in a profession separated from politics. Many of the Deng's specific administrative reforms, such as dangzheng fenli (separate the Party from government affairs) and ganbu zhishihua, zhuanyehua (make cadres more knowledgeable and professional), were designed to achieve administrative efficiency.

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[16]. Ibid., p.146.

[17]. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.316.

[18]. Ibid., p.309.

[19] H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp.196-244.

Two fundamental problems confronted Deng as he initiated administrative changes. One is the problem of disengaging the administrative apparatus from the party politics. The other is how to control the ripple effects of administrative reform into other social and political spheres. According to early theorists, public administration can be, and indeed should be, regarded as separate from politics and policy-making. Woodrow Wilson argued in 1887 for a dichotomy -- a clear distinction -- between politics and administration. Administration, he said, "lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions." "The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics."[20] Wilson's view of public administration has two implications. First, politics should be separated from public administration. Second, public administration should be based on merit rather than partisanship. In other words, public administrators should not be involved in the politics of policy formulation.

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[20]. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.LVI, December 1941, pp.493-4.

Likewise, Max Weber suggested in 1918 that the politician's conduct "is subject to quite a different, indeed, exactly the opposite, principle of responsibility from that of the civil servant." According to Weber, the politician must "take a stand," "be passionate" and "take an exclusively personal responsibility for what he does." But the civil servant is "to execute conscientiously the order" of the politicians.[21]

The politics-administration dichotomy does not fit modern China. Administrative discretion has enabled Chinese bureaucrats to be a major part of the policy formulation process. Moreover, administration and politics are inseparable in the PRC. T.H. Rigby argues that it is very hard "to draw a fairly sharp distinction between 'politics' and 'administration'" in Communist regimes whrer "conflicts of interest and aspiration, denied a special political sphere of operation," turn "processes ostensibly executive and administrative in character" into "a distinctive crypto-politics."[22] In addition, the CCP leaders have never accepted the need for a politically neutral civil service. They have argued that policy is the lifeblood of administration. This was corroborated by Minister of Personnel Zhao Dongwan, who, to dispel speculation about a possible change of mind on the subject, made it explicit in 1988 that the Chinese civil servants "should actively participate in state politics."[23]

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[21]. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans. & ed., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p.95.

[22]. T.H. Rigby, "Crypto-politics," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., ed., Communist Studies and the Social Sciences: Essays on Methodology and Empirical Theory (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), pp.116-7.

Moreover, Deng and his associates were looking for a model of development administration which would fit China's political realities. Development administration, as defined by Harry Friedman, includes two elements: "(1) the implementation of programmes designed to bring about modernity and (2) the changes within an administrative system which increase its capacity to implement such programmes."[24] These are the two functions Deng and his associates expected the nation's administrative body to perform. They wanted it to implement Deng's modernization plans and to initiate changes to enhance the administrative system's efficiency.

Several approaches to modernization

Modernization upsets the "social equilibrium" and causes such problems as disorder and instability.[25] Scholars have adopted different approaches to the study of modernization and each notes different problems. Fred Riggs, for example, probes institutional imbalance in the process. He notes that modernization leads to "the lack of balance between political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures."[26] In other words, the bureaucracy expands too rapidly and too quickly while the political system lags behind.[27] This "institutional gap" results in a bureaucracy which acts without much political supervision.

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[23]. RMRB (Overseas Edition), October 6, 1988.

[24]. Harry J. Friedman, "Administrative Roles in Local Governments," in Edward W. Weidner, ed., Development Administration in Asia (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1970), p.254.

[25] See, for example, David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization, Protest and

Riggs' "institutional gap" does not fit China. First, government bureaucracy in China has been under CCP control. Indeed, as suggested above, the bureaucracy has existed primarily to maintain the CCP's dominance. Deng's modernization has not erased this essential feature of Chinese politics. Second, China's modernization has not resulted in a more powerful government bureaucracy. On the contrary, the assumption of government office has become less desirable than it used to be. Obviously Riggs' suggestion offers little insight into the Chinese modernization experiences in the past

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Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentics-Hall, 1966); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: little, Brown & Co., 1966).

[26] Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.120.

[27] Ibid., p.126.

decade.

Samuel Huntington argues that modernization may engender political instability. He sees an inevitable gap between mobilization and institutionalization in the process of modernization.[28] In his opinion, this "political gap" brings about disorder and instability in society.

Huntington's observation did not fit the reality of Mao's China when the CCP, in tight control of Chinese society, bridged the gap between mobilization and institutionalization. A strength of the Communist parties has been their ability to organize the masses and to establish political institutions. Deng's reformist policies, however, have obviously made a notable impact on the CCP's capacity to control modernization. Significant cracks became visible soon after Deng's first, limited political liberalization. The use of force in 1989 to crush a mobilized population indicates that the Party has failed to bridge the gap in the process of modernization.

Why did a "political gap" not develop in China until Deng's era? Why did the Party fail to maintain its strength in organizing the masses and establishing political institutions as Deng moved to modernize the nation? The most likely explanation is Deng's new reformist policies which tend to achieve economic prosperity through administrative reform. Has administrative reform undermined the Party's ability to control the state bureaucracy, thereby also loosening the Party's control over society? In other words, has administrative reform impaired the state's capacity? These questions must be answered before Huntington's concept of a political gap can be used to explain post-Mao China.

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[28]. Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Inc., 1971), p.157.

Both Riggs' and Huntington's arguments draw attention to gaps between programmes and performance in modernization. Performance may fall short of grandiose plans. Grand programmes may propel a nation closer to modernity while poor performance may lead to unanticipated troubles in the process of modernization. In setting lofty goals for modernization, Deng has not been able to establish development administration with the capacity to supervise the implementation of modernization programmes.

This dissertation asks whether there is a behavioural gap in the process of China's modernization in the last decade. I will argue that many of the troubles in China's modernization in the last decade are more related to unethical bureaucratic behaviour than to unbalanced institutional or political development. A major problem for China after Mao is a "behavioural gap," a term referring to a gulf between the efforts to achieve an efficient administration and the efforts to achieve ethical bureaucratic behaviour as the bureaucrats are asked to manage reform. Put simply, this dissertation stresses the importance of bureaucratic behaviour in China's modernization.

A "behavioural approach" offers several advantages. It helps focus the study on a key element of Deng's modernization programme, namely his attempt to upgrade the administrative performance in order to promote modernization. A careful study of this component of Deng's modernizing efforts should help explain some of the major problems in the nation's modernization process.

In addition, such an approach may reveal the causes for China's so-called "implementation problem" which has much to do with the policy-implementing institutions, particularly the government bureaucracy. David Lampton claims that implementation problems "are endemic to centralized Leninist political and Stalinist bureaucratic systems."[29] Policy implementation, with its unintended or unanticipated consequences, may lead to "the greatest delay or divergence between intentions and outcome."[30] Deng's intention to refashion the state administration in order to facilitate economic reform and forward his modernization programmes has not brought about a satisfactory outcome for him. As Zhao Ziyang, the now deposed General Secretary of the Party, admitted in the Party's Thirteenth National Congress in November 1987, "the quality of management and supervision cannot keep up with the changing situation."[31] A serious examination of the behavioural gap may help find answers to the implementation problems and illustrate gap between plans, goals and accomplishment.

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[29]. David M. Lampton, "The Implementation problem in Post-Mao China," in David M. Lampton, ed., Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.8.

[30]. Ibid., pp.16-17.

Third, the behavioural gap helps to decipher many other puzzles of Deng's administrative reform. While he emphasized the need to change state administration in order to modernize China, Deng had difficulty with administrative reform. The process of reform has been inconsistent and discontinuous. On the one hand, the process of policy making for administrative reform required adequate knowledge of public administration and clear ideas about modernization. On the other hand, implementing policies for administrative reform endangered the political control over administrators. Such control emphasized the inseparability of politics and administration. In addition, one could only expect bureaucratic resistance normal to administrative reforms which redistributed power and shook up the _status quo_.

Deng's difficulties in promoting reform centre around the changing role for the administration, the transformation of the administrative system, and bureaucrats' resistance to change. China's administrative system, as envisaged by Deng, sought to accelerate economic growth. This was not, however, the job assigned to the nation's administration in the three decades since the founding of the PRC. As described in Chapter Two, China's administration formerly served to transform an old society and to consolidate a new regime by controlling society. Built by the CCP to achieve Party goals, the state bureaucracy was basically honest but certainly not ready to assume new tasks. When the most important economic restructuring required a new administrative machinery competent to manage the nation's modernization, that left open the question of what the state should manage and how the bureaucrats would behave.

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[31]. _Beijing Review_, Vol.30, No.45, November 9-15, 1987, p.25.

Deng did not have a clear idea about how to reform the administrative system and so he pursued two options. The first was to turn to intellectuals whose knowledge was useful. These well-educated men and women, in his view, should be involved in administrative reform. Their study of public management could provide information on various aspects of administrative practice, including organization, personnel management, supervision and motivation. In addition, their study of public management could also help analyze the impact of economic reform on the Chinese system of state administration and help point out the strengths and weaknesses of various academic and official proposals on public administration. Academic studies could offer options on administrative reform for policy consideration. However, did a cordial relationship exist between the ruling Party and the intellectuals when Deng felt the need for the latter's help? Was there any obstacle to scholarly activities?

As Chapter Three indicates, the Party has long distrusted intellectuals. Can this relationship be changed to promote greater academic discussion of proposed reforms? And even if the intellectuals responded positively to the more hospitable climate created by Deng and his associates, will their ideas be taken seriously? Moreover, will intellectuals' values be compatible with official ones? And, once mobilized, can scholars be kept under the Party's control? A case study in Chapter Four -- a study of the journal Chinese Public Administration during the period of 1985 through 1987, addresses these questions.

Deng's other solution was to adopt an experimental approach -- "groping one's way through the river by feeling out the stones." Experimentation helps accumulate experience but can be a risky undertaking because of unanticipated results. Indeed, in experimenting with various economic and structural reforms, Deng and his associates were often unaware of their full implications.

Moreover, Deng had no strong sense of what modernization would require. Chalmers Johnson maintains that modernization requires developments in the economic, political and social sectors.[32] Deng, however, focused on economic development and linked administrative reform with economic development. As a result, neither China’s leaders nor the administration were prepared to manage changes in other sectors.

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[32]. Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970), p.37.

Administrative reform is profoundly political. The implementation of reform strategy depends, as Chapter Five demonstrates, upon many factors other than the intentions of a handful of elite reformers. Inevitably, new strategies of public management encroach on the interests of certain groups. Therefore, the adoption of one strategy in administrative reform might not be an appropriate answer to the questions raised by economic reforms. Consequently, compromises often resulted.

The responses of administrators to reform are discussed in Chapter Six. Since their position and power are directly endangered by administrative reform, their reappraisal of the new circumstances is crucial and their response to changes are important. Would government officials lose their power in the reform? How many of them would lose their positions? Would their status be threatened? What interests did bureaucrats try to preserve?

The CCP faced a complex situation in administrative reform. Deng and his associates believed naively in their capacity to maintain political control over administrators. They ran a risk in switching strategies which contradicted their earlier policies and goals. In the course of the switch, many of the new modes of management undermined the traditional methods of political control. Consequently, a gap emerged between the Party's efforts to enhance administrative efficiency and its ability to supervise the bureaucrats.

China's vast administrative structure was asked to perform a "U-turn" in the course of modernization. Deng's reform meant changing existing structures from the top down in accordance with new goals. The structures which were required to administer new goals and policies were also expected to oversee their own transformation. Could Chinese administrators be efficient and ethical?[33]

The behavioural gap

The process of reform and modernization in post-Mao China disclosed several gaps and many contradictions associated with the behavioural gap. First, there was a gap in timing. The pace of economic development exceed that of administrative restructuring. Alec Nove argues that "reform requires steps towards achieving a separation of" political and economic powers.[34] Chinese policy-makers have endeavoured to delegate bureaucratic power, believing that this would help achieve administrative efficiency. They did not, however, try to separate political and economic power within the bureaucracy. Nor did the authorities at the same time restructure the administrative apparatus adequately so that the administrative system could be watched properly.

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[33] For our purposes "ethical" bureaucratic behaviour implies refraining from appropriating the benefits of office for personal gain.

[34]. Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p.179.

On the one hand, Chinese authorities took radical steps to enliven the nation's stagnant economy. The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP decided in December 1978 to shift the Party's focus to economic development.[35] The resolution was followed by a series of measures intended to steer the economy away from centralized control and toward market regulation, culminating in the Party's Decision on Economic Restructuring in 1984.

But administrative reform did not keep pace with rapid economic change. In December 1978 the authorities put the issue of the reforms in the "superstructure" on the agenda.[36] At the time, this term was still vague, though it obviously included administrative restructuring. This ambiguity might indicate that the authorities were unsure whether the nation's administrative system required a comprehensive overhaul. Tan Jian, a political scientist with the Institute of Political Science, had explained the subject of administrative reform in June 1983.[37] Still, administrative reform was slow in coming.

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[35]. Beijing Review, Vol.21, No.52, December 29, 1978, pp.6-16.

[36]. Deng Xiaoping, "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite As One in Looking to the Future," Selected Works, p.164. See also "The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP," Beijing Review, Vol.21, No.52, December 29, 1978, pp.6-16.

[37]. RMRB, June 1, 1983.

The drafting of "The Provisional Regulations On Civil Servants" began only in October 1984. And it took more than three years and twelve drafts to make the document acceptable. Moreover, the authorities cautiously decided that these "basically mature" regulations could only be practised for trial implementation at the national and provincial level.[38]

Second, there was a gap in appeal. Business management upstaged public administration in post-Mao China. The concept of the "four modernizations" as the guiding principle for China's modernization efforts was largely oriented to the economy. New incentives for economic performance were practised in business management when the authorities allowed for profit-making. The media stressed reports about entrepreneurs who rescued failing enterprises or earned large profits. The new wealth of entrepreneurs stood in sharp contrast with government officials' meagre incomes. As the reforms proceeded, there were more chances to earn money in other walks of life than government. As a result, many young men and women chose careers in sectors other than public administration. For example, a survey in November 1987 disclosed that such professions as teachers, workers, engineers, scientists, military officers, farmers, medical workers and self-employed individuals found favour in the eyes of a majority of teenagers. Only 4.2 per cent of them wanted to become state cadres.[39]

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[38]. RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 10, 1987.

The "economic responsibility system," a system stressing the profit motive by linking a staff member's income with his job performance, was praised in business management. Public administrative agencies were told to emulate experiences in business management, including the profit motive. The Party's Decision on Economic Restructuring in 1984 explicitly urged a new wage system in state institutions "in accordance with the principle of linking wages with responsibilities and achievements."[40] Did this strategy motivate government officials to work more effectively in the interests of the public or their own financial interests? What happened was that such a strategy did not succeed in making positions in public institutions more attractive and in curbing private enrichment at public expense, thereby refining the image of government cadres.

Third, there was a gap in responsiveness. Modernization aroused increasing demands from society on the state. Yet the response from the government was often delayed, deficient and disappointing. The modernization programme depicted a rosy picture of the future in order to impel the people to strive for the goals set forth in the blueprint. These pledges dangled the hope of a better life but also quickly raised citizen expectations beyond the authorities' capacity to fulfil them.

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[39]. RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 19, 1987. It was puzzling that being a teacher remained first choice among them. A possible explanation could be that they cherished knowledge and were ignorant of most teachers' unbecoming social and economic status.

[40]. See "Decision of the CCP's Central Committee on Reform of the Economic Structure," RMRB, October 21, 1984.

No longer content with owning wristwatches, bicycles and sewing machines, the Chinese now ask for colour TVs, refrigerators and washing machines. They anticipate an increase in their salaries, but it is slow in coming. Those who could afford to purchase expensive appliances were equally unsatisfied because the government failed to deliver a sufficient amount of high-quality consumer goods. In addition to their material benefits, the Chinese also looked forward to better service from government agencies. Yet many officers working in the bureaucracy were apparently preoccupied with things other than providing service.

Indeed, modernization is a multifunctional process. It brings about economic growth and upgraded material life. It also kindles the flames of materialist longings. Moreover, modernization and the subsequent policy of opening up Chinese society to foreign culture opened the public's eyes, widened their horizon and exposed them to the living standards of developed countries, where governments are under constant public pressure for a better performance. In this sense, modernization is also a process of education. Consequently, the demands on the Chinese bureaucracy were rising.

S.N. Eisenstadt identified four kinds of bureaucracy:

service-oriented to rulers, totally subservient to rulers, autonomous and oriented to their own advantages, and self-oriented but also serving the polity in general rather than any specific stratum.[41] The huge bureaucracy in China, which Chae-Jin Lee labelled the Achilles heel of the modernization,[42] had been service-oriented to rulers. As stated by Guangming Ribao, government officials know only that they should be responsible to their boss but not to the public.[43] The Chinese public was anxious to see the leviathan being transformed into a bureaucracy serving the polity in general rather than any specific stratum. But the government had much difficulty responding to this demand for administrative restructuring. A poll by Jingji Ribao indicated that seventy-eight per cent of those questioned believed that "the main obstacle to reform stems from middle-level officials and administrative offices."[44]

Fourth, there was a gap in capacity. The past decade witnessed a contrast between efforts to reform the administrative system and its declining capacity, which will be described later in this dissertation. Modernization called for administrative reform. However, many of the steps taken by the authorities to make the administration more capable of managing modernization failed. The "administrative men" were still in short supply.[45]

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[41] S.N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p.276.

[42] Chae-Jin Lee, China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984).

[43] Guangming Ribao (hereinafter GMRB), October 6, 1986.

[44] China Reconstructs, Vol.XXXVI, No.1, January 1987, p.57.

Administrative institutions can contribute to modernization because of their knowledge and expertise. S.N. Eisenstadt provides a list of several important functions they perform.[46] But to do so, the administration must jettison many of its illiterate and semiliterate cadres and supervise a new army of bureaucrats effectively. Chinese policy-makers, however, had difficulty recruiting enough qualified candidates for public office. They also failed to realize the importance of supervising millions of government officials on whom depends the success of reform and modernization.

Chinese bureaucracy lacks clear functional differentiation and a division of labour, both of which are key elements of Weber's "ideal type." The undifferentiated nature of Chinese administration was exacerbated in the course of Deng's administrative reform when numerous public officers were left uncontrolled in wielding their power. This has enabled many of them to continue to meddle with others' activities. The so-called "mothers-in-law," a nickname for government agencies which make everything their own business, appeared everywhere despite efforts to curtail bureaucratic intrusion through decentralization.[47]

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[45]. For the "administrative man" see Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision Making Process in Administrative Organization, 3rd Ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p.39.

[46]. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., pp.110-1.

To be fair, Deng and his associates tried, to a limited degree, to maintain some control over public administration. However, they were more interested in increasing bureaucratic autonomy than in supervising the bureaucrats in administrative reform. Autonomy can drive bureaucracy in two directions. As Peter Self writes:

> Control in this sense does not mean simply (or primarily) making sure that policies which have been met are faithfully executed. It was also the converse meaning of so holding the reins of office that the decisions of administrators can always (if necessary) be over-ruled or amended. It means also establishing an atmosphere in which administrators will continually be aware of political guidelines and constraints.[48]

Self suggests that political control may result in politicians' overruling administrative decisions and in constraints on administrators. Lax political control can reduce the arbitrary interference of politicians into administration. It may also lead to unchecked expansion of bureaucratic power. Therefore, bureaucratic autonomy is two-sided. Bureaucrats seek autonomy in order to find the proper means to implement policy, but too much autonomy may defeat the purpose of bureaucracy, which is to implement policy. Whether bureaucratic autonomy will contribute to better implementation of policies or, on the other hand, produce bureaucratic abuse of power is always a tough challenge for policy-makers.

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[47]. See, for example, RMRB, January 7 and 12, 1985.

[48]. Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics: An Inquiry into the Structure of Processes of Modern Government (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1972), p.161.

The leadership of post-Mao China produced a bureaucracy with some autonomy but little supervision. As the bureaucracy gained autonomy, bureaucratic behaviour became increasingly irresponsible. Indolence, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and pursuit of self-interest are all part of China's bureaucracy. Unable to stop government officials from pursuing narrow interests, the authorities failed to prevent this from happening. Weakened supervision over the bureaucracy was an important explanation.

Sources of information

This dissertation examines Chinese government bureaucracy from the Third Plenum of the CCP's Eleventh Central Committee in 1978 until the Party's 13th Congress of 1987. Two reasons underpin my decision to end this analysis in 1987. By 1987 the authorities had already established a pattern of administrative reform which emphasized administrative efficiency. Although bureaucratic "unhealthy tendencies" were developing, there was little evidence that the post-Mao leadership tried to change the unhealthy patterns. The ruling elite which emerged at the 13th Congress faced a variety of difficulties in pushing the reform. As the debate over administrative problems intensified, a power struggle within the top leadership escalated and preoccupied policy makers. As a result, administrative reform made little progress after the 13th Congress.

The dissertation draws largely on Chinese language publications in the PRC. They include Renmin Ribao (RMRB) and Guangming Ribao (GMRB) -- two of the major national newspapers in China. Zhengzhixue Yanjiu (ZZXYJ) (Studies in Political Science) of the Institute of Political Science under the CASS and Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli (ZGXZGL) (Chinese Public Administration) of the Chinese Association of Public Administration provide the views of the nations' leaders and scholars about administrative reform and offer insights into debates about administrative reform. In addition, Fuyin Baokan Ziliao (Digests of Chinese Newspapers and Journals), published by Chinese People's University, gathers almost all important articles from major papers and journals across China and enables students of China abroad to reach many other Chinese publications, and through them, feel the pulse of the nation's development. These sources help in providing a picture of China's modernization.

A Chinese saying states that "a waterfront pavilion gets the moonlight first." The advantage of being in a favourable position renders much information on China accessible to observers in Hong Kong. Publications which take advantage of this position, such as Ming Pao, Cheng Ming, The Seventies, which has been renamed The Nineties since May 1984, and Far Eastern Economic Review were indispensable for this dissertation.

Works on China produced by Western scholars as well as their articles in journals analyze China from the perspective of Western social science. Literature in public administration provides various theories, some of which can offer guidelines in interpreting the development of China's administrative reform. This dissertation also employs such literature.

Several pitfalls arise, however. Commenting on the study of contemporary Chinese politics in the United States, Harry Harding alerts students of China to the dangers of "one-sided cynicism," "the pseudo-sophistication," uncritical acceptance of new sources of information about China, and "neglect of the broader and more sensitive questions of national policy."[49] To start with the last trap, this dissertation intends to examine a nation-wide phenomenon -- the behavioural gap. Obviously such a topic, if well explored, should contribute to "broad-gauged studies of national level of politics."[50]

Caution must be also exercised when applying "Western" concepts to China and assessing the validity of new information about China. Correspondence with residents of

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[49]. Harry Harding, "The Study of Chinese Politics: Toward a Third Generation of Scholarship," World Politics, Vol.XXXVI, No.2, January 1984, pp.306-7.

[50]. Ibid., p.307.

China, interviews with those who have visited the nation recently, and other evidence can reduce the possibility of misusing the views of Western social scientists. Altogether, these precautionary steps can also ward off an overly judgemental approach. Certainly, growing up and being educated in China is an asset and has made it easier to discern what does or does not apply to China.

A note on Romanization

An explanation is necessary concerning the Romanization of Chinese characters. On the one hand, the English-language scholarly works on China used the older Wade-Giles system until recently. On the other hand, in 1979 the PRC officially adopted the pinyin system for transliterating Chinese names and places in the Roman alphabet. The new system is now generally used in Western newspapers and most scholarly publications. This dissertation uses the new pinyin system, except for several historical places and persons such as Confucius. A special rule of the new system requires that their traditional spelling need not be changed. Meanwhile, to alleviate confusion for readers who may still have difficulty with the pinyin, I give, when necessary, the Wade-Giles transcription in parentheses following the pinyin at the first occurrence.

Summary

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two surveys the administrative system prior to reform in the PRC. It examines the early experiences of Chinese Communists in controlling the administration. It also probes the strengths and weaknesses of the PRC's administrative system. The overview demonstrates that "one cold day does not make the river freeze three feet thick." China's ancient history and culture and the CCP's political considerations account for the structure and behaviour of the PRC's administration. The chapter asks why the behavioural gap did not appear until Deng's modernization programme.

Chapter Three examines the relationships between the Chinese authorities and intellectuals and probes how such relationships have changed since Deng's call for "Four modernizations." The chapter examines intellectuals' response to the new atmosphere and whether their participation enhanced administrative efficiency and encouraged ethical bureaucracy.

Chapter Four, as a case study, reviews all the issues of Chinese Public Administration during a period from 1985 through 1987. By examining such articles, I analyze the journal's focus, its contributors' interests, and how they reflect and influence administrative reform.

Chapter Five examines the content of administrative reform by investigating the underlying politics of administrative change. It delineates the major themes in the debate.

Chapter Six probes the bureaucracy's response to administrative reform. By illustrating how government officials have responded, the chapter highlights the consequences of the behavioural gap. It reveals how the bureaucrats changed their behaviour in response to broad change.

Chapter Seven summarizes the discussion of the behavioural gap. In addition, the chapter speculates on how the behavioural gap might be bridged in the process of modernization.

Chapter Two: An Honest Administration Prior to Reforms

This chapter examines public administration in the People's Republic of China prior to the sweeping reforms of the 1980s. The chapter looks at China's tradition of moral public administration. It also probes the PRC's morally-based administrative system before the reforms.

The goal of the PRC's administrative policy was to produce a new kind of administrator. The third part of the chapter outlines the principal characteristics of an average PRC administrator prior to Deng's reforms. This description addresses the following questions: first, was the quality of government management a severe administrative problem at the time? Second, how did the Party achieve an ethical administration? Third, why was administrative reform necessary when Deng launched China's recent modernization effort?

A tradition of emphasizing morality

The traditional administrative system received serious challenges when the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) had difficulty dealing with foreign powers. These problems prompted efforts to reform government and to modernize China in the late nineteenth century. Zhang Zhidong raised the idea of "Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning as the means" (zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong) in the wake of the Opium War in 1839-1842. The Reform of 1898, led by Kang Youwei and Liang

Qichao, was inspired by Japan's Meiji Restoration and tried to introduce political reform in China. Dr. Sun Yat-sen pioneered the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Manchu Dynasty and founded the Republic of China.

Imperial China collapsed because of its inability to compete with, or respond positively to, the challenges of the West. Modernization for national salvation was thus a response to this national crisis. China's traditional ideology (Confucianism) and institutions (the traditional bureaucracy) became identified with national failure. They were criticized and rejected by China's younger intellectuals who sought western models as their salvation. In Mao's words, these "Chinese progressives went through untold hardships in their quest for truth from the Western countries."[1]

Communism was an outcome of the search for alternatives. Concern with the fate and future of China led to the founding in 1921 of the Chinese Communist Party. Pursuing national independence and social revolution, the Communists experimented with policies of modernization. Soon after Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) established the Nationalist Government in Nanjing in 1927, the Communists under Mao embarked on a different path in an attempt to set up a new revolutionary administrative system.

In their efforts to forge a new administration, the Chinese Communists were determined to break with the past.

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[1]. Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol.IV, p.412.

They witnessed the failure of the dynastic bureaucracy to modernize China. As Tang Tsou pointed out, the collapse of the traditional order in China "produced a total response in the form of a totalitarian movement and regime with a total ideology which contained an all-inclusive criticism of the existing society and justified total change and reconstruction."[2]

Although rejecting both traditional Chinese models and those of the liberal West including the ideas of China's westernized intellectuals, the Chinese Communists did not ignore the nation's cultural legacies as its long history had impact on the establishment of a Communist-ruled government. For centuries China's state administration was identified more with moral behaviour than with professional skills. Behaving morally implied obeying the emperors unconditionally. When the centralized system of xian (hsien) (county) was adopted around 221 B.C.[3] the system of centralization was meant to strengthen

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[2] Tang Tsou, "Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework for Analysis," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Volume 1; China's Heritage and the Communist Political System, Book One, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p.280.

[3] H. G. Creel, "The Beginning of Bureaucracy in China: The Origin of the Hsien," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXIII, No.2, February 1964, p.171 & p.163. Administrative centralization can be traced back to the years of the First Emperor of Qin (r. 246-214 B.C.). See Ch'ien Mu, Traditional Government in Imperial China: A Critical Analysis (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press), p.1.

"monarchical authority"[4] and confirm the "emperor as the supreme head of state administration."[5]

Dezhi (rule of morality) was perceived as a virtue of government.[6] The perfection of individual morality was considered the starting point and basis of the proper ruling of a society.[7] Consequently, China's tradition identified government not with law but with moral standards and moral behaviour established for government officials.[8] The inner state of mind and spirit, or ethics, was deemed more important than "objective" measures when evaluating their performance.[9]

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[4] Sun Yue, "Zhongguo Lidai Guanzhi Jiangzuo Lianzai 6: Huangdi Daquan Dulan" (On China's System of Civil Service Throughout Dynasties. Seminar Six: Emperor's Monopoly of Power), Wenshi Zhishi, No.5, 1984, p.78.

[5] Zhang Jinfan, "Administration and Administrative Law in Ancient China," Social Sciences in China, Autumn 1986, p.189.

[6] Confucius teaches that "Govern the people by regulations, ... and they will flee from you, lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, ... and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord." See The Analects of Confucius, trans. and annot., Arthur Waley, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p.88.

[7] According to Confucius, "Wishing to order well their states, [the ancients] first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons." See Confucius, The Great Learning, in James Legge, trans., The Four Books, (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), pp.301-2. See also Liu Zehua, Zhongguo Chuantong Zhengzhi Sixiang Fansi (Reflections on the Chinese Traditional Political Thoughts) (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1987), p.62.

[8] Confucius advocates that "Ministers, in serving their ruler, [should be guided] solely by devotion to his cause (chen shi jun yi zhong)." See The Analects of Confucius, p.99.

[9]. Max Weber noted the absence in China of formal logic of legal thought as part of "Confucian life of orientation." See Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism

Practising ritualism was another way to demonstrate one's moral behaviour. Dynastic China's obsession with ritualism caused Etienne Balazs to describe Chinese regime as that of "red tape and petty fuss -- yards and yards of tape and never-ending fuss."[10] However, this "endless fuss" was considered the "most apparent" "Confucian touch."[11] A ruler, according to Confucius, "should observe the established ceremonies, and offer all sacrifices in accordance with the rites, and then all else will go well into the world."[12]

To behave morally required considerable regard for personal relations. Among these personal relations were two kinds of guanxi, or "connections." The gentry, who were "free 'literati'" but had family members serving as government officials[13] or "returned officials,"[14] gained access to the

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(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964.), pp.148-9.

[10]. Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme, trans. H.M. Wright and ed. Arthur F. Wright, (New Haven: Yale university Press, 1964), p.11.

[11]. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p.47.

[12]. Wolfram Aberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.36.

[13] Wolfram Eberhard, p.73. Since "gentry" is a borrowed foreign term, Ping-ti Ho alerts his readers to the fact that "the most important determinant of English gentry status was landed property and sometimes other forms of wealth" but that "there is danger in borrowing it as a generic term for the Chinese class of officials and potential officials who ... owed their status only partly to wealth but mostly to an academic degree." See Ping-ti Ho, "Social Mobility in China Since the Fourteenth Century," (from Ping Ti-Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp.40-43,

bureaucracy and had influence in the administration. Another kind of connection was between clans and government officials, which made it possible for clans to exert pressure upon the bureaucracy in favour of their narrow interests.[15] Guanxi was never thought to be unethical as it carried a human touch by facilitating the informal relationships that could be crucial in accomplishing meaningful bureaucratic goals.

Emphasis on morality has led to a unusually high reputation given to qingquan (moral and clean officials). Ancient China's administrative system fused the local judiciary and the executive -- administrators were also judges. This system "made it easier for the emperor to control the judiciary."[16] On the other hand, a complaint against corrupt local officials was dispatched only if the case was handled by a qingquan. Quite often, bureaucratic abuse of power was dealt with by an imperial commissioner from the Central Government who happened to be a qingquan. As a result, qinquan was a useful way to maintain ethical bureaucratic

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51-52, 256-62.) in James T.C. liu and Wei-ming Tu, eds., Traditional China (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970), p.64.

[14] Hsiao-tung Fei, China's Gentry: Essays on Rural-Urban Relations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), p.32.

[15]. James B. Parsons, "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces," in Charles O. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming Times (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p.227.

[16]. Zhang Jinfan, p.190.

bahaviour before bureaucratic corruption spun out of control.

Even the well-known civil service examination system in traditional China was based more on morality than merit. The system was named keju zhidu (literally translated as the "category selection" system) in A.D. 606 when Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 581-618) set up the category of jinshi.[17] The keju system did not lead to a competent administration because examinations had little to do with administrative skills. The examination system during the Ming and Qing Dynasties required that the candidates write bagu essays, topics of which were selected from the Four Books and the Five Classics,[18] all of which stress the importance of moral standards and moral behaviour.

Traditional China's obsession with morality was reinforced by the Communists for several reasons including Mao's distrust of a professional and rigid bureaucracy. His "enthusiasm for dispensing with basic governmental institutions"[19] enhanced the role of ideology in government and enabled the CCP to follow the traditional Chinese model of administration. In addition, the newly established Leninist regime in Moscow provided a example of controling the government bureaucracy by means of ideology. The Soviet model illustrated the importance of having an obedient administrative apparatus as a useful tool of policy implementation in the ruling party's hands. The Chinese Communists saw the Soviet model as a full-blown alternative to the western ideal of bureaucracy.

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[17] Mao Lirui, Ju Junong and Shao Heting, Zhongguo Gudai Jiaoyu Shi (A History of Education in Ancient China) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), p.247.

[18] The Four Books are The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects of Confucius, and Mencius. The Five Classics are The Book of Songs, The Books of History, The Book of Changes, The Book of Rites, and The Spring and Autumn Annals.

[19] Lucien W. Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981), p.75.

Consequently, while determined to create a new administrative system capable of accomplishing the task of modernizing China, the Chinese Communists were developing an administrative apparatus which would not be a Weberian-type of bureaucracy. It would be a moral administration with an emphasis on ethics rather than administrative efficiency. Efforts to create such an administrative system were noticeable from the beginning when the Chinese Communists experimented with a new type of government in the fall of 1931.

They settled in Jiangxi Province where they founded the "Provisional Soviet Government," "evolved an administrative system," and "developed all the attributes of a state."[20] After being defeated in the fifth military encirclement launched by the Nationalists in 1934, the CCP left on the Long March and one year later arrived in Shanxi, where they established their own administrative system -- the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area Government.

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[20] Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.1.

Communist-controlled governments were also established in other areas. They had smaller jurisdictions, less population and were less stable. However, their administrative practices were largely modeled after the "Provisional Soviet Government" or the Shan-Gan-Ning Border Area Government. Therefore this study looks mainly into these two governments, which provided valuable experiences for the CCP and prepared the Party for running a vast nation.

The government structures set up by the Communists were intended for the mobilization of the peasantry against the traditional social structure. To achieve this goal, the Communists decided to maintain and reinforce the ideological adherence of recruits to the cause whether they were peasants or western educated intellectuals. The Communists also endeavoured to establish a new code of bureaucratic behaviour which emphasized biaoxian.[21] Consequently, distrust of professional bureaucracy, the resultant tight control over it, and a reliance on ideology and mobilization of populace in policy-implementation became two main features of the newly established governments run by the Communists.

The CCP's control over bureaucracy was obvious even in the early 1930s. "The Party exercised civil authority through its Central Bureau for Soviet Areas, the highest authority ... for the Provisional Central Soviet Government" in Jiangxi. Party branches were employed "to supervise the formation of ... local governments."[22] Party cadres were placed in charge of government affairs so that Party control could prevent recalcitrant bureaucratic behaviour and ensure a prompt implementation of its policies.

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[21] The literal translation of the word is "performance." In Chinese context, however, it refers more to political performance rather than to technical performance.

In addition to personnel arrangement, ideology was another important means of keeping bureaucrats under control. When cadre-training institutes were established in Jiangxi, they included schools for administrative and ideological work. The cadre school for ideological work, first called the Marxist-Communist School and later the Central Party School, was founded in 1933 in Jiangxi. The administrative school produced cadres for various levels of government. This kind of political indoctrination and training helped to place "generally capable men in key positions at all levels of the Communist infrastructure" and more importantly, produced a bureaucracy with predictable behaviour that "enabled the Chinese Communist movement to continue against overwhelming odds."[23]

It should be pointed out that the new administration established by the Communists, though well controlled, was far from professionally competent. During the Yanan (Yenan) Period, a key problem in shaping an administrative structure appropriate to the CCP's goals was the lack of qualified personnel. "The overwhelming majority" of local cadres were politically committed but "innocent both of revolutionary ideology and of the workings of stable administration." However, this did not seem to be the Communist leaders' main concern. Other concerns were more urgent. The original leaders from the local partisans, though having "extensive revolutionary and military experience," were not "versed in Marxist-Leninist theory." Students from other parts of China were drawn to Yanan and formed part of "the pool of potential leaders and administrators." But they seldom had revolutionary experience.[24] Therefore, ideological education was necessary to make sure that they "reorient their thinking and leadership in the pursuit of new revolutionary goals."[25] Administrators' professional skills were secondary in comparison with their ideological commitment.

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[22] James Pinckney Harrison, The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-72 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp.202-3.

[23] James Pinckney Harrison, p.207.

The Yanan period witnessed the growing importance of mass involvement in policy implementation. Examples include: sending intellectual cadres to isolated communities; motivating the peasantry in the struggle against the landlord class (a power base for the old regime); altering the agrarian pattern through the cooperative movement; creating a self-sufficient economy based on cooperative and participatory principles; and achieving a social, economic and cultural transformation through popular education movement.[26] The most conspicuous political movement during that period was the rectification movement of 1942-44, which "became the model of countless future campaigns."[27]

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[24] Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.145-6.

[25] Ibid., p.207.

The rectification movement "was directed toward building a unified party committed to common ideas, methods, and goals," with emphasis "on creative adaptation to the unique problems and need of a revolutionary China and people's war."[28] This adaptation was done through exposing the errors in all cadres, criticising their shortcomings, and reevaluating their work in an environment of critical self-examination under the guidance of special committees. The result was positive from the Party's standpoint. The rectification movement "strengthened commitment to the party and particularly to its revolutionary ideals."[29]

The Yanan period in the CCP's history was one which saw the linking of a mass political campaign with the upgrading of the cadres' revolutionary commitment. The rectification movement made a great contribution to the Chinese Communist movement by enshrining the mass movement as one of the Party's indispensable means of maintaining a desirable behaviour among its cadres.

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[26]. For details of the Yanan way see Mark Selden, pp.208-76.

[27] James Pinckney Harrison, p.322.

[28] Mark Selden, p.190.

[29] Ibid., p.196.

That is why the Communists felt confident in managing state affairs when they assumed power over mainland China in 1949. They knew the importance of ideology in state administration. They discovered an unusual method of dealing with bureaucracy -- the mass political campaign. They had learned how to control the administrative machinery. The CCP started to remould the administrative system in accordance with their vision of government.

A cadre system based on morality rather than merit

PRC's administrative machinery was not staffed through merit. The administrative practices in the Liberated Areas provided the Chinese Communists with useful experiences and prepared them for running the most populous country in the world.

The administrative machinery of the PRC is complex. In 1949, the Central Government comprised thirty-five functional departments. This number varied, ranging from thirty-three in 1970 to ninety-eight in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The structural reform of the State Council in 1982 brought the figure down to fifty-two.[30]

The administrative system is centralized. Three levels of administration -- province, county and township -- are organized under the central government.[31] The administrative units at the provincial level include twenty-two provinces, three municipalities directly under the Central Government, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, and five Autonomous Regions, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi Zhuang, Tibet, Ninxia Hui and Xinjiang Uigur. There are 2,137 administrative units at the county level. Between them are 209 prefectures or their equivalents.[32] They are, however, only representative agencies of the provincial or autonomous region governments.[33] Townships are the administrative units at the lowest level. More than 7,500 of them had been officially established by 1986.[34]

The PRC's administration was successful in reaching several goals. As "the force of the core leading our course forward,"[35] the CCP, "an organizational hero" and a "party of a new type" in Kenneth Jowitt's terms,[36] established a morally-based and therefore well-controlled government administration. This goal was achieved by organizational and ideological means.

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[30]. Xueshu Luntan, No.2, 1983, p.58; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.2, 1983.

[31]. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Article 30, Beijing Review, Vol.25, No.52, December 27, 1982, pp.15-16.

[32]. Baike Zhishi, No.3, 1982, pp.10-13; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.6, 1982, pp.36-38.

[33]. It is argued that the nation is actually divided into four administrative levels with prefecture being one of them. Shehui Baozhang Bao, November 6, 1986. See RMRB (Overseas Edition), December 6, 1986.

[34]. RMRB (Overseas Edition), February 23, 1987.

Organizationally, the executive branch of the government faces no challenge from the legislature and judiciary. According to the 1978 constitution, the state structure of the PRC included three major components: the National People's Congress, the State Council, and the People's Courts and Procuratorates.[37] This may remind people of the principle of checks and balances in some Western democracies whereby each branch of government checks the others. But such a similarity is superficial -- basic differences exist between the Chinese and Western systems. The legislature and judiciary in the PRC did not exist to, and could not, check the executive body. In theory, the National People's Congress was the highest organ of state power and exercised the legislative power of the state. In practice, its function was "to symbolize the regime's legitimacy and popular base rather than to chart the political course of the country."[38]

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[35]. Mao Zedong, in Stuart R. Schram, ed., Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), p.i.

[36] Kenneth Jowitt, The Leninist Response to National Dependency (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), p.36.

[37] I refer to the PRC's 1978 constitution because this chapter reviews China's administrative system before Deng initiated reform. For a detailed description of the state structure of the PRC before Deng's reforms see Chapter Two of "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, Vol.21, No.11, March 17, 1978, pp.9-13.

The 1978 constitution did not mention independence of the people's courts and the people's procuratorates. On the other hand, it emphasized the role of the masses in administering justice. Unable to exercise judicial power independently, the judiciary could not oversee the other branches of the government.

The State Council was the executive body of the highest organ of state power. It was the highest organ of state administration. A weak legislature and a weak judiciary allowed the executive body to become the most powerful institution among the three parts of state structure. Performing vast functions, the executive was the Party's tool.

To ensure that this highest organ of state administration follows the Party's directives, the CCP established an interlocking structure of the government and Party. A Party hierarchy paralleled the government hierarchy. Some form of Party organization was established alongside every level of state organ. In each level of government, Party organizations, rather than state institutions had the final voice. To this end, the governmental structure was interpenetrated by Party members. Many Party cadres were assigned overlapping roles in both hierarchies but were primarily responsible for the implementation of Party directives.

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[38] James R. Townsend & Brantly Womack, Politics in China, 3rd Ed., (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1986), p.100.

Fred Riggs' concern for the relative weakness of political organs in transitional societies does not apply to China.[39] To quote Samuel Huntington, "The triumph of the revolution is the triumph of party government."[40] The mastery of the CCP over the art of association has not only terminated the nation's history of being a "sheet of loose sand" but also spurred formalization and institutionalization of the Party's power in the People's Republic. Huntington writes that:

> The ability to create public organizations and political institutions is in short supply in the world today. It is this ability which, above all else, the Communists offer modernizing countries.[41]

Government in dynastic China was by royal families or the "mandarinate."[42] Government in Communist-led China is "by political institutions, not social forces."[43] Parallel hierarchy, more than anything else, formalizes the power of the Party over every possible area of society.

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[39]. For Riggs' view see Fred W. Riggs, in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., p.120.

[40]. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p.315.

[41] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," in Henry Bienen, ed., The Military and Modernization (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton Inc., 1971), p.190.

[42] Etienne Balazs, p.16.

[43] Samuel P.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p.341.

Parallel hierarchy allows the Party to control the government. A. Doak Barnett's exploration of Chinese bureaucracy highlights the interplay of Party and government. He states that "the Party constitutes the elite of the elite, and monopolizes ultimate policy and decision making authority."[44] Further, the Party "has not simply supervised the ruling of things but has tended to step in and run them itself."[45] The Party has secured an unchallenged position vis-a-vis the government. It has displayed extraordinary skill in enforcing discipline on cadres and eliciting positive commitments from them. As a result, "many traditional patterns of behaviour associated with bureaucrats in China, including endemic corruption, nepotism, and factionalism, appear to have been kept under effective control."[46] It is safe to state that prior to the reforms of the 1980s China had a basically honest administration thanks to the Party's supervision of bureaucracy through parallel hierarchy.

The CCP also used ideology to control bureaucracy. The Party stressed zhengzhi guashuai (putting politics in command).[47] Emanating from Marxist analysis of matter and consciousness, which argues that as a historical element ideology "can react on its environment and even on the causes that have given rise to it,"[48] zhengzhi guashuai is an indispensable tool for the Party to control the bureaucracy.

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[44] A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) p.429.

[45] Ibid., p.430.

[46] Ibid., pp.434-5.

[47] The term did not receive public criticism until recently. A high-ranking army official pointed out that "the slogan 'politics takes command' cannot precisely and properly

Zhengzhi guashuai has made the issue of being both "red and expert" an essential criterion in personnel management. That is, cadres should be politically loyal and professionally competent. Literally, being "red and expert" gives equal weight to ideological purity and technical knowledge. In practice the former is much more important. The authorities believed that ideology insures a faithful army of cadres for policy-implementation. As a result, recruitment into the civil service was based more on Party membership than on advanced education. Political loyalty became an essential qualification for administrators. In the People's Republic, only Party officials could be appointed to high positions in the bureaucracy. Ferrel Heady interprets the phenomenon as

> a desire to curb bureaucratic power, combined with reluctant acceptance of the inevitable need to maintain a state bureaucratic apparatus [and also] a determination to politicize the bureaucracy and make it

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indicate the relationship between politics and economy, consciousness and matter, political work and other work. For a long period of time it has become a synonym of massive political movement" and should be disused. See RMRB, July 23, 1984.

[48] Friedrich Engels, "To Franz Mehring," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), p.767.

responsive to Party direction.[49]

Emphasis on ideological loyalty has boosted the informal power of Party members, who allegedly were more reliable politically and pure ideologically. Though not positioned in the government hierarchy, many Party officials exercised power over government agencies. The Party's Head of Propaganda is not a government official but his power exceeds that of the Minister of Culture. This picture is true at each level of the hierarchy. Within a government institution, a subordinate, if holding Party membership, may ignore or challenge his boss who is not a Party member. Take for example the relationship between a non-Communist Director of a Bureau *(juzhang)* and a Communist Section Head *(chuzhang)*. The former, though occupying a higher bureaucratic position, must listen to the latter.[50] Other examples abound.

Ideology and organization have become the two indispensable means for the CCP to build a new political system. Franz Schurmann observed that "Ideology and organization have arisen in China because a traditional social system no longer existed to give unity to the society."[51] Ideology and organization united a disintegrating society and held together "a vast building made of different kinds of brick and stone."[52] A key element in holding this network together was that the Party has effectively controlled the government bureaucracy and made it the Party's obedient tool.

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[49] Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative perspective* (New York: Mercel Dekker, Inc., 1979), p.375.

[50] See Qian Jiaqu, *Qishi Nian de Jingli* (Experiences in the Seventy Years) (Hong Kong: The Mirror Post Cultural Enterprises Co. Ltd., 1986), p.210. A party member's informal power did not disappear even in the 1980s. For example, a Director of a Bureau in Nanjing City questioned the authority of non-Communist Vice-Mayor by asking: "I represent the Party, but whom does he represent?" See *RMRB*, March 13, 1983.

The PRC's morally-based administration also featured the Central dominance of local governments. This was achieved by way of "democratic centralism" and dual leadership. The CCP believes in "democratic centralism." Its 1977 Constitution stipulates that "The whole Party must adhere to the organizational principle of democratic centralism and practise centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance."[53] The 1978 Constitution of the PRC echoes this idea when it states that "all ... organs of state practise democratic centralism."[54]

As an organizational principle, democratic centralism has two inseparable components: centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. These two components imply considerable control of local government. Local initiative, if not approved by the Centre, can be attacked as an attempt to build an "independent kingdom." Enthusiasm from the bottom, if not favoured by the top, can be condemned as anarchy.

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[51] Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p.1.

[52] Ibid.

[53] "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," Peking Review, Vol.20, No.36, September 2, 1977, P.17. I refer to the CCP's 1977 constitution because this chapter reviews China's administrative system before Deng initiated reform. The principle of democratic centralism remains in the CCP's 1982 constitution, which helps to explain why post-Mao reforms have failed to solve old problems while creating new ones.

[54] "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, Vol.21, No.11, March 17, 1978, p.6.

Indeed, practice in the years after the founding of the PRC indicated that the authorities often stressed the noun rather than the adjective. Democracy could not be discussed without being related to centralism. Centralism, on the other hand, was emphasized repeatedly as necessary. The main purpose of democratic centralism was to solidify a centralized structure and secure the supremacy of leaders. By underscoring this principle, leading cadres have always dictated orders to subordinate administrative units and requested full implementation of these directives. Meanwhile, local officials, afraid of being accused of violating democratic centralism, chose to follow, though often perfunctorily, their superiors' orders.

All the functional departments at or below the provincial level operate under dual leadership. On one hand, these departments are subject to the leadership of governments at or below the provincial level. On the other hand, these departments are also subject to the vertical leadership of corresponding government departments at the higher level.[55]

Dual leadership secures central control over local government. A student of regionalism in the early years of the PRC, Dorothy Solinger, noticed the contradiction between local initiative and unification. She observes that "the dichotomy may have to be resolved in the direction of unification: whatever can be made uniform is to be made to conform."[56] Nevertheless, since the horizontal leadership is basically political and the vertical one is largely professional, the latter invariably gives way to the former whenever they clash. Dual leadership has tipped the balance in favour of local governments. As a result, Party committees at or below the provincial levels have a strong voice over their functional department's business. Central control can thus only materialize through the Party organizations at various levels.

The PRC's morally-based administration was achieved with the help of mass campaigns which served two purposes. One was to check the performance of government bureaucrats. The other was to mobilize the masses for policy implementation.

Harry Harding suggests four approaches to the problem of checking bureaucratic behaviour. The "rationalist" approach stresses the merits of bureaucratization on the one hand and ignores the existence of organizational, social, or political flaws inherent in the structural principles of bureaucracy on the other.[57] The "radical" approach dreams of destroying the bureaucracy and replacing it with a non-bureaucratic organization.[58] "External remedialism" wants "to subject bureaucracy to effective outside supervision and control."[59] "Internal remedialism" tries to inject "nonbureaucratic elements into the staffing and operations of the bureaucracy with the intent of alleviating some of the problems that emerge in purely bureaucratic organization."[60]

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[55] "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu Zhuzhifa" (The Organizational Law of the PRC's Local People's Congresses and Governments at Various Levels), Article 40. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzhi Fagui Xuanbian (Selected Organizational Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Jingji Kexue Chubanshe, 1985), p.156.

[56] Dorothy J. Solinger, Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.30.

Although all four of the approaches to the bureaucratic dilemma were adopted in China in recent history,[61] Harding singles out internal remedialism as "the centre of gravity of Chinese Communist organizational policy."[62] In addition, due to their "distrust of any form of supervision that is not controlled by the Party," Chinese leaders were "limited in their use of external remedialism".[63] As a result, it was internal mechanisms that have determined the performance of the huge Chinese bureaucracy.[64] These internal mechanisms usually took the form of mass political campaigns. Techniques of mass mobilization were employed to raise cadres' revolutionary fervour, to prevent the reemergence of 'bourgeois' values, and to preclude the erosion of revolutionary momentum. Mass mobilization made it essential to use the Party cells within the government bureaucracy as effective "political combat organizations."[65]

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[57] Harry Harding, Organizing China, p.14.

[58] Ibid., p.15.

[59] Ibid., p.16.

[60] Ibid., p.17.

[61] Ibid., p.329.

[62] Ibid., p.333.

[63] Ibid., p.335.

As an advocate of "uninterrupted revolution," Mao favoured mass campaigns. He said that:

> Our revolutions come one after another.... For a considerable period of time to come [problems] will continue to be solved by annual bloom-contend-rectify-reform campaigns.... Our revolutions are like battles. After a victory, we must at once put forward a new task. In this way, cadres and the masses will forever be filled with revolutionary fervour, instead of conceit.[66]

Political campaigns were a way of raising commitment and motivation among the cadres. However, campaigns also involved almost every Chinese citizen and were "aimed at the twin goals of attacking a particular political or social issue and mobilizing popular resources under CCP leadership."[67] The authorities attempted to elevate class consciousness among the public and thereby mobilize them for the dual purposes of transforming the old society and consolidating the new regime. In the process the CCP resorted to "self-conscious utilization of class conflicts."[68] As Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush described, the preferred method of policy-implementation in the PRC was mobilization of the populace and class struggle, often characterized by political fanaticism, rather than rule by bureaucratic expertise.[69]

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[64] Ibid., p.337.

[65] For more about the concept see Jeremy T. Paltiel, "The Cult of Personality: Some Comparative Reflections on Political Culture in Leninist Regimes," Studies in Comparative Communism, Spring and Summer 1983, pp.49-64.

[66]. Jerome Ch'en, Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.62-3.

This morally-based administrative system in the PRC has had several weaknesses. One of these was lack of administrative competence. The PRC's administrative system, like its many predecessors, was based on political criteria rather than knowledge and expertise. It was also required by the tasks the new regime had to carry out. When the regime's priority was to consolidate the new political order and to transform the old society, politically loyal cadres were much more important than technically competent administrators. The CCP's emphasis on ideological rather than technical standards in staffing the administrative apparatus has resulted in a technically less competent government bureaucracy. As "red" was placed over "expert," few of the nation's "best and brightest" could be assigned to administrative positions. In the meantime, many of the professionals in the bureaucracy who were not considered to be "red" were sent to the front line of production. Schurmann observed, for example, how professionals in the national bureaucracy were ruthlessly attacked and dismissed from their positions through intensive propaganda of ideology during the three years of the Great Leap Forward period.[70]

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[67] James R. Townsend & Brantly Womack, Politics in China, p.110.

[68]. A. Doak Barnett, p.443.

[69]. Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972-1982," Problems of Communism, September/October 1982, No.5. p.15.

A second weakness of the PRC's administration was lack of responsiveness to the public. Emphasis on democratic centralism often resulted in local needs being ignored. All regional governments must listen to decisions made by the leaders at the top level. All provinces should subordinate their needs to those of the Central Government. Meanwhile, centralism also gives a cadre on the higher level of the government hierarchy power over those lower down. Therefore, centralization of authority resulted in enormous power wielded by local Party and government officials within their jurisdictions. Most of these "local emperors" (tu huangdi) rarely bothered to respond to the public's needs unless they were forced from above.

Mass campaigns have had several ill effects. First, repeated campaigns divert enthusiasm in society from constructive programs. Second, class struggle casts a shadow over interpersonal relationships and generates distrust among people. Mandatory participation in the campaigns forced people to expose one another's shortcomings and errors, breaking up their camaraderie. This benefited elite control over society but undermined progress and prosperity. Third, the CCP's attempts to manipulate social forces not only mischanneled the limited reservoir of specialized talent but also misscheduled non-priority tasks.[71] In addition, though effective in mobilizing a huge population, these campaigns were "often extremely disruptive of more regularized and routinized governmental functions."[72] As a result, the "stable balance wheel"[73] supposedly provided by the Chinese bureaucracy was often missing in national administration.

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[70] Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, pp.71.

The PRC's administration also had to address the problem of the links between informal connections and formal procedures. Lucian Pye blamed guanxi (connections) for "an extraordinary element of uncertainty in Chinese politics."[74]

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[71] A. Doak Barnett, p.437.

[72] Ibid., pp.437-8.

[73] Ezra F. Vogel, "Politicized Bureaucracy: Communist China," in Fred W. Riggs, ed., Frontiers of Development Administration (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1971), p.567.

[74]. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981), pp.130-1.

Actually guanxi is a cause and a consequence of uncertainty in Chinese politics. The uncertainty in Chinese politics has forced cadres to knit networks of informal connections in order to survive in ruthless political struggles and to gain access to key figures in the huge administrative apparatus.

As described by Pye, Mao understood:

> "the 'dangers' inherent in the institutionalization of governmental administration, which tend to produce inter-elite conflicts, clashes of interests, and loyalties that are not focused solely on the paramount leader."

Mao also excelled at "suppressing the potential danger of factions forming out of institutional interests."[75]
His dislike for institutionalization and preference for personal loyalty has set an example and led to various networks of guanxi, the role of which grew over years.

Connections are made now not only through the clan as in the past but through common CCP experiences. They were formed through common experiences in the Long March (1934-5), the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-45), and the War of Liberation (1945-9). Those who worked underground together in the White Area (the Guomingdang-controlled area) established connections through joint struggle. So did those in the Red Area (the Liberated Area). The young men and women sent by the Party to study in the Soviet Union also developed close bonds. The "Cultural Revolution" created many factions and added more networks of guanxi to the nation's administrative system. An old comrade-in-arms, old colleague, old superior, or old subordinate can be a key to the settling of matters. Connections can rescue a cadre in deep trouble because the network may provide access and influence to someone in charge of the case. Connections can also help an official who is unable to accomplish his assignment through normal bureaucratic channels. As a result, administration has become increasingly personalized as networks keep growing and expanding, even though it is often many years before a network established close connections. Tremendous efforts will be required to unweave this man-made web of guanxi.

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[75] Lucian Pye, p.88.

Emphasis on formalities was another weakness of the PRC's administration. Studying political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems, Kenneth Jowitt noticed that "ritual was regarded as both substance and form." Zhengzhi guashuai led to the wide use of rituals in China because rituals not only provide a new mode in which one's political loyalty can be manifested but also help imbue the people with the new political doctrine. Therefore, Jowitt attributed ritualism in Marxist-Leninist regimes to their "identity-defining experiences," and "the adoption of a Stalinist approach to social transformation and political consolidation."[76]

As the authorities resorted to rituals in realizing social transformation and political consolidation, the cadres also discovered other merits of rituals. Government officials often turned to formalities as a means for survival. Formalities have made it possible for people to pretend to be politically loyal while avoiding the accusation of political passiveness. Formalities have also allowed cadres to deal with "crash programmes" perfunctorily in campaign-style policy-implementation.

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[76]. Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," APSR, Vol.68, September 1974, No.3. P.1185.

The CCP's efforts to establish a new administrative system have had unanticipated effects. A major unanticipated consequence was the degeneration of the Communists' system of political mobilization. As Andrew Walder suggests, the root cause of the degenration lies in its very structure:

> in its principled particularism, in its favoured treatment of activist-clients, in its demand for political loyalty, and in the wide personal discretion necessary in the exercise of its rewards and punishments.[77]

This structure together with its shortcomings was inevitable due to the authorities' emphasis on moral values in establishing a new administrative system. The CCP attempted to pursue new goals in its rebuilding of the administration. The unintended consequences of these efforts, however, have translated the Party's vision of a new administration into a unanticipated reality -- a product of neo-traditionalism in Walder's term. As a result, a special type of bureaucrat -- a

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[77] Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), p.220.

Chinese organizational man -- was born in Communist China.

The Chinese organizational man

Max Weber portrayed a "pure type" of bureaucratic official.[78] Herbert Simon described the "administrative man" of "bounded rationality."[79] Peter Blau and Michel Crozier depicted a bureaucrat's informal behaviour.[80] Anthony Downs saw a bureaucrat as a man of biases.[81] This section examines a typical Chinese bureaucrat, whom I label the "Chinese organizational man." The "Chinese organizational man" has the following features.

1. An organizational man avoids organizational errors.

For China's bureaucrats, technical errors are forgivable but political errors may be fatal in career terms. The wise official is cautious.

Political errors are deviations from, or opposition to, Party policy. Organizational errors mean disobedience or defiance of one's superior. In most cases, errors of both kinds coincide. Siding against one's boss suggests departing from the Party line. Different situations arise, however. A bureaucrat has to choose between the two options: either to criticize the boss and implement the Party's overall plans or to follow the boss despite the Party's general principles.

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[78] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans., A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp.329-340.

[79]. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour, p.xxxi.

[80]. Peter M. Blau & W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962). Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon.

[81]. Anthony Downs, pp.77-78.

Where the boss of an unit exercises tight control over his subordinates and enjoys strong informal connections at upper levels of hierarchy, most subordinates will defer. They do so because they realize their "economic and social dependence on the enterprise" and their "political dependence on the party and management" and more importantly, their "personal dependence on supervisors."[82] They are not concerned with whether the superior is right or wrong. They care only about their own security, which hinges not on the Party but on their superior as its incarnation. Therefore, there exist numerous "independent kingdoms" within China's administration. As a consequence, putting central policies into effect at the grassroots level is a lengthy and difficult process.

2. An organizational man knows the importance of informal organizations.

Bureaucrats know that the mentor-protege relationship offers more safety than the superior-subordinate relationship. Elliot Jaques claimed that formal organizations, which he labels "the high-P-high-D role systems," are relatively permanent and detached while informal organizations, which he dubs "the high-P-low-D role systems," are relatively permanent and undetachable.[83] The mentor-protege relationship is part of the informal organization. It is sought because of its undetachability but also for its proximity to power and protection against being hurt. As a result, a bureaucrat under "protective umbrella" provided by his informal "back-stage boss" could be more influential than the bureaucrat's formal position suggested. This was especially so in China because of the previously mentioned parallel hierarchy and the Party's dominance in the administrative system.

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[82]. Andrew G. Walder, p.12.

Informal organization is crucial in a bureaucrat's dealing with clients. For example, Kenneth Liberthal and Michel Oksenberg studied Chinese bureaucratic politics so as to enable American businessmen to work more effectively with the PRC. The two scholars alerted the U.S. businessmen to the importance of Chinese officials' stature, which resulted, among other things, from "close association with a higher level leader" and helped to acquire "the degree of access to the power elite."[84] In other words, a bureaucrat's informal "back-stage boss" is as important as his own formal position.

Informal organization provides an informal "back-stage boss" who is essential for a bureaucrat in winning respect from his colleagues and superiors. Wang Daming, Deputy Head of the Department of Propaganda in Beijing in early 1960s, became a celebrity thanks to his association with Deng Xiaoping through playing bridge. The mentor-protege relationship between Deng and Wang was resumed after the "Cultural Revolution." Wang's superiors played up to him because with his help they could access the nation's paramount leader. By the same token, Wang's colleagues curried favour with him. Wang was pleased with his stature until it was challenged and lost in a less controlled election.[85]

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[83]. Elliot Jaques, A General Theory of Bureaucracy (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), p.31.

[84]. Kenneth Liberthal & Michel Oksenberg, Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Energy Development (Washington: U.S. Government Printing House, 1986), p.14.

The informal "protective umbrella" provided by the informal organization has been a problem for China's public administration. Policy-implementation was undermined because officials tended to pay more attention to informal connections than to formal superior-subordinate relationships.[86] Second, bureaucrats often reciprocated the informal protection by satisfying the needs of the informal boss. The slogan "to serve the people" could be seen almost everywhere across the nation but was practised less and less seriously. Third, informal "protective umbrellas" often rendered bureaucrats exempt from formal supervision. Bureaucratic misbehaviour became difficult to restrain.

3. An organizational man sees administration as an

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[85]. Changchuan, "Deng Xiaoping Qinxin Guanchang Pengbi" ("The Ups and Downs of a Deng Xiaoping's Protege"), Zheng Ming, February 1988, pp.14-15.

[86]. For examples see Liu Binyan and Liu Guosheng, "Wuxing de Jiqi" (An Intangible Machine), RMRB, February 8, 1984.

organization rather than as a profession.

Susan Shirk called the Chinese regime a "virtuocracy" because the regime awards life chances to the virtuous. In a virtuocracy, "a person's moral worth remains a major criterion" in occupational selection and promotion.[87] This led to the perception of administration as an organization, not a profession. Naturally, organizational loyalty is more important than professional qualifications. Emphasis in personnel management has been placed on seniority rather than merit. Though incompetent, a bureaucrat can still be promoted as long as he stays in the position and commits no error. His political performance is deemed more significant than his professional accomplishment. Qian Jiaqu, an economist who was assigned to a high government position, admitted that if he "was sated with food and remained idle, obeyed the Party and accomplished nothing," he would have been deemed a model cadre.[88]

Emphasis on seniority therefore led to a system of rewarding indolence and punishing diligence. Here is the main reason why bureaucrats preferred to idle away their time. Several other factors, all of which made organizational loyalty more important than professional skills, also sustained the system. First, political campaigns in the past decades always had those who committed errors as targets for attack. In order to survive these frequent political storms, one must avoid mistakes. As long as one could steer clear of being victimized and manage to keep one's personal file undefiled, one's chance of keeping a job was good.

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[87] Susan L. Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p.4.

[88]. Qian Jiaqu, p.210.

Second, in order to show "redness," bureaucrats were tempted to flatter their bosses, to shout slogans and to discredit their rivals. Illiteracy became an asset because it indicated his proletarian and hence revolutionary family background.[89] On the other hand, expertise requires devotion to technical knowledge and professional work and drives one toward vocational achievement. This also means less attention to political activities.

Third, the absolute authority of the Party's leadership implies the Party's infallibility. The Party is not challengeable. From this statement, it is deduced that the boss in a work unit who represents the Party is not challengeable either. A new way of thinking or an innovative method of work, however, could often differ from what the boss has in mind and might therefore not be to his liking. A boss's disfavour almost invariably leads to disgrace and the eventual loss of job.[90] Why should one bother to hazard his career by courting resentment?

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[89]. See Qian Jiaqu, p.253.

[90]. For examples see Liu Binyan and Yuan Chunqian, "Baiyi xia de Wugou" (Filth under the White Clothes), RMRB, February 25, 1984.

Fourth, the "iron rice-bowl" system guarantees a lifelong job for an office-holder, provided he commits no serious errors. Chinese leaders thought that one of the advantages of socialism was the full employment obtained through those "iron rice-bowls." The Chinese authorities were, however, oblivious to the ill effects of life tenure. The unbroken "rice-bowl" suggests an interminable retention of a position and also implies automatic promotion based on seniority. As a result of this system of upward-only movement in personnel management, a bureaucrat feels no need to upgrade himself. Instead, he patiently awaits his promotion.

4. An organizational man protects his own organization with the help of formalities.

Due to a lack of professional qualifications, a Chinese bureaucrat's zeal for formalism is high. To avoid being criticized as incompetent, he often submits palatable reports. He focuses his attention on window dressings. He makes flashy and unsubstantial scenes instead of doing solid work.

Several factors have given rise to bureaucratic formalism in China. As described earlier, one of the legacies from imperial China is ritualism. In dynastic China, much attention was given to imperial ceremony in order to manifest a ruler's Mandate of Heaven.[91] In contemporary China, efforts were made to emphasize formalities in order to maintain the authority of organizational leaders at various levels. Thus, regular political lectures to the masses were less for ideological indoctrination than for reinforcing the speaker's image as an authority figure. Many attending these meetings simply slept through them. "Going down to the grassroots units" was less aimed at acquainting oneself with the situation there than with displaying one's superiority. These trips often resulted in a superficial understanding.

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[91] Frederic Wakemen, Jr., The Fall of Imperial China (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p.57.

Penchant for formalism hides the cadres' inadequate education. Low literacy among cadres has made it difficult for them to comprehend and evaluate the technical content of their administrative assignments. It is much easier for uneducated officials to accept, emulate and develop formalities, i.e., formal procedures, as the primary means of administration. Formalities do not require formal education to put them to use. Formalities take less time and less effort to work out. Formalities are more perceptible than substance. In sum, formalities suit ill-educated bureaucrats' taste and are by no means beyond their abilities.

Third, stressing formalities caters to the senior officials who have received little professional training. Pleasing them reduces a bureaucrat's chance of falling into disfavour. As a result, cadres across the nation took a part in the so-called "steel-making by the entire people" in 1958 without laying bare the absurdity of the myth. Likewise, few had the audacity to refrain from the impossible venture of producing five tons of grain per mu.[92] If Mao and some other top leaders believed the modern version of Arabian Nights or at least admired these fruitless formalities, why shouldn't the rest of us?[93]

Finally, China's public administration is fraught with "crash programmes," designed to fight quick battles and gain instant results. Pressure from above is great. Carrying out these programmes is, however, often more complicated than anticipated. Reality down on earth is not easy to transform. Caught in a dilemma between the superiors and cadres, bureaucrats often see "formalism" as the best option to protect their organization and themselves. As explained earlier, formalities could fool officials at higher levels. Formalities can also circumvent troubles caused by substantial changes in society.

5. An organizational man organizes society through control.

Franz Schurmann observed that in China "the state was far more oriented toward control than toward management of society."[94] Keeping his jurisdiction under control has been the primary concern for an office-holder in China. Interestingly, the Chinese words Guan (officer) and guan (discipline, manage, be in charge) sound identical except for the difference in tone. Chinese culture emphasizes that being a government official means being in control and a disciplinarian. Paternalism in traditional China led to officialdom's monopoly of power. As analyzed by Lucian Pye, China's political structure is "a self-contained system very little influenced by citizens or nongovernmental elites." Government officials have learned to respond "only to their ideas" without caring about people's needs and demands.[95]

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[92]. See Qian Jiaqu, pp.258-9. See also GMRB, May 8, 1985. Mu is a unit of area equal to 0.0667 hectares.

[93]. According to Li Rui, a former secretary of Mao, Mao did think the incredibly high yield was possible. See GMRB, May 9, 1985.

[94] According to Schurmann, "Management means operational leadership through organization, and constant directive efforts over men to achieve goals. Control means the exercise of restraint over and the checking on human beings to make

Political campaigns have also contributed to a "control type" of bureaucratic behaviour. An essential part of almost all CCP political movements is to punish those who commit organizational and political errors or who do not toe the line. Few of these campaigns aim to improve service to the people. Experience in the campaigns taught office-holders to avoid making mistakes and to seek control. As a result, the more political campaigns were launched, the more control-oriented the bureaucracy became and the more service deteriorated.

Chinese officialdom thus concerns itself with control.

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sure they are doing what is expected or are not hurting the interests of those in power." See Franz Schurmann, p.406.

[95]. Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political development (Cambridge, Mass: the M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp.13-4.

Naturally, directives from above have more to do with control. An ambitious bureaucrat, to be successful, must obey superiors, control subordinates and regulate society. Chinese authorities needed a particular type of bureaucrat when the primary goal of the state is transformation of an old society and consolidation of the new regime's power. To implement these tasks requires politically loyal, control-conscious cadres, although they might not be knowledgeable or service-concerned. Such officials are less effective when modernization calls new policies.

Conclusion

In its search for a better administrative system, the CCP was influenced by China's tradition of emphasizing morality in public administration. This orientation was noticeable in the CCP's first administrative experiments in the Liberated Areas when it was fighting for the control of the nation.

The CCP's early administrative practices provided useful experiences and prepared the Chinese Communists for running the new People's Republic through a morally-based administrative machinery. The Party secured tight control over government bureaucracy and made it an obedient tool in transforming an old society and consolidating the Party's power. The Centre has dominated local governments. The mass campaign is sometimes an effective means in policy implementation. These accomplishments enabled the revolutionary regime to achieve new goals of administration, such as bringing about radical changes, transforming society and consolidating the ruling Party's power.

The PRC's administration manifests glaring weaknesses. It is neither technically competent nor responsive to local needs.

Obviously, bureaucrats working in such an administration were politically conscious, with some of them being very committed. They felt little need for professional knowledge and expertise but maintained a basically ethical behaviour. They knew the importance of informal networks. They were concerned with control over society.

This balance between the administrative eficiency and bureaucratic behaviour in China's public administrative institutions existed until the nation's politics took a new turn. A perceived behavioural gap did not emerge until Deng reassumed his power at the end of 1978 and decided to mobilize the nation for modernization. He perceived the graveness of the problem of administration because modernization places different requirements on administration. This triggered the administrative reforms that are the subject of this dissertation. But at the outset, Deng involved the intellectuals whose role is studied in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: Intellectuals' Choice: Efficiency and Ethics

Deng Xiaoping saw the administrative system as unsuitable for the new mission of modernization. But while acknowledging the need for administrative reform, he had few clear ideas about how reform should be carried out. He knew that academic advice should be solicited but that the political values of the Party should remain unchallenged. Whether Deng and his associates could mobilize the intellectuals without challenging the status quo was an open question.

Intellectuals, as defined in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, are "the aggregate of persons in any society who employ in their communication and expression, with relatively higher frequency than most other members of their society, symbols of general scope and abstract reference, concern of man, society, nature, and the cosmos."[1] In this dissertation, the term "intellectual" describes mainly those with a university education involved in producing, manipulating, and disseminating knowledge and information but who are not full-time managers of administrative bodies. Instead, they occupy staff positions in Party or government agencies or institutions of higher education. Responding to the authorities' call to contribute to the administrative restructuring, they actively discussed reforms and made their opinions known through the media.

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[1] Edward Shils, "Intellectuals," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.7, ed. David Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p.399.

This chapter examines intellectuals' traditional roles in Chinese society. It explores their relationships with the Communist leadership prior to the reform.

The chapter also looks at how Deng motivated and mobilized intellectuals for his reform programmes. It discusses the intellectuals' response to Deng's efforts to coopt them and Deng's dilemmas.

The traditional role of intellectuals in Chinese society

Confucianism dominated Chinese society for more than two thousand years. As Y.C. Wang has observed, under the Confucian system, Chinese intellectuals performed moral, political, and socioeconomic functions.[2] They assumed roles as standard-bearers of morality, critics of the authorities, and spokesmen and protectors of the public. These roles led to a strong sense of mission. This sentiment of destiny was best demonstrated in a statement by Fan Zhongyan, a famous poet and Prime Minister of the Song Dynasty (960-1279): "A scholar worries over the world before the world worries itself; a scholar is happy only after all mankind has achieved happiness."[3]

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[2] Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West 1872-1949 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), pp.3-37.

[3] Ku-wen kuan chih (A Compilation of Ancient Famous Essays), Vol.9, (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1956), p.138.

When China was facing a Western challenge during the Opium War, a sense of mission prompted Chinese intellectuals to search for modernization. Intellectuals looked to other civilizations for solutions to China's declining status. A new generation, the "May Fourth generation," took to the street on May 4, 1919 to protest China's treatment at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. These young men and women, "more distant from the Confucian tradition" and "more radical in their cultural criticism," stood "at the forefront" of "a series of incomplete efforts to uproot feudalism while pursuing the cause of a nationalist revolution."[4]

In the wake of the May Fourth incident and as the successful October Revolution in Russia was gaining influence among Chinese intellectuals, some of them became interested in socialism. Among them was Chen Duxiu, a professor from Beijing University. Various groups for the study of socialism or Marxist theory were established. They laid the groundwork for the 1921 founding of the Chinese Communist Party which elected Chen as its first leader.

Some intellectuals were also interested in and inspired by Western democracy. As James Townsend points out:

> In the years between 1915 and 1919 there was a great spread of Western political ideas. For the first time, Chinese intellectuals began to think in more serious terms of liberation, political democracy, and free expression of

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[4] Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp.6-7.

> individual opinion.... From this time on, the great majority of Chinese intellectuals accepted the democratic ideal though they differed in their interpretation.[5]

They became "the first advocates of democratic institutions in China"[6] and believed that Western liberalism would provide some clues to China's weakening position vis-a-vis other world powers. Yan Fu, who translated works of Adam Smith, J.S. Mill, T. H. Huxley, et al., saw the economic value of liberal principles.[7] Yan and many other intellectuals were convinced that "the values necessary for national strength in the modern world were to be sought in the wisdom of Western theories and ideologies."[8]

In order to learn from western theories and ideologies, some aspiring Chinese young men and women studied abroad. According to Vera Schwarcz, they "were at once pushed out of China and pulled toward foreign countries."[9] At the same time, many children of the traditional landlord-bureaucratic elite felt less and less comfortable with such Confucian values as arranged marriages and filial piety. Foreign travel for further education was attractive because it would expose Chinese students to new values which they believed were responsible for Western economic progress. Foreign countries offered new opportunities for knowledge which might be relevant to China's salvation.

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[5] James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University Press, 1969), p.26.

[6] Ibid., p.23.

[7] John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution: 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), p.150.

[8] Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic, A Revised and Expanded Edition of Mao's China, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p.13.

[9] Vera Schwarcz, p.28.

There were also those who enrolled in Western-styled schools in China in order to learn from Western civilization. Often run by American missionaries, such schools trained Chinese students "in modern liberal-arts subjects" and moulded them "in the ideas and customs of the denominational colleges in the United States."[10]

It was conceivable that intellectuals educated in ideologies other than Marxism would differ with Chinese Communists on how to modernize China. Many Chinese intellectuals saw France, the United States, or Japan after the Meiji Restoration, as the models for China. The Chinese Communists were, however, influenced by their Soviet comrades. Most of the Chinese intellectuals emphasized the virtues of liberty and democracy and rallied around the slogans "Science" and "Democracy." The Communists stressed class struggle as the driving force behind progress and prosperity. Little wonder that the two groups found themselves on uneasy terms.

The CCP's policy of ambivalence toward intellectuals

This uneasiness was reflected in the CCP's long standing ambivalence toward intellectuals. It understood the need for expertise in the modernization process. It was also aware of their "negativist role" in the decomposition of power,[11] which was principally their role as critics. The Party's stance toward intellectuals thus alternated between support and coercion.[12] The contradictions of the Party's approach became visible in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

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[10] John King Fairbank, The Chinese Revolution, p.190.

1. Yanan period.

Merle Goldman writes that from the early 1940s, the CCP tried to indoctrinate intellectuals and to force them to follow the Party's political line.[13] The first campaign of this kind was launched in Yanan and was called the rectification movement.

The "Yanan rectification" was actually preceded by a Party resolution in 1939 on the absorption of intellectuals. The document stated that "without the participation of intellectuals, victory in the revolution will be impossible."[14] Mao declared in the same year that "the whole of the Chinese revolutionary movement found its origin in the action of young students and intellectuals who had been awakened."[15]

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[11] Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), p.43.

[12] Merle Goldman, China's Intellectuals: Advice and Dissent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p.9.

[13] Ibid., p.8.

[14] Conrad Brandt et al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p.349.

But the intellectuals who flocked to Yanan to join the Party in the early 1940s were already suspected for having smuggled bourgeois ideologies into the Party.[16] The need for the ideological remoulding became pressing. The "Yanan rectification" in 1942 was designed for this purpose. As Tang Tsou observed, "Although Mao underscored the importance of the intellectuals in the Yanan period, his dictum that literature and art are subordinate to politics showed how poorly he understood the role of the professionals in modern society."[17]

2. The early years of the PRC.

On the eve of the Communist triumph on the mainland, Mao emphasized the importance of coopting more intellectuals in order to overthrow the counter-revolutionary forces.[18] Soon after the founding of the PRC, in order to gain complete hegemony over the intellectuals, Mao stated that "thought remoulding, especially the thought remoulding of intellectuals, is one of the most important prerequisites" for

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[15] Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.4.

[16]. Xiong Fu, ed., Shijie Zhengdang Cidian (A Dictionary of the Political Parties Across the World) (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 1986), p.27.

[17] Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical perspective (Chicago: The University Press, 1986), p.271.

[18]. Mao Zedong, Selected Works, Vol.IV, p.372.

"democratic reform" and industrialization.[19] The campaign to remould intellectual thought was launched in 1951. Although many well-known scholars had refused to flee the mainland or had returned from abroad to join the CCP in building the new China, they were all forced to chastise themselves for their "reactionary views."[20] During the campaign, "81,000 intellectuals were 'unmasked and punished," and more than 300,000 lost their civil rights because of 'political unreliability'."[21]

This was the Chinese intellectuals' first encounter with the new Communist government. In retrospect it may seem surprising that they were not fully aware of the Party's attitude toward them. On the other hand, one could argue that they were aware of the Party's attitude but that their sense of mission continued to call them to perform their traditional roles. Therefore, when encouraged in 1956 to voice their opinions about the Party and government, many did as they were told.

3. The period of the "Hundred Flowers."

In January 1956 Mao claimed that in order to catch up with the most advanced nations in the world "the decisive factor was to have cadres, to have an adequate number of excellent scientists and technicians."[22] He then decided to "let a hundred schools of thought contend" in the sciences.[23] In April 1956 Mao outlined a policy to "let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools of thought contend."[24]

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[19]. Mao Zedong, Xuanji, Vol.V, p.49-50.

[20]. For details see Jiushi Niandai, August 1987, pp.84-89.

[21] See Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch 1949-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.48.

The policy served a dual purpose. First, it tried to convince intellectuals of their importance in the nation's development. Second, by appealing to the intellectuals' sense of mission, the policy was designed to mobilize them to rectify bureaucracy by encouraging their criticism from outside. Roderick MacFarquhar argues that Mao allowed intellectuals to criticize the government officials' abuse of power so that he could rectify the style of work on the basis of these criticisms.[25] This view is shared by Merle Goldman and

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[22] Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p.114.

[23]. Lu Dingyi, "Baihua Qifang Baijia Zhengming de Lishi Huigu" (A Historical Retrospect of "Letting a Hundred Flowers Bloom and Hundred Schools of Thought Contend"), GMRB, May 7, 1986.

[24]. Yu Guangyuan, "Shuangbai Fangzhen Tichu Sanshi Zhounian" (The Thirtieth Anniversary of Putting Forth the "Hundred Flowers" and "Hundred Schools" Policy), RMRB (Overseas Edition), May 16, 1986. The phrase "let a hundred flowers bloom" originates from Mao's inscription in 1950 for the theatrical circles which reads: "Let a hundred flowers bloom, weed through the old to bring forth the new." See GMRB, May 7, 1986. The locution "let a hundred schools of thought contend" traces back to the period of Warring States.

[25]. Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred Flowers (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1960), p.11.

Richard Solomon.[26] Many intellectuals took an active part in the "blooming" and "contending."

Criticisms of Party and government bureaucracies were acute. Wang Ruowang, a veteran Communist writer, portrayed a minister who had alienated the common people, including his father, from the countryside, and a bureaucracy which had become indifferent and irresponsive to the public.[27] Wang Meng, a young writer, also a Party member, described in detail an elusive Party bureaucracy.[28] Liu Binyan, an editor of Zhongguo Qingnian (China Youth), advocated investigative journalism to probe Party and government bureaucracies.[29]

Proposals for institutional change emerged. Fei Xiaotong, an anthropologist with a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics,[30] asked to lift the "two lids" which suppressed scientific research and democracy.[31] Others argued for a "committee for the righting of wrongs done."[32] There were also suggestions that a "political planning board" be set up and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) be regarded as the "senate."[33]

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[26]. See Merle Goldman, "Intellectual Dissent in the People's Republic of China," in Yu-ming Shaw, ed., Power and Policy in the PRC (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.287; and Richard H. Solomon, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p.272.

[27]. Wang Ruowang, "A Visit to His Excellency: A Five-minute Movie," in Hualing Nieh, ed., Literature of the Hundred Flowers, Vol.II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp.371-379.

[28]. Wang Meng, "A Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department," in Hualing Nieh, ed., pp.474-511.

[29]. Liu Binyan, "The Inside News of the Newspaper," in Hualing Nieh, pp.412-464.

[30]. James P. AcGough, select. and trans., Fei Hsiao-t'ung: The Dilemma of a Chinese Intellectual (White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1979), p.11.

A trickle of complaints grew to a torrent of criticism which could not be tolerated by the Party leadership. Therefore the "two hundred" policy inaugurated only six weeks before was suddenly replaced by the "Anti-Rightist" campaign which ended up with seven hundred thousand "rightists" publicly humiliated. Over ninety-five percent of them were intellectuals.[34]

Moreover, Mao wrote a new code of behaviour, not for state bureaucrats, but for China's intellectual commmunity.

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[31]. Current Background, No.470, p.12. See also R. David Arkush, Fei Xiaotung and Sociology in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981), p.244.

[32]. Current Background, No,470, p.21.

[33]. Ibid., p.21 & P.29. According to Qian Jiaqu, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC, the proposer Zhang Bojun was hooked by Li Weihan, Director of the Department of the United Front under the Party's Central Committee. See Qian Jiaqu, Qishi Nian de Jingli (Experiences in the Seventy Years) (Hong Kong: The Mirror Post Cultural Enterprises Co. ltd., 1986), p.239.

[34]. Qian Jiaqu, p.256. MacFarquhar says that "No complete statistics of the number of rightists exists..." See MacFarquhar, ed., The Hundred Flowers, p.265. The figure suggested by Qian is used here because of his background and the likely access to,reliable information.

His speech of June 19, 1957,[35] entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," presented six criteria for distinguishing right from wrong or "fragrant flowers" from "poisonous weeds." The "fragrant flowers" should contribute to national unity, socialist transformation and construction, the people's democratic dictatorship, democratic centralism, the leadership of the Party, and the international socialist unity.[36]

Mao's six criteria, effectively used in the "Anti-Rightist" movement, had disastrous consequences. The "Hundred Flowers" and "Hundred Schools" policy disappeared. As Lu Dingyi, then Director of the Party's Propaganda Department, writes in his memoirs, Mao later suggested that the hundred schools of thought actually belong to only two schools: one is bourgeois, the other is proletarian.[37] From then on, any ideas, if not judged proletarian, would be labelled as bourgeois and therefore subject to criticism. Ideological monopoly suppressed the academic community. Consequently, when the authorities called for the Great Leap Forward, few intellectuals dared to challenge the absurdity of the catastrophic "Leap" policies.[38] It was not until the Party again felt the need for intellectuals that the pressure began to ease.

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[35]. The speech was made public in Renmin Ribao of June 19, 1957 after "editing and adding", as Lu Dingyi admitted. A major change made in the published version turned out to be the subsumption of these six criteria. Roderick MacFarquhar interprets the amendment as a belated effort to silence critics of the Party. See Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), pp.262-263. Michel Oksenberg's explanation, which Solomon considers to be "the most plausible," suggests the Party leadership's eventual decision to storm "anti-Party rightists." Meanwhile, Solomon himself conjectures that the revision may indicate the Chinese attempt to mitigate the unease of the Russians upset by Mao's abetting non-Party people in criticism of the authorities. See Richard H. Solomon, pp.290-291.

[36]. Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp.41-42.

[37]. GMRB, May 7, 1986.

4. The "Cultural Revolution."

The failure in the Great Leap Forward and the sudden withdrawal of Soviet experts in the late 1950s compelled the Party to resort to intellectuals and forced it to reduce its pressure on them. The Party even "stepped up its efforts to recruit intellectuals into the Party in order to utilize their talents."[39] Vice-Premier Chen Yi's speech in August 1961 ushered in a new period of relaxation when intellectuals were urged to devote themselves to modernization.[40] It seemed that they were again granted the opportunity to perform their traditional roles. This good time, however, did not last long.

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[38]. For the disastrous consequences of the "Leap" policy see Qian Jiaqu, p.260.

[39] Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p.51.

[40]. GMRB, September 3, 1961. For an analysis of that period see Merle Goldman, "Party Policies towards the Intellectuals: The Unique Blooming and Contending of 1961-2," in John Wilson Lewis, ed., Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.268-303.

The nation-wide criticism in the winter of 1965 of The Dismissal of Hai Rui, a play by Wu Han, a professor of history, was only a prelude to a grand symphony.[41] The play allegedly contained a veiled attack on Mao. The "Cultural Revolution" soon started with an assault on "reactionary academic authorities" and other "bourgeois intellectuals" and "revisionist intellectuals."[42] They were labelled the "stinking ninth category."[43] Their status deteriorated in the turmoil of the ensuing decade. Their major concern was survival, not academic research.

Intellectuals were not the only victims of the "Cultural Revolution." Mao believed that the movement was necessary to prevent the degeneration of the Party and government officials by "revolutionizing the superstructure."[44] As Michael Oksenberg writes, both bureaucrats and intellectuals were now seen as evil in the authorities' eyes.[45] Mao's ideological approach to administration, however, yielded perverse effects. The nation's economic management was fumbled.

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[41]. Richard Solomon sees an "apparent" link between Wu's artistic work and his discontent with Mao's policies. See Richard Solomon, p.418. Qian Jiaqu, however, disagrees. See Qian Jiaqu, p.265. So does the writer. Wu was actually a pawn in a battle between Mao and his opponents.

[42]. See RMRB, June 1, 1966; in Richard Solomon, p.488.

[43]. During the "Cultural Revolution" intellectuals were ranked ninth after landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, Rightists, renegades, enemy agents and "capitalist roaders."

[44]. See Harry Harding, Organizing China, pp.235-266; and Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study, p.328.

[45]. Michael Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview," in John M.H. Lindbeck, ed., China: Management

To clear up the mess, Deng was recalled from internal exile and restored to the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973.[46] He took charge of the State Council in January 1975 when Premier Zhou Enlai was hospitalized with cancer.

Being aware of the roles of intellectuals in accelerating economic growth, Deng turned to them for help. He told scientists and technicians not to "feel downcast."[47] To address their problems, he masterminded in 1975 "Three Documents" on science, technology and industry,[48] which heralded the advent of "comprehensive overhaul and consolidation" (quanmian zhengdun). Deng's programme was halted because he betrayed Mao's ideological approach to administration. The 1976 "Tiananmen Square incident" led to Deng's downfall.[49]

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of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p.83.

[46]. Deng became the "number two arch capitalist roader" and was put under house arrest in Beijing late in 1966. He was sent to Jiangxi Province in the Southern China in October 1969 and stayed there until February 1973. Deng's daughter Mao Mao recounted Deng's life in exile in an article on RMRB of August 1984. For an abridged English version of the story see China Reconstructs, Vol.XXXIV, No.4, April 1985, pp.28-30.

[47]. Deng Xiaoping, "On Consolidating National Defence Enterprises," Selected Works, p.41.

[48]. For an examination of these documents see Merle Goldman, China's Intellectuals, pp.215-220.

[49]. For an examination of Deng's "overhaul and consolidation" in 1975 and his fall in 1976 see Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Zhongguo Wenge Shinian Shi (The Ten Years' History

Deng's failure illustrated the CCP's dilemma in its dealing with intellectuals. Could there be a solution which would reconcile the intellectuals' sense of mission and the Party's policy of co-optation? This game between the two sides was played in post-Mao China as the Party became increasingly concerned about its declining legitimacy.

Deng's coopting efforts

Mao's death and the arrest of the "Gang of Four" in 1976 rang the death knell of the "Cultural Revolution." Deng's rehabilitation in the wake of these events made him a powerful actor in the authorities' game with intellectuals. In John Israel's words, it was "a dangerous game of cooptation."[50] According to him,

> the Party recruits intellectuals, seeking to control them, broaden its own base, and restore weakened legitimacy. Intellectuals play a still riskier game by entering the Party, hoping to advance their own interests and to transform the establishment from within.[51]

There were several reasons why Deng and his associates felt that recruiting intellectuals would restore the Party's legitimacy.

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of China's "Cultural Revolution") (Hong Kong: Da Gong Bao, 1986), pp.507-613.

[50] John Israel, "Foreword," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek, eds., China's Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.: 1986), p.xii.

[51] Ibid.

As described in Chapter One, Deng interpreted modernization as reflecting technological progress, faster economic growth, and a better standard of living. In other words, his modernization programme placed special emphasis on economic development. Deng wanted to increase the nation's administrative efficiency. He took a structural approach to the problem of upgrading the nation's administrative efficiency by finding fault with unsound organizational and working systems and institutions. He believed that the state administration had to be reformed so China could be lifted out of poverty and backwardness.

Though acknowledging the need for administrative changes, Deng was not sure how administrative reform should proceed and how it could serve modernization better. What he knew was "to grope one's way through the river by feeling out the stones." His experiments, as it turned out, would take their toll on China's modernization.

Deng's pragmatism also prompted him to rally the support of the intellectuals. His pragmatism -- "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice" -- enabled him to mobilize intellectuals to new purposes. When intellectuals' skills were in demand, Deng motivated them to advance his goals.

Deng sought to achieve economic prosperity which he believed would enhance the regime's legitimacy. He tried to increase administrative efficiency as a means to his broader end. He felt the need to solicit advice on his experiments. Above all, his pragmatism led him to grasp the value of intellectuals and the necessity to coopt them. To achieve this goal, Deng rehabilitated their reputation, restored the study of political science and public administration, and rekindled their interest in creative and critical research.

1. Rehabilitating the reputation of the intellectuals.

When Deng reactivated his plan of economic growth, which in many ways deviated from Mao's ideas, he felt it necessary to lessen Mao's influence and subdue the internal Party opposition. Deng's modernization programme led to his efforts to devalue Mao. In doing so, Deng needed intellectuals in their role as critics of Maoist policies and Mao's followers.

At the time some Party leaders wished to adhere to Mao's legacy and continue his policies. They pledged to "resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave."[52] Labelled the "Whatever" faction, this group attempted to tie Deng's hands. Deng bluntly contended that "the 'Two Whatevers' do not accord with Marxism."[53] To defeat his opponents, he turned to the intellectuals for support.

To enlist the intellectuals' help Deng stated in May 1977 that "Those who engage in mental work are also workers."[54] In 1978 he claimed that intellectuals "are already part of the working class itself."[55] These words marked Deng's efforts to enhance intellectuals' status.

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[52]. See GMRB, February 7, 1977.

[53]. Deng Xiaoping, "The 'Two Whatevers' Do Not Accord With Marxism," Selected Works, p.51.

When Hu Fuming, an instructor of philosophy at Nanjing University,[56] proposed in 1978 a new concept claiming that "practice is the sole criterion of truth,"[57] Deng echoed this view and affirmed that "the correctness of the solutions is something which needs to be tested in practice."[58] Months later he related the need to seek truth from facts with the necessity of challenging or even abolishing Maoist policies. To act on what Mao endorsed without the slightest deviation was, in Deng's words, to "debase Mao Zedong Thought."[59]

2. Restoring the study of political science and public administration.

In order to motivate the intellectuals to examine critically China's administrative system, Deng urged in 1979 that the long neglected study of political science be made a priority.[60] As a result, the Chinese Political Science Association (CPSA) was established in 1980.[61] In 1985, after five years' preparation, the Institute of Political Science under the (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was formally established.[62] However, the 43 staff members of the Institute of Political Science ranked that institute among the smallest in CASS.[63] Similarly, a preparatory group for the Chinese Public Administration Association (CPAA), supposedly an academic association created in December 1984,[64] had only Professor Xia Shuzhang, a Harvard-trained philosopher[65] and Vice-President of the CPSA, as the single academic among its seven members.[66]

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[54]. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.54.

[55]. Ibid., p.105.

[56]. Hu was later promoted to a member of the Party's Provincial Standing Committee.

[57]. GMRB, May 11, 1978.

[58]. Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work," Selected Works, p.128.

[59]. Deng Xiaoping, "Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere to the Principle of Seeking Truth From Facts," Selected Works, p.141.

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[60]. Deng Xiaoping, "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles," Selected Works, p.188.

[61]. Its membership was 1075 in early 1987. See Wang Huning, "Zhongguo Zhengzhixue Yanjiu de Xin Quxiang" (New Trends in the Studies of Political Sciences in China), ZZXYJ, No.2, 1987, p.47. Liaowang seems to have given an inflated figure in its February 10, 1986 issue. According to the weekly newsmagazine the CPSA had more than 1500 members in 1985. See Liaowang, No.6/7, February 10, 1986, p.53. It is also interesting to notice that the first provincial political science association emerged in Hubei as early as spring 1977. This may indicate the initiative by the political scientists in the province to participate but also demonstrate the slow nationwide development of the discipline. See ZZXYJ, No.1, 1985, p.1.

[62]. ZZXYJ, No.3, 1985, backcover.

[63]. Robert Bedeski, Jerome Ch'en and Graham Johnson, Social Sciences in the People's Republic of China (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1985), p.40.

[64]. ZGXZGL, No.1, 1985, p.2.

[65]. GMRB, April 9, 1984.

Obviously, Deng's efforts to encourage political science and public administration were half-hearted. In playing this dangerous game with intellectuals, the Party leadership was mainly interested in controlling them, broadening its own base, and restoring its legitimacy. The CCP did not want to see intellectuals gaining enough power to threaten the CCP's leadership.

3. Rekindling intellectual interest in creative and critical studies.

Deng's closing address at the Central Working Conference preceding the Third Plenum again revealed his intention to rekindle the interest of intellectuals in creative academic studies. Concerned with the China's gloomy economic performance, Deng castigated the many structural defects in the nation's administration and blamed these for obstructing modernization.[67] He urged more study of management structures.[68]

The intellectuals' response was encouraging. For example, when the Party sought opinions on economic restructuring, a group of economists centred their study on questions about economic reform.[69] In 1980 Yu Guangyuan, a noted economist and Deputy Secretary General of the CASS, compiled a list of more fundamental issues for exploration, including the role of market regulation and the division of power between enterprises and government.[70] But as the story unfolded later, economic restructuring invariably has political spill-overs which Deng did not anticipate.[71]

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[66]. ZGXZGL, No.1, 1985, p.2.

[67]. Deng Xiaoping, "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth From Facts and Unite As One in Looking to the Future," Selected Works, p.152.

[68]. Ibid., p.161.

Deng's 1980 speech on the reform of Party and State leadership got intellectuals interested in administrative reform. This discourse dispelled some intellectuals' concerns about the lack of freedom of speech imposed by Mao's six criteria. It also sent the message that the current system of administration was defective and that intellectuals would be welcome to help address the issue of administrative efficiency. Scholars responded to Deng's call. Liao Gailong, for example, gave a long colloquium on the PRC's administrative structure.

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[69]. Yu Guangyuan, "Zhengzhi Jingjixue yu Jingji Tizhi Gaige" (The Study of Political Economy and the Reform of Economic Structure), in Yu Guangyuan, Lun Woguo de Jingji Tizhi Gaige (On the Reform of Economic Structure in Our Country) (Hunan: Hunan Renmin Chubanshe, 1986), p.6.

[70]. Yu Guangyuan, "Zai Juexin Gaige zhi hou" (After Deciding to Reform), On the Reform, pp.62-64.

[71]. For the political spillover of economic reform see A.G. Meyer, "Authority in Communist Political Systems," in Lewis J. Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), p.103; Hong Yung Lee, "The Implications of Reform for Ideology, State and Society in China," Journal of International Affairs, Vol.39, No.2, Winter 1986, p.80; Ronald Amann, "The Political and Social Implications of Economic Reform in the USRR," in Hans-Hermann Hohmann, Alec Nove and Heinrich Vogel, eds., Economics and Politics in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p.127.

Probably the most influential speech aimed at engaging intellectuals was made by reform-minded Wan Li, Vice-Premier and a member of the Party's Politburo. He stated in August 1986 that:

> All political issues and issues on policies need to be studied. All of them may be discussed and contended over prior to their final decision.... Even disagreement on certain stipulations in the Constitution, laws and the Party's resolutions may continue to be discussed through normal ways and channels within given scope.[72]

Wan's address indicated his, and perhaps Deng's, continuing effort to coopt intellectuals in order to advance modernization. This speech led intellectuals to believe that the Party had a genuine interest in intellectuals and in critical thinking.

The authorities' efforts to rekindle intellectual interest in creative and critical studies paid off. Many intellectuals thought that the CCP had changed its attitudes and was now determined to include them in policy making. It seemed to them that they were now allowed to perform their traditional roles as critics of the official policies and positions. They set aside their fear of becoming again targets of the Party's ideological remoulding and voiced views at odds with the Party's ideology.

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[72] Wan Li, "Juece Minzhuhua he Kexuehua shi Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Yige Zhongyao Keti" (Democratization and Scientification of Policy-making Is an Important Subject in the Reform of Political System), RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 15, 1986.

Intellectuals' views on administrative reform[73]

Encouraged by Deng, many Chinese social scientists scrutinized the nation's administrative system. They brought out values which sometimes conflicted with the Party's fundamental principles. As Israel observed, by playing this dangerous game with the Party, intellectuals hoped "to advance their own interests and to transform the establishment from within."[74]

Western influence is obvious on intellectuals in their discussion of their subjects for several reasons. Many Chinese scholars received their education either in Western countries or in missionary colleges or universities run by foreign missionaries in China. The post-Mao "open-door" policy exposed a new generation of Chinese men and women to Western civilization. Modernization came to mean catching up to the West. Finally, Deng's pragmatism allowed Chinese intellectuals to learn from Western experience.

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[73] Alvin Gouldner divides intellectuals into two groups -- technical and political. This dissertation will not follow his categorization in examining intellectuals' opinions about China's administrative reform because views expressed by both groups have political implications. See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: The Seabury Press, 1979), p.48.

[74] See Footnote 51.

Academic discussions focussed on two issues. One was to achieve administrative efficiency by enhancing the role of professional knowledge -- and implicitly the role of intellectuals -- in administration. The other was to achieve an ethical administration. Under study were five issues: a merit system, the think tank, a laissez-faire economy, the principle of checks and balances, and the politics-administration dichotomy, to employ a traditional Western term.

1. A merit system.

Many scholars denounced the current practices of personnel management. Their critiques were directed at cadres' lifetime tenure, which they held responsible for such problems as the cult of personality,[75] gerontocracy, mediocrity, and the resultant administrative inefficiency.

Attempting to uproot the causes for the lifetime tenure, they pointed out that public office was used to reward the Party faithful and that the recruitment process, selection by the Party, made lifetime tenure inevitable.[76] Also, the CCP's Constitution stipulates no fixed term for leading cadres. Even "heavenly mandate" in monarchical China was construed as mandatory lifetime tenure for cadres.[77]

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[75] Bao Jirui, "Tantan Zhongshenzhi Wenti" (On the Life Tenure), Guizhou Shehui Kexue, No.1, 1981, pp.29-34, in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.3, 1981, pp.47-48.

[76] Xiao Guangming et al., "Lun Feichu Ganbu Lingdao Zhiwu Zhongshengzhi" (On the Abolition of the Life Tenure of Cadres at Leading Positions), Jiangxi Daxue Xuebao, No.4, 1980, pp.20-28; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.3, 1983, pp.25-33.

On the other hand, suggestions were offered on how to effect a merit system in order to enhance administrative efficiency. These included "in-service education and training in rotation,"[78] stress on managerial skills and professional knowledge in administrators' qualifications,[79] and special attention to the humanities, natural sciences, and management.[80] In sum, claimed You Chunmei, cadres at a higher educational level could function more effectively.[81]

Two persons deserve special attention here. One is Wen Yuankai, a professor of chemistry from the University of

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[77] Jia Fuhai et al., "Luelun Zhongshenzhi" (On the Life Tenure), Shehui Kexue, No.4, 1980, pp.10-15; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.3, 1981, p.42.

[78] Xia Shuzhang, "Lun Ganbu Lunxun" (On Cadres' Training in Rotation), GMRB, November 22, 1982. See also Xia Shuzhang, ed., Xingzheng Guanlixue (The Science of Public Administration) (Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1985).

[79] Sha Hong, "Ganbu Jiaoyu de Zhanlue Juece" (Strategic Decision in Cadres' Education), Liaowang, No.8, 1982, pp.33-34; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.8, 1982, pp.67-68.

[80] Zhong Jiaming and Peng Qingxing, "Shilun Xingzheng Lingdao Renyuan de Zhishi Jiegou" (On Administrative Leading Members' Knowledge Structure), Qiu Suo, No.6, 1982, pp.60-65; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.1, 1983, pp.25-30.

[81] You Chunmei, "Lingdaozhe de Suzhi he Lingdao Banzi de Jiegou" (A Leading Member's Quality and the Structure of a Leading Body), Jianghuai Luntan, No.3, 1985, pp.14-18; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.6, 1985, pp.104-108. You's doctoral dissertation entitled Leadership Training for Economic Development in China In Service Training of Public Managers, 1978-1983 focuses on the improvement of cadres' administrative skills as well. What she attempts to explore in the essay is: 1.the new demands for leadership talents; and 2.the needs among incumbent leaders for retraining.

Science and Technology in Hefei who was among those first to point out China's personnel system ignored the vital role of administrative skills in modernization. Wen described administrative skills as "software" whereas science and technology were the "hardware."[82] He also urged the Chinese government to send abroad more students and scholars of social science to have them specialized in "software."[83]

Another noteworthy person is Yan Jiaqi, who in 1979, proposed the termination of cadres' life tenure.[84] Born in 1942, Yan enrolled in the Department of Applied Mathematics and Electronic Computer at the Chinese University of Science and Technology in Beijing in 1960. After graduation, he entered the Institute of Philosophy under the CASS and studied Friedrich Engel's Dialectics of Nature under Yu Guangyuan's supervision. The "Cultural Revolution" inspired Yan to switch "from the kingdom of philosophy to that of theology." The unprecedented fanaticism sweeping China during that period sparked his interest in political science,[85] which led to his directorship at the Institute of Political Science under the CASS and his two-volume book on the "Cultural Revolution," one of the few such publications in China.[86]

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[82] RMRB, December 20, 1982. Wen, a graduate from the Department of Chemistry at the Nanjing University in 1968, began to teach in the University of Science and Technology in Hefei in 1973. Seven years later he was promoted associate professor. See Tide Monthly, No.1, 1987, p.24. Wen took the chairmanship in the Department of Applied Chemistry in 1984. He held a concurrent government position as Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Education Commission in Anhui since 1985. See GMRB, April 11, 1986. Late in 1986 Wen was promoted full professor. He was even allegedly nominated for Vice-Governor in the province. See Zheng Ming, January 1987, p.87.

[83] RMRB, December 20, 1982.

[84]. RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 8, 1985.

Yan's view on lifetime tenure became the official view thirteen months later.[87] This of course strengthened his sense of mission and encouraged him to be more forceful. Yan claimed that China's political system was an autocracy which could only result in an "unbridled" cult of personality and must be eradicated.[88] He also attacked the personalized nature of Chinese politics and argued that the structure of personnel should be "institutionalized" within the system.[89] Both Wen and Yuan received influential government positions. Wen took the Vice-Chairmanship of the Provincial Educational

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[85]. Zhou Rong, "Zhongguo Gaige Lilunjia Yan Jiaqi" (Yan Jiaqi -- A Theorist of China's Reform), Guangjiaojing, No.171, December 16, 1986, pp.14-18.

[86]. The book entitled Zhongguo Wenge Shinian Shi (The Ten Years' History of China's "Cultural Revolution") is authored by Yan Jiaqi and his wife Gao Gao. Both volumes were published by Da Gong Bao in Hong Kong in December 1986. Yan and Gao's book was also published in Tianjin but was permitted only for internal circulation amid the "anti-bourgeois liberalization" campaign unleashed in early 1987.

[87] Yan's proposal was given an approving nod by the party thirteen months later. See "Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th central Committee of the CCP," Beijing Review, No.10, March 10, 1980, p.8.

[88] Yan Jiaqi, "Jianjue Shixing Jiti Lingdao de Yuanze" (Firmly Implement the Principle of Collective Leadership), RMRB, July 26, 1981.

[89] Yan Jiaqi, "Lun Gaige" (On Reform), RMRB, July 6, 1982.

Commission in Anhui.[90] Yan was invited to serve in the Political Structure Reform Office for the party centre.[91] However, as the position of Chinese intellectuals deteriorated in 1989, Wen was arrested and Yan was forced into exile.

2. The think tank.

Think tanks were stressed. They were seen as vital for achieving administrative efficiency and could channel communications between government agencies and societal groups,[92] and examine specific projects and develop long-term strategies.[93] They could also offer policy options, assist in adjusting policies, and provide forecasts for policy-makers.[94] Therefore it was proposed that "comprehensive designing institutes" be set up under the direct leadership of local government chief executives.[95]

3. A laissez-faire economy.

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[90] GMRB, April 11, 1986.

[91] Andrew J. Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p.9.

[92] He Jianzhong, "Guanyu Gaijin Guojia Jiguan Zhinang Jigou de Jige Wenti" (Several Issues On Improving the "Think Tank" For the State Institutions), ZZXYJ, No.2, 1985, p.57.

[93] Wang Shicheng and Cheng Xianping, "Shilun Zhinengtuan" (On the "Think Tank"), Zhengzhou Daxue Xuebao, No.3, 1985, pp.13-18; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.11, 1985, pp.96-97.

[94] Yu Hongzhi, "Jianli Difang Zhengfu Zhinang Jigou de Chuyi" (Opinions On the Establishment of "Think Tanks" For Local Governments), Shehui Kexue Pinglun, No.7, 1985, pp.78-82; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.7, 1985, p.35.

[95] See Xu Yuanzhou et al..

While a laissez-faire economy may sound too liberal and too Westernized, many scholars felt that lesser state intervention in economic activities should be encouraged. Decentralization could facilitate administrative efficiency. It was pointed out that those regimes with centralized power have been moving toward decentralization in order to achieve economic efficiency and other purposes.[96] Decentralization was particularly important for a nation of vast size and huge population.[97]

The dual leadership of administration in the PRC was practised through tiaotiao (vertical administration) and kuaikuai (horizontal administration). A result was the state's double control over society. Decentralization would reduce the pressure from the central government. One way of realizing this idea was to expand the jurisdiction of a number of central cities through a scheme called "city administering counties."[98]

The new system of "city administering the counties,[99] as a step in the direction toward decentralization, was welcomed by the academic community. This new administrative structure delegated power from prefectures to municipal governments so that the restraint by tiaotiao (vertical administrative) control by the central government and kuaikuai (horizontal administrative) control by provinces can be lifted. Scholars believed that the change would promote local horizontal economic links and contribute to economic prosperity.[100] In addition, interflow between urban and rural areas could proceed more smoothly, bypassing much of the bureaucratic hierarchy.[101]

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[96] Zheng Baoxiang, "Zhongyang he Difang Quanxian de Huafen" (A Division of Jurisdiction Between the Central and Local Authorities), Xue Lilun, No.1, 1984, pp.17-18; in BKFYZL (KXSHZY), No.1, 1984, pp.141-2.

[97] See Ren Da.

[98] Gao Shangquan, "Chongfen Fahui Zhongxin Chengshi de Zuoyong" (Bring the Role of Central Cities into Full Play), RMRB, October 21, 1983.

[99] Doak Barnett wrote in 1967 that "Liaoning does not have any sort of intermediary level of administration between the province and the counties..., has abolished all such units, and has placed its counties directly under the supervision of

Another way of making a government more laissez-faire and less interfering in society was to streamline the administrative body of the state. It was argued that an overlapping of government agencies "hampers rational

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the major municipalities in the province." See A. Doak Barnett, p.116. Actually Liaoning began to practice the system of "city administering counties" in 1958, discontinued it and set up prefectures in 1964, and then restored the system in 1968 with 12 out of its 45 counties still being administered by two prefectures. These two prefectures were finally abolished in 1984. See RMRB, February 1, 1983 and July 22, 1984.

[100] Wu Peihua et al., "Shi Lingdao Xian Tizhi Gaige de Chubu Jingyan" (Preliminary Experiences On Reform In the System of "City Administering Counties"), Lilun Yuekan, No.4, 1985. pp.32-36, in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.5, 1985, pp.31-35.

[101] The General Office of the Provincial Economic Research Centre in Liaoning, "Liaoning Sheng Shixing Shi Lingdao Xian Tizhi de Diaocha" (An Investigation On the Implementation of the System of "City Administering Counties" In Liaoning province),Hongqi, No.3, 1983, pp.14-17; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.2, 1983, pp.77-80.

arrangement of productive forces and multiplepurpose use of productive resources."[102] However, solving the problem was difficult. As some scholars pointed out, all kinds of temporary Party and government agencies kept emerging and remained for years. Many of these offices were actually "in perpetuity."[103]

4. The principle of checks and balances.

Intellectuals were also concerned about unethical bureaucracy. They felt that governmental accountability could not be resolved by purely administrative means or by looking only at the administrative apparatus. They argued for the principle of checks and balances. Liao Gailong, Deputy Director of the Party History Research Centre under the Party's Central Committee,[104] who coined the nickname "Gengshen Reform,"[105] called for checks and balances to be injected into the system in order to effect an accountable administration.[106]

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[102] Yin Fulun, "Jigou Gaige yu Xiandaihua Jianshe" (Structural Reform and Modernization Construction), Xueshu Luntan, No.1, 1983, pp.26-28; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.2, 1983, pp.63-65.

[103] Ren Bing and Huai Yi, "Xia Juexin Kankan "Linshi" Jigou" (Be Determined To Cut Off "Temporary" Agencies), Beijing Ribao, January 22, 1982; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.1, 1982, p.111.

[104]. GMRB, May 12, 1985.

[105] The year of 1980 was called the year of Gengshen according to the traditional Chinese calendar.

[106]. Liao Gailong, "Historical Experiences and Our Road of Development" (Part III), Issues and Studies, December 1981, pp.86-99.

A principal way to introduce checks and balances was to strengthen China's legislature. This would enable it to supervise the executive. The weaknesses of the people's congresses were now discussed even in public. Supposed to exercise the power of the state, deputies to these congresses were called only to endorse, not deliberate and discuss, Party policies. "A deputy's duty is done the moment the meeting is over."[107] As a result, for decades the legislature has not been able to supervise the public servants of the state and government.

The causes of China's feeble legislative record were explored. This lamentable situation was attributed to a misleading Soviet model, the CCP's misuse of public's trust,[108] and its disdain for state legislature.[109] In addition, China's legislative body had no financial independence. It was an appendage of the executive because it was funded by the executive.[110]

The legislature could not effectively supervise the executive.[111] Some of the legislators held concurrent posts in the executive,[112] making it unlikely that they could be independent enough to supervise that executive. Others treated the law-making institution as a sanatorium for retired veteran cadres.[113]

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[107] Ren Da, "Fahui Difang Guojia Quanli Jigou de Zuoyong" (Bring the Initiative of Local Organs of State Power Into Full Play), Xinxiang Pinglun, No.8, 1982, pp.6-7; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.9, 1982, pp.51-2.

[108] Gao Fang, "Gaijin Renmin Daibiao Zhidu Chuyi" (Preliminary Opinions on the Improvement of the System of People's Congress), Xinan Zhengfa Xuebao, No.4, 1980, pp.8-13; in FYBKZL (KXSHZY), No.1, 1981, p.69.

[109] Ibid., p.73.

[110] Chen Yunsheng, "Jiaqiang Difang Renda Changweihui Jianshe" (Reinforce the Standing Committees of the Local People's Congresses), RMRB, June 15, 1981.

One can hardly expect any significant supervisory role from such a powerless legislature. Little wonder that few administrative laws were enacted in the legislature.[114] What is worse, in the late 1950s the authorities dismantled the Ministry of Supervision,[115] effectively eliminating the only internal check over the executive branch.

Many reforms were presented in response to this problem. Some pushed for legislative power to criticize government officials, to reject the government's work report, or to disapprove candidates for government positions recommended by the Party.[116] Others wanted to limit the number of Party and government officials sitting in the legislature and to have power to impeach members of the executive.[117] Moreover, as a law making body, the legislature should also draw up laws and regulations on all aspects of administration: organization, personnel, files, penalties and supervision.[118] There were also proposals aimed at enhancing the legislators' qualifications. Their accountability to the public should be emphasized. A limited number of terms for them should be set.[119] The legislative job should be made full-time.[120] Legislators should meet regularly.[121]

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[111] Liu Chuanshen, "Difang Renda Changweihui Ying Chenwei Mingfuqishi de Quanli Jiguan" (The Standing Committees of the Local People's Congresses Should Become Organs of Power In Reality As Well As in Name), Shehui Kexue (Shanghai), No.4, 1981, pp.127-130; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.9, 1981, pp.67-70.

[112] See Chen Yunsheng, RMRB, June 15, 1981.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Qing Zhi, "Lun Zhiding Xitong Wanzheng de Xingzheng Fagui" (On the Formulation of Systematic and Comprehensive Administrative Laws and regulations), Xuexi yu Yanjiu, No.8, 1982, pp.14-16; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.8, 1982, pp.37-39.

[115] The Central Government of the PRC established in October 1949 the People's Supervisory Commission, which was renamed the Ministry of Supervision in September 1954. The institution was dispensed with in April 1959. See Hong Chenghua, Gua Xiuzhi et al., eds., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Yange Dashiji (A Chronicle of the Development of the Political System of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Chunqiu Chubanshe, 1987), pp.10, 104, 196.

5. The politics-administration dichotomy.

The politics-administration dichotomy as envisioned by Woodrow Wilson was favoured by Chinese intellectuals. The Party was urged to leave the government alone. Li Honglin, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Theory in the CCP Propaganda Department, saw the Party's interference in administration as a root cause of problems in China's administration.[122] Parallel hierarchy, which enabled the Party to meddle with government affairs, was blamed for administrative inefficiency and unethical administrative behaviour.[123]

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[116] See Gao Fang, pp.71-72.

[117] See Liu Chuanshen, "The Representative Body And the Supervisory System."

[118] See Qing Zhi.

[119] In the past many deputies were "reelected" for four or five times.

[120] Gao Fang, pp.70-73.

[121] The Fourth NPC in 1975, which met only for five days, was convened ten years after the conclusion of the Third.

To make scholarly opinion on the matter more palatable to the authorities, one article claimed that the Party's greater separation from government would serve its own interests. The author argued that parallel hierarchy distracted the Party from its own activities and resulted in lax Party discipline.[124] This in turn undermined the original purpose of parallel hierarchy -- effective control over the government by the Party.

Several suggestions were offered to overcome these defects, one of which argued that no joint sessions be held by the Party and government except on vital issues and that no government business be discussed by the Party's standing committees.[125] Also, the Party leadership should only lay down general programmes and guiding principles. Party members should be role models not "bosses" with mercurial behaviour.[126]

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[122] See RMRB, October 2, 1978 and Xinhua Yuebao (Wenzhaiban) (hereinafter XHYB), November 1979.

[123] Jing Dong, "Buneng yi Dang dai Zheng" (The Party May Not Supersede the Government), Hongqi, No.21, November 1, 1980, p.6.

[124] Zhang Wenguang, "Dang Zheng Fengong shi zai bi xing" (It Is Imperative to Distinguish Between the Party and Government Functions), Hebei Ribao, October 21, 1982; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ) No.10, 1982, p.67.

[125] See Zhang Wenguang.

Deng's dilemma

Deng encouraged Chinese intellectuals to advise on the nation's administrative reform. But he also espoused socialism by calling the nation to adhere to the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.[127] While intellectuals' opinions about upgrading administrative efficiency might sound acceptable to Deng, their proposals to achieve an ethical administration threatened the Party's authority. Therefore, he may have assigned himself an impossible mission. Deng's dilemma flowed from his naive view that intellectuals' skills could be separated from their values, from his unwillingness to grant elite membership to intellectuals, from their sense of mission, and from Party hardliners insecurities.

Lucian Pye observed that in modern China the ruling classes denied "government and influence to members of the educated classes." One explanation for this "aggressive treatment of intellectuals" was the official aversion for their values. And Mao's ideology "has provided the basis for a more vicious attack on intellectuals than any earlier political class."[128]

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[126] See Yin Fulun.

[127] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.172.

Although Deng attempted to treat intellectuals less aggressively at the onset of his modernization programme, his dislike for their values was consistent. This was corroborated by his charging intellectuals with spreading "spiritual pollution" and preaching "bourgeois liberalization."

Deng's pragmatism made it possible for him to put these well-educated men and women to use. He believed that it was possible to exploit their skills and to control their influence. His version of modernization led him to conclude that knowledge and expertise were important. Yet his approach blinded him to the difficulty of separating intellectuals' skills from their values. When he encouraged them to contribute their knowledge to modernization, they were also contributing their values, which might contradict his own.

Deng wanted to see a minimal division of labour between the Party and government. Intellectuals not only gave opinions on how to make this possible but went beyond Deng's views. Liao Gailong's proposal of dividing the Party's power centre into three committees was obviously under Western influence and modelled after the three branches of government.[129] This opinion, based on the idea that "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," might have brought about a more honest bureaucracy than it is today. However, Liao's suggestion violated the CCP's principle of unified (yiyuanhua) leadership.

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[128] Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp.45-46.

[129] See Liao Gailong, Issues and Studies, December 1981, pp.86-99.

Deng agreed to allow Chinese students and scholars to study abroad. He did not expect a majority of them, whether in natural or social sciences,[130] to be susceptible to such values as liberty and democracy. But in January 1987 some 1,000 Chinese students in the U.S. signed an open letter to the CCP expressing their concern over the latest developments including rampant bureaucratic corruption in China's reform.[131] At that point, as indicated by his criticism of some prominent dissenting intellectuals, Deng began to worry about values alien to his beliefs. But then it was too late. These values already prepared hundreds of thousands of Chinese students, at home and abroad, for the unprecedented pro-democracy movement of 1989, which would threaten the regime.

Kenneth Jowitt claims that there are three stages of development in Leninist regimes -- transformation of the old society, consolidation of the revolutionary regime and inclusion.[132] With the achievement of transformation and consolidation, China was to shift, as suggested by Jowitt, to an inclusion process, "marked by the methodical consideration and management of tasks" rather than by "controlled or elite-directed disruption."[133] Both "methodical consideration and management of tasks" require the involvement of intellectuals because of their education and knowledge. But whether intellectuals can be effectively mobilized for this purpose depends on whether the ruling elite is really willing "to expand membership in the regime in a way that allows politically coopted social elites or activists to maintain their social-occupational identity."[134] The expansion of membership means that the more professional, skilled, and articulate strata including intellectuals will increase their status.[135]

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[130] Ruth Hayhoe noticed that only a small percentage of government-sponsored students were enrolled in social sciences. See Ruth Hayhoe, "A Comparative Analysis of Chinese-Western Academic Exchange," Comparative Education, Vol.20, No.1, 1984, pp.39-56.

[131] For a full text of the letter see Jiushi Niandai, February 1987, p.9.

Deng was using intellectuals without giving them significant social status. Even though their skills were in high demand, they were barred from participating as "citizens" who have the right, among other things, to watch their government. Instead, they found that they could only continue to behave like "subjects."[136] Little wonder that offering the CCP membership to intellectuals was parsimonious.[137]

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[132]. Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," World Politics, October 1975, p.69.

[133] Ibid., pp.94-95.

[134] Ibid., p.72.

[135]. Ibid., p.75.

By not granting elite membership to intellectuals, Deng demonstrated his unwillingness to "approach the question of power in a more complex fashion, to differentiate types of power, and to allow different elements in a society to exercise different forms of power."[138] With the advantage of hindsight, his mobilization of intellectuals was doomed to failure.

Intellectuals' sense of mission also put Deng's mobilization efforts in a predicament. Many intellectuals, whose sense of mission was reinforced by their exposure to Western social sciences, wanted to use these theories to restrain the ruling elite. The posters that appeared on the "Democracy Wall" in 1979, which called for a "fifth modernization," meaning further liberalization of Chinese politics,[139] concerned Deng because they "could undermine" his

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[136] For the definitions of "subjects," "participants," and "parochials" see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Eds., Comparative Politics Today: A World View, Fourth Edition, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1988), p.42.

[137] Lynn T. White III, "Thought Workers in Deng's Time," in Merle Goldman with Timothy Cheek and Carol Lee Hamrin, eds., China's Intellectuals and the State: In Search of a New Relationship (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p.259.

[138] Kenneth Jowitt, p.78.

[139] Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, "The Democracy Movement in China, 1978-1979: Opposition Movements, Wall Poster Campaigns, and Underground Journals," Asian Survey, July 1981, pp.747-74.

"great undertaking."[140] So did Guo Luoji's article in Renmin Ribao about politics and an accountable public service.[141]

In 1983 Zhou Yang, Chairman of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, advanced the concept of "socialist alienation."[142] He maintained that in socialist China alienation exists in the political, ideological and economic spheres, which has caused the degeneration of public servants and other problems.[143] Deng was angered and asserted that such a view "will only lead people to criticize, doubt and negate socialism..., and to renounce their confidence in the future of socialism and communism."[144]

In 1986, encouraged by Wan's speech on democratizing the policy-making process, a few intellectuals attacked the basic features of the political system. Professor Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist, charged Deng's "top down" reform for being divorced from the public and for not meeting broad public needs.[145] Professor Su Shaozhi[146] claimed that democratic centralism is a "tortured" concept which emphasizes only centralism.[147] Yu Haocheng, Vice-President of the CPSA and Editor-in-chief of the Mass Publishing House, suggested that the "four cardinal principles" be considered merely as a guiding ideology for a political party but not for the public.[148] Wang Ruoshui wanted to readjust the relationship between the Party and its leader but also between the people, the Party and its leader.[149] Qin Benli, Editor-in-chief of Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Herald) in Shanghai, claimed that political power should be not only restrained but also redistributed.[150] Some cadres in the Central Party School even proposed to abrogate all two million Party branches across the country to effect free expression of views.[151]

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[140] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.237.

[141]. RMRB, November 14, 1979. Guo, a lecturer in Philosophy at Beijing University, was ordered by Deng to be exiled from Beijing. He was accepted by Nanjing University. His promotion, however, got stranded ever since.

[142] Of the same opinion was Wang Ruoshui, former Editor-in-chief of Renmin Ribao. See Wang Ruoshui, "Tantan Yihua Wenti" (On the Question of Alienation), Zheng Ming, December 1983, pp.68-72.

[143] Zhou Yang, "Rendaozhuyi he Yihua Wenti" (Humanism and the Problem of Alienation), Zheng Ming, December 1983, p.68. See also Zhou Yang, "Guanyu Makesizhuyi de Jige Lilun Wenti de Tantao" (A Study of Some Theoretical Questions Concerning Marxism), RMRB, March 16, 1983.

[144] Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues, p.32.

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[145]. Fang Lizhi, "Yi wei Ziran Kexuejia Kan Gaige -- Fang Lizhi Jiaoshou Dawen Lu" (A Natural Scientist Views Reform -- A Dialogue With Professor Fang Lizhi), Shehui Bao, October 28, 1986, in Jiushi Niandai, February 1987, pp.52-54.

[146] Su, born in 1922, graduated from the Department of Economics at the Nan Kai University (founded in 1919) in Tianjin. He was appointed Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought under the CASS in the early 1980s.

[147]. Su Shaozhi, "Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Chuyi" (My Humble Opinions on Reform of Political Structure), Dushu (Reading), September 1986; in Zheng Ming, September 1987, p.72.

[148] Mo Mingqi, "Wei Minzhu Fazhi he Renquan Nahan" (Whoop for Democracy, Legality and Human Rights), The Mirror, September 1986, p.56.

[149]. Wang Ruoshui, "Shuang Bai Fangzhen he Gongmin Quanli" (The "Hundred Flowers" and "Hundred Schools" Policies and Citizens' Rights), Hua Sheng Bao, August 8, 1986, in Zheng Ming, September 1986, p.60.

[150]. Shi Binhai, "Bixu Gaibian Dang Lingdao Yiqie de Guannian" (The Concept that the Party Leads Everything Must

All these proposals called for restraint or a reduction of power which has been monopolized by the CCP. These ideas, though uttered by a few people, endangered the very existence of the ruling elite and the political system. The need to suppress the intellectuals became urgent. The Party's need for intellectuals' advice was once again subdued by its fear for the "destructive" impact of some of their opinions.

Many veteran leaders were worried and feared a loss of their power and privileges. They were leery of intellectuals.

In 1983, when Deng raised the issue of "spiritual pollution" and charged some intellectuals of disseminating "all kinds of corrupt and decadent ideas of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes,"[152] the hardliners launched the "anti-spiritual pollution" campaign. Deng Liqun, head of the Party's Department of Propaganda, exhorted people to combat "cultural contamination," which included "obscene, barbarous, reactionary" content in mass communication, "vulgar taste" in art, "indulgence in individualism, anarchism, liberalism," and

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be Changed), The Mirror, September 1986, pp.37-39.

[151] Luo Bing, "Yao Wenyuan shi Dashou Dengtai le" (Hatchet Men Like Yao Wenyuan Went up on the Stage), Zheng Ming, December 1986, p.10.

[152]. Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues, pp.29-30.

"speeches running counter to China's social system."[153] The combat claimed some victims. Both Zhou Yang and Wang Ruoshui were chastised for espousing "socialist alienation." Zhou was forced to make self-criticism in public.[154] Wang had to resign his position in the Party paper.

The purpose of the campaign was two-fold. First, intellectuals were warned to be careful in voicing opinions on reform. More importantly, Party reformers became very careful lest they became "contaminated."

Although strong opposition from reform-minded leaders within the Party aborted this political campaign,[155] damage was inflicted on academic activities.[156] In addition, the hardliners' retreat was temporary. Three years later, the comeback which they were waiting for took place .

In 1987, at the Politburo's enlarged meeting also attended by more than a dozen hardliners, General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who was widely regarded as the intellectuals' strongest guardian within the Party, was forced to resign.[157] Meanwhile, three prominent dissenting intellectuals Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang were expelled from the Party. They were accused of intending "to remould the Communist Party" and "to copy bourgeois democracy." Intellectuals received a new label this time -- preachers of "bourgeois liberalization."[158]

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[153] "Clearing Cultural Contamination," Beijing Review, Vol.26, No.45, November 7, 1983, p.13.

[154] See RMRB, November 6, 1983.

[155]. According to a Hong Kong report, Zhao Ziyang threatened to resign if the campaign continued. Hu Yaobang simply drew a parallel between criticism of so-called "spiritual pollution" with censure of The Dismissal of Hai Rui, which bespoke the dawn of the "Cultural Revolution." See Luo Bin, "Hu Yaobang Deng Liqun Edou Yubo" (In the Wake of the Bitter Fight Between Hu Yaobang and Deng Liqun), Zheng Ming, April 1984, pp.7-8.

[156]. See Liao Wen, "Fan Wuran xia de wentan" (The Literary Circle under Anti-pollution), Zheng Ming, December 1983, pp.17-19.

A new label for the intellectuals and Hu's resignation meant the hardliners' victory and boded ill for Deng's efforts to coopt intellectuals. Having got rid of the label of the "stinking ninth category," well-educated men and women were motivated to contribute to the nation's modernization with their knowledge and expertise. They soon found themselves again threatened with another pejorative label --"preachers of bourgeois liberalization." Hu's resignation also meant that intellectuals' opinions on reforms received a less favourable review from the authorities.

Conclusion

The 1980s witnessed a change in the relationship between the Party and intellectuals, though the Party continued to play the game of cooptation. The development was a product of several factors. These include Deng's emphasis on the economy and the structural component of his modernization programme. Moreover, his experimentalism and pragmatism made him more receptive to intellectuals' advice.

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[157] For details of the event see Qi Xin, "Beijing zui Hanleng de Dongtian" (The Coldest Winter in Beijing), Jiushi Naindai, February 1987, pp.40-45.

[158] See Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues, pp.161-166.

In order to mobilize intellectuals for the administrative reform which would promote his modernization programme, Deng rehabilitated their status, rekindled their interest in academic research, and restored the study of political science and public administration. Intellectuals responded to Deng's gestures. The discussions were aimed at achieving an efficient and ethical administration by means of a merit system, the think tank, a laissez-faire economy, the principle of checks and balances, and the politics-administration dichotomy.

But as intellectuals became critical, Deng's commitment waned. He appeared to believe that intellectuals' skills could be separated from their values. In addition, Deng was unwilling to grant intellectuals elite membership which was required at the stage of inclusion.

Moreover, a strong sense of mission among some intellectuals has caused the concern within the ruling elite about their very existence. The political ramifications of these opinions went beyond Deng's expectations and made it likely that hardline pressure would be exerted against the scholars.

Consequently, Deng started with mobilizing the intellectuals in order to be advised on the reform but ended up with unanticipated threats to the essence of China's political system. As a result, the intellectuals' opinions of achieving an efficient and ethical administration could hardly be heeded by the authorities. A behavioural gap was inevitable. To corroborate this statement, the following chapter will examine the articles that appeared in China's most prestigious journal of public administration Chinese Public Administration during the first three years since its inauguration.

Chapter Four: A Case Study: The Journal Chinese Public Administration

As the Chinese authorities and the intellectuals tried to cooperate in the late 1970s and early 1980s, considerable debate occurred in the journal Chinese Public Administration. Inaugurated in 1985 by the Chinese Association of Public Administration, this periodical is the only journal of its kind at the central level. The publication is directly subordinate (guakao) to the State Council. As a result, its articles reflect the official views as well as trends in China's administrative reforms.

This chapter examines Chinese Public Administration between 1985 and 1987. Three questions are asked. First, what themes emerge? Second, who contributes? Third, what are the interests, scholarly and political, of the contributors?

Focus of attention

Chinese Public Administration was published bimonthly in its first year. It became a monthly the following year. This fact could be interpreted, on the one hand, as a growing need for more ideas about administrative reforms, and on the other hand, an enhanced interest among certain groups and therefore an increasing number of manuscripts. Table I provides data on the various topics addressed in the 1985-87 period.

The subjects addressed may be grouped into four categories: A. association business; B. basics and references; C. policy announcements; and D. discussions of reform. Category A includes reports on the activities of the national and regional associations of public administration. Out of the 572 reports run by the journal during the three years, forty-six are devoted to association activities and forty-three to announcements or reviews of new publications. Altogether, eighty-nine pieces (15.6 per cent of the total) belong to this category.

Category A yields a trend. In terms of reports on association activities, the three years saw sixteen, twenty-two and eight reports respectively. Obviously, the year 1986 had the most reports on association activities, which were in fact a top-down movement. Many associations came into existence only after the State Council issued a document in 1985 announcing the 1984 establishment of the Preparatory Group for the Chinese Association of Public Administration (CAPA).[1] Accounts on their activities most likely appeared in the journal the following year. For example, there were fourteen associations (or preparatory groups for associations) at the provincial level by January 1986.[2] Twelve of them were

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[1] "Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Chengli Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli Xuehui Choubeizu de Tongzhi" (A Notice by the General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of the Preparatory Group of the Chinese Association of Public Administration), Chinese Public Administration, No.1, 1985, p.2.

[2] "Gedi Xingzheng Guanli Xuehui (Choubeizu) Jiankuangbiao" (A List of the Associations or Preparatory

TABLE I

CATEGORIES

	1985	1986	1987	Total
ASS	13.8% (16)	11.6% (22)	3.0% (8)	8.0% (46)
PUB	6.8% (8)	7.9% (15)	7.5% (20)	7.5% (43)
BAS	6.0% (7)	3.2% (6)	3.4% (9)	3.8% (22)
HIS	11.1% (13)	7.4% (14)	5.7% (15)	7.3% (42)
INT	7.7% (9)	8.4% (16)	3.4% (9)	5.9% (34)
POL	1.7% (2)	0% (0)	0.8% (2)	0.7% (4)
THE	16.2% (19)	21.6% (41)	24.2% (64)	21.7% (124)
PRA	18.8% (22)	23.7% (45)	30.9% (82)	26.0% (149)
PRO	17.9% (21)	16.3% (31)	21.1% (56)	18.9% (108)
TL	100% (117)	100% (190)	100% (265)	100% (572)

ASS -- Association news
PUB -- Reports on publications
BAS -- Basics
HIS -- Historical
INT -- International
POL -- Policies
THE -- Theories
PRA -- Practice
PRO -- Proposals

Note: Some total percentages are actually more or less than 100 per cent because of rounding.

Groups of Public Administration in Various Provinces), Ibid., No.4, 1986, p.32.

founded after the State Council notified the provinces of the decision on CSPA.

Government officials were heavily involved in these new associations. At the central level, the leadership of the Preparatory Group for CSPA comprised seven people. Jiao Shanmin, Deputy Minister of Labour and Personnel, headed the group. Professor Xia shuzhang of Zhongshan University was the only academic member.[3] The heads of the fourteen associations or preparatory groups at the provincial level were high-ranking government officials. They included three vice-governors, two secretaries general of their provinces, seven deputy secretaries general, a director and a deputy director of the provincial general office.[4]

There were eight, fifteen, and twenty reports on publications related to public administrations in 1985, 1986 and 1987 respectively. A closer look at them reveals that most of the books announced in these issues were at the introductory level. Their titles included such words as "introductions," "basics," "lectures," "basic knowledge," "handbook," etc.[5] Book reviews did not appear until late in

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[3] "Guowuyuan Bangongting Tongzhi" (A Notice by the General Office of the State Council), Ibid., No.1, 1985, p.2.

[4] "Xingzheng Xuehui Jiankuangbiao" (A List of the Associations of Public Administration), Ibid., No.4, 1986, p.32.

[5] Ibid., No.2, 1985, p.28; No.4/5, 1985, p.36, p.45; No.3, 1986, inside backcover; No.9, 1986, p.31; No.10, 1986, p.30;

1986 and 1987.[6] Moreover, among the new books reported in the journal only two titles were devoted to comparative public administration.[7]

The second group of articles were basics and references. They include basic knowledge, historical episodes, and introductions to comparative public administration. There were twenty-nine, thirty-six, and thirty-three pieces of writing in this category in 1985, 1986, and 1987 respectively. They constitute 17.1 per cent of the total of the articles in the period examined.

This three year period paid more attention to historical episodes (forty-two pieces) than to foreign public administration or basic knowledge. Meanwhile, foreign public administration (thirty-four pieces) received slightly more coverage than basic knowledge (twenty-two pieces). It is possible that both editors and authors felt that they were more familiar and therefore more comfortable with administrative practices in China's lengthy history, many of which could serve as good references for current reforms. It is also likely that there could not be found as many contributors who were well exposed to foreign public administration. For examples, articles on China's traditional public administration addressed a variety of issues including the nation's ancient administrative thoughts,[8] administrative systems in dynastic China,[9] personnel management in traditional China,[10] administrative reforms,[11] and administrative supervision.[12] There were also many anecdotes from China's administrative practice in various dynasties.

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[6] Ibid., No.11, 1986, p.20; No.1, 1987, p.46; No.6, 1987, inside backcover.

[7] Ibid., No.4/5, 1985, p.45; No.11, 1986, p.20.

In comparison, the articles on foreign public administration introduced readers to administrative practices in only a few countries, such as the United States,[13] United Kingdom,[14] France,[15] Soviet Union and Eastern European countries,[16] and Japan.[17] There were also articles on the administrative structure in Hong Kong.[18] The main focus was, however, on the US public administration which received the most coverage.

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[8] "Woguo Gudai Guanli Sixiang Jianshuo" (A Brief Introduction to China's Ancient Thoughts on Administration), Ibid., No.1, 1985, p.23.

[9] Shuzhi, "Woguo Lidai Xingzheng Zhidu he Guanzhi Jianjie" (A Brief Introduction to the Administrative Systems in Dynastic China), Ibid., No.2, 1985, p.29; No.4/5, 1985, p.56; No.6, 1985, p.30; No.3, 1986, p.32; No.6, 1986, inside backcover; No.9, 1986, p.30.

[10] Su Yutang, "Woguo Gudai Renshi Zhidu Jianjie" (A Brief Introduction to the Personnel Systems in Ancient China), Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.31; Ouyang Xiongfei, "Woguo Gudai Guanli de Luyong, Peixun ji Guanzhi Pinwei" (The Recruitment, Training and Ranking of Government Officials in Ancient China), Ibid., No.6, 1985, p.32; Li Jinwang, "Zhuge Liang de Yongren zhi Dao" (The Personnel Management by Zhuge Liang), Ibid., No.1, 1986, p.29; Zhang Chuangxin, "Woguo Gudai Xuanguan Fangfa Jianjie" (A Brief Introduction to the Selection of Government Officials in Ancient China),Ibid., No.4, 1986, p.27; Zhuoyue, "Guanzhong de Renshi Guanli Sixiang" (Guanzhong's Thoughts on Personnel Management), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.43; Guang Deming and Zhang Chunying, "Sun Zhongshan de Ganbu Guanli Sixiang" (Dr. Sun Yat-cen's Thoughts on Cadres' Management), Ibid., No.8, 1987, p.46; Cai Jing, "Qiantan Zhu Yuanzhang de Yincai Shouzhi Lun" (On Zhu Yuanzhang's Appointment of Officials Based on Merit), Ibid., No.9, 1987, p.47.

[11] Weng Yongqing, "Lun Han Wuti dui Neiting Xingzheng Jigou de Gaige" (On the Reform of Administrative Structure by Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty), Ibid, No.1, 1987, p.38; Zhang Tianwang, "Zichan xiang Zheng de Gaige Cuoshi" (The Reform Measures by Zichan, Prime Minister of State Zheng), Ibid., No.12, 1987, p.40.

[12] Zhu Guobin, "Tangdai Jiancha Zhidu Qianxi" (An Analysis of the Supervisory System in Tang Dynasty), Ibid., No.10, 1987, p.46.

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[13] Eugene McGregor, "*Meiguo Wenguan Zhidu Gaige de Lishi he Xianzhuang* (The History and Current Situation of the Reform of the US Civil Service), Ibid., No.2, 1986, p.29; Lin Zhimin, "*Meiguo Xingzheng Guanli de Yanjiu he Jiaoxue Qingkuang*" (The Research on and Teaching of Public Administration in the U.S.), Ibid., No.5, 1986, p.30; Sun Shiwen, "*Yige Meiguo Zhengfu Yizhong de Zhinang Jigou -- Meiguo Gonggong Xingzheng Xuehui*" (A Think Tank On Which the U.S. Government Depends -- the American Association of Public Administration), Ibid., No.7, 1986, p.29; Xue Jiayu, "*Meiguo Wenguan Zhidu de Yici Zhongda Gaige*" (An Important Reform in the U.S. Civil Service), Ibid., No.9, 1986, p.32; Buo Guili, "*Meiguo Shizheng Guanli de san zhong Zuzhi Moshi ji qi Bijiao*" (A Comparison of the Three Models in the U.S. Municipal Administration), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.40; Zhu Qianwei, "*Luosifu de Xingzheng Guanli Yishu*" (Roosevelt's Art of Administration), Ibid., No.3, 1987, p.40.

[14] William Proden, "*Yingguo Wenguan Zhidu de Tezheng ji Gaige de Zhuyao Neirong*" (The Civil Service in the United Kingdom: Its Characteristics and Reform), Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.22; "*Ying Zhengfu Bumen Zhiwei de Shezhi he Chenghu*" (The Establishment and Official Titles of the Positions in the Government Agencies of the United Kingdom), Ibid., No,6, 1985, p.31.

[15] Marcel Binet, "*Faguo Gongzhi Zhidu de Yanbian ji qi Zuzhi, Guanli Yuanze*" (The Evolution and the Organizational and Managerial Principles of Public Service in France), Ibid., No.1, 1986, p.25; Pan Xiaojuan, "*Faguo Guojia dui Gonggong Qiye de Jiandu*" (The Supervision of Public Enterprises by the State in France), Ibid., No.1, 1987, p.41.

[16] Sun Shiwen, "*Luomania Xingzheng Tizhi de Liangxiang Gaige*" (Two Reform Measures in Romania's Administrative System), Ibid., No.2, 1985, p.31; Tian He, "*Sulian Dongou Guojia Gaige Xingzheng Guanli Jingji Zhineng de Pingjia*" (A Comment on the Reform in Administering the Economy in the Soviet Union and Eastern European Countries), Ibid., No.4, 1986, p.23; You Jingwen, "*Shehuizhuyi Guojia Guanlixue Yiban Lilun Wenti yi shu de Pingjia*" (A Book Review of "The General Theoretical Questions in the Science of Public Administration in Socialist Countries"), Ibid., No.6, 1986, p.31; Xu

Still, post-Mao China's interest in foreign public administration was tentative, superficial and very heavily influenced by work in translation. In 1985, nine reports on foreign public administration included three translations and four introductory articles. The remaining two pieces were research articles.

1986 yielded fifteen reports on foreign public administration, including five translations and one introductory article. And 1987 saw eight reports on foreign public administration with only one of them being a translation. Altogether, out of the thirty-two articles on foreign public administration that appeared in Chinese Public Administration in the three year period, there were nine translations and five introductory articles. One may conclude that scholars in post-Mao China had a growing interest in comparative public administration.

Yangsheng, "Sidalin Shidai Suweiai Guojia de Xingzheng Tizhi Gaige ji qi Jingnian Jiaoxun" (The Experiences and Lessons in Administrative Reform Under Stalin), Ibid., No.8, 1987, p.41.

[17] Li Lulu and Hu Jiafang, "Riben Zhengfu Jingji Zhengce zhong de Shenyihui Zhidu" (The Hearing System in the Economic Policy Making by the Japanese Government), Ibid., No.8, 1986, p.32.

[18] Yuan Fan, "Xianggang Zhengfu de Xianxing Jigou Shezhi ji qi dui Jingji de Guanli" (The Current Structure of Hong Kong Government and Its Administration of Economy), Ibid., No.9, 1986, p.24; No.10, 1986, p.31; No.11, 1986, p.31.

The third group of articles were policy announcements. They were not many. The journal published four reports in that category during the three year period. They constitute only 0.7 percent of the total of articles published in the journal within the period. Two of them appeared in 1985; the remaining two, in 1987.

The journal's two policy announcements in 1985 were official documents. One, issued by the Party's Central Committee, defined governmental functions in terms of economic management.[19] The other, issued by the provincial authorities in Fujian, was intended to restrain the expansion of Party and government bureaucracy there.[20] The definition of governmental functions in economic management and the streamlining of bureaucracy were two important issues the administrative reforms must address. But whether these two problems could be dealt with properly by merely issuing authoritative documents was an open question. The fact that the journal printed official documents demonstrated the intentions of the Chinese leadership to guide the process of administrative reforms.

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[19] "Zhengque Fahui Zhengfu Jigou Guanli Jingji de Zhineng" (Perform the Government's Function in Administering the Economy Properly), Ibid., No.1, 1985, pp.14-15.

[20] "Zhonggong Fujian Shengwei, Fujiansheng Renmin Zhengfu Pizhuan Shengbianwei Guanyu Yange Kongzhi Dangzheng Jiguan Jigou Bianzhi de Baogao de Tongzhi (A Notice by the Provincial Party Committee and Provincial People's Government About Approving and Distributing the Report of the Provincial Committee on Nomenclature on Strictly Controlling the Nomenclature of the Party and Government Agencies), Ibid., No.6, 1985, pp.17-18.

No policy announcements were printed in 1986. Was this an indication of the editors' efforts to encourage free discussions on administrative reforms instead of publishing official directives from the authorities? Or did it reflect a more amicable political atmosphere at the time when the leadership was open to various opinions on reform? Since the journal is directly subordinate to the State Council, a likely answer is that the editors' move reflected the mood within the top leadership.

Two policy announcements appeared in 1987. They were not, however, Party or government documents. One was a collection of several of Deng's quotations on reform of political structure.[21] The other was a letter on the science of public administration by Qian Xueshen, a well-known nuclear scientist but also a member of the Party's Central Committee.[22] Although these two pieces of writing were not official documents issued by the Party or government, both the authors were well known. Their words carried weight in the process of administrative reforms.

A fourth group of articles discussed administrative reform including general theories (124 pieces), practical developments (148 pieces), and reform proposals (108 pieces).

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[21] Deng Xiaoping, "Deng Xiaoping Tan Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige (Deng Xiaoping On the Reform of the Political Structure), Ibid., No.1, 1987, p.1.

[22] Qian Xueshen, "Qian Xueshen Tan Xingzheng Guanli Xue" (Qian Xueshen On the Science of Public Administration), Ibid., pp.2-3.

380 articles belong to this category. They constitute the bulk of the journal's content in the period examined, namely 66.5 per cent.

Steady growth can be detected in terms of the number of the articles in this category published in each of the three years. The year 1985 had sixty-one pieces. This number was almost doubled in the following year (117 pieces) and more than tripled the year after (202 pieces). Administrative reform was being enthusiastically addressed.

The sub-categories include general theories on public administration, practical developments, and proposals for administrative reform. The journal published 124, 148, and 108 pieces in each of these sub-categories in the three year period. The fact that practical development has received the most coverage implies that development in practice was moving ahead of theory. But it may also suggest that practitioners, rather than scholars, were more enthusiastic about reform.

On the other hand, had the authorities demonstrated a genuine interest in debating administrative reform, there probably would have been more reform proposals in the journal. Yet in terms of the number of articles, the journal published fewer articles on reform proposals than on theory or practical development. A possible explanation is that raising reform proposals might be riskier than doing theory or reporting practical changes. Intellectuals, though driven by their sense of mission, could not ignore the spectre of political persecution.

Did the journal have a different focus in discussion of administrative reforms in each of the three years? In 1985, it published nineteen theoretical articles, twenty-one articles on practical developments, and twenty-one articles on reform proposals. The coverage was thus evenly divided among the three sub-categories. This situation changed in the following two years when ln 1986 forty-one articles on theory, forty-five on practical developments, and thirty-one on reform proposals were published. The trend continued in 1987, with sixty-four articles on theory, eighty-two on practical developments, and fifty-six on reform proposals being published. The journal thus stressed practical developments in 1986 and 1987. Reform proposal was the least discussed topic in those two years.

The fact that the journal reported practical developments more often and reform proposals less frequently had several implications. Reform-minded leaders within the Party, though encouraging intellectuals' participation in administrative reforms, received only a few opinions from the academic community. Intellectuals, though motivated by the Party to contribute to the process of administrative reforms, found that they enjoyed limited freedom in fulfilling their mission of reforming China's administrative system.

Contributors

Chinese Public Administration's emphasis on practice is highlighted by its contributors whose backgrounds are noted in Table II.

One should bear in mind that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between scholars and practitioners based only on the name of their work units. The categorization here is based on institutional affiliation. There were relatively easy cases. For example, a person working in a ministry of the Central Government is assumed to be a practitioner. However, if the name of the person's specific sub-workunit is provided, he or she could be categorized differently. There were two articles, whose authors work in the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Labour and Personnel respectively. Since the name of their sub-work unit is also provided, namely one works in the Research Institute of Economics and the other works in the Bureau of Cadres, the former is considered a intellectual and the latter, a practitioner.[23] Still, the above example might run the risk of false categorization because not everyone working in a research institute is an intellectual. Cases also arise when sub-work unit is not identified. Therefore, the categorization can be subjective in some cases. In addition, there were a few articles in each of the issues, for the authors of which no institutional affiliation was given. As a result, the figures provided in the table might

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[23] See Ibid., No.10, 1987, p.14 and p.28.

TABLE II

AUTHORS

	1985	1986	1987	Total
Intellectuals	22.1% (15)	29.9% (43)	33.5% (71)	30.4% (129)
Practitioners	23.5% (16)	48.6% (70)	41.5% (88)	41.0% (174)
N/A	54.4% (37)	21.5% (31)	25.0% (53)	28.5% (121)
Total	100% (68)	100% (144)	100% (212)	100% (424)

not be as accurate as they could be. Even so, a summary of the available institution affiliation for certain contributors sends a signal to readers about the degree of intellectuals' participation in administrative reforms.

Between 1985 and 1987 the journal published 174 articles by practitioners. Intellectuals wrote 128 articles for the journal. There were also 121 pieces of writing that were contributed by authors with no institutional affiliation. Altogether, practitioners constituted 41.1 per cent of the total writing published by the journal in the three year period, while intellectuals made up 30.3 per cent. Authors, whose institution affiliation was not provided, composed the remaining 28.6 per cent.

Practitioners contributed more to the journal than the intellectuals for the entire three year period and for each of the three years. Sixteen articles were authored by practitioners while fifteen were written by intellectuals in 1985. In the same year thirty-seven articles were authored by people whose institutional affiliation was not provided. The gap between practitioners and intellectuals was widened the following year when the former group had seventy publications and the latter had only forty-three pieces, with thirty-one articles belonging to the category of unavailable identity. The trend continued in the year of 1987. Practitioners authored eighty-eight articles while intellectuals wrote seventy. Fifty-three pieces could not be identified.

It is conceivable that practitioners contributed more articles to the journal than intellectuals. A main reason is that Deng and his associates adopted an experimental approach to reformist changes in post-Mao China. Therefore, the authorities needed to see more reports on empirical rather than theoretical reports on the process of administrative reforms. As Michel Oksenberg wrote, China's transition from Maoist revolutionary rule occurred "with resistance to an era of bureaucratic rule through administrative law, incremental change, and a decisional process involving empirical analysis of policy choices."[24] Government officials were in a better position to analyze the reform process than intellectuals.

As well, Chinese bureaucrats had to deal with a new situation brought about by Deng's reforms. They held an ambivalent attitude toward this development.[25] They were threatened by change but could also enhance their capacity under the new circumstances. Being on the defensive, they had to survive. One of their strategies was to influence leadership by giving their version of reform process which would lead to decisions in their favour.

On the other hand, intellectuals were restrained in voicing their opinions. Most had not received formal training in public administration. And although they found themselves in a new environment, their areas of autonomy were still severely circumscribed. Not every member of the academic community dared to test the limits set by the state, especially in the area of administrative reform, which intimately involves politics and the Party.

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[24] Michel Oksenberg, "The Deng Era's Uncertain Political Legacy," in Kenneth Liberthal, Joyce Kallgren, Roderick MacFarquhar, and Frederick Wakeman, Jr., eds., Perspectives on Modern China: Four Anniversaries (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), p.319.

[25] Ibid., p.326.

Moreover, unlike the associations of public administration in many other countries, which are headed by scholars, the associations of public administration in China were led by practitioners. As a result, these organizations look more like unions of government officials than academic associations. These associations served the narrow interests of government officials rather then broad policies of administrative reform. The journal under the direction of the CAPS tended to give more coverage to writings by practitioners than those by intellectuals.

It is also interesting to look at the contributors' backgrounds. Those practitioners who contributed to the journal during the three year period worked in a variety of places, including government offices, armed forces, and enterprises and factories. The bulk, however, served in government bureaucracies. 155 out of the 174 articles contributed by the practitioners were written by those working either in the Central or local government offices. Nine articles were contributed by army officers. Cadres from enterprises wrote ten articles.

In comparison with military cadres or enterprise cadres, officials in government bureaucracies were especially enthusiastic about administrative reforms. Two reasons may account for their enthusiasm. One was that they felt more threatened by administrative reforms than the other two groups and therefore attempted to exercise some influence on the process of the reform which could have an impact on their position, power, and privileges. In addition, they also wanted to show that, by participating in discussion of reform, they were generally supportive of reform changes.

The intellectuals' background is less homogeneous than that of the practitioners. Seventy-six of the 128 contributing intellectuals worked in educational institutions. The remaining fifty-two were positioned in non-educational institutes. That the educational institutions were responsible for only slightly over half of the discussion of administrative reforms in the journal was alarming. A likely explanation can be found in the Party's policy toward intellectuals in the past decades. Guided by Mao's philosophy of emphasizing practice and ignoring theory, the CCP never paid enough attention to theory, especially in the social sciences. Intellectuals were rarely encouraged to initiate creative academic projects.

On the other hand, intellectuals working in the research institutes and other non-educational institutions actively discussed administrative reforms. The educational circle

(Jiaoyujie) within the academic community was a "severe disaster area" (Zhongzaiqu) hit the hardest during the Cultural Revolution. It took longer for them to recover psychologically and academically. When asked to participate in reform discussions, many professors were unwilling to risk their careers or unable to provide well-considered opinions. In comparison, the scientific and technical circle (Kejijie) fared better than the educational circle during the ten years of chaos. They were singled out by Deng for special treatment soon after he returned to power in 1977. As a result, they recovered faster and were more enthusiastic in advising on reforms.

There were other explanations why the scientific and technical circle was more responsive to Deng's efforts to motivate the academic community in support of his modernization program. Traditionally, Chinese schools are established to teach, not to do research. Most instructors at universities see teaching as their principal function. Their view of the profession was reinforced by political campaigns under the Communist rule. Focusing on teaching rather than research is a "safe" strategy as one can teach from state-approved textbooks. When encouraged to engage in more creative scholarly and professional academic activities, some educators had difficulty adapting to the new environment.

The social sciences were never favoured by the Communist leadership. Only after Deng resumed power did post-Mao leadership decide that these disciplines could be used to modernize the nation. He called for the restoration of social sciences, in particular political science and public administration. New research institutes were founded which recruited ambitious young men and women. As a principal function of these newly established institutes was to advise on the reforms, it was easier for those working there to be fully committed to reform. Official sanction combined with a renewed sense of mission on the part of those research fellows have resulted in their more active participation in discussing the administrative reforms.

Besides their employment backgrounds, another interesting point to look at is the contributors' positions. Thirty-seven of the 174 contributing practitioners were identified by their positions to indicate that they were leading cadres within the government hierarchy. These positions include Minister of Personnel,[26] Commander of the Navy of the PRC,[27] Governor,[28] Vice-Minister of Public Security,[29] Commander of a military district,[30] Mayor.[31] Six articles were penned by authors who held leading positions. Their names were so popular that the editors of the journal felt no need to give these authors' institutional affiliation and the rank of their position. These include Deng Xiaoping,[32] the principal architect of reforms in post-Mao China, Bo Yibo,[33] one of the most powerful octogenarian veterans in post-Mao China, Vice-Premier Tian jiyun,[34] Vice-Minister of Labour and Personnel Jiao Shanmin,[35] and others.

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[26] Zhao Dongwan, "Lianxi Gongzuo Shiji Jiuzheng Guanliao Zhuyi" (Be Linked to the Work Practice and Correct Bureaucratism), Chinese Public Administration, No.10, 1987, p.1.

[27] Liu Huaqing, "Jiaqiang Jiguan Guanli Tigao Gongzuo Xiaoluu" (Strengthen the Administration of Government Agencies and Improve the Work Efficiency), Ibid., No.4, 1987, p.9.

[28] See, for example, Jia Zhijie, "Zhuanbian Zuofeng Tigao Banshi Xiaoluu" (Change the Work Style and Improve the Work Efficiency), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.5.

[29] See, for example, Yu Lei, "Nuli Tansuo Zhongguo de Gongan Guanli Xue" (Work Hard to Establish the Chinese Science

Thirty-one articles were institutionally authored and these probably carried more weight. They often served as guidelines for other institutions in the process of reform and

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of Administration of Public Security), Ibid., No.9, 1986, p.1.

[30] See, for example, Fu Quanyou, "Xin Shiqi Junshi Guanli Yingdang Shuli de Jige Guannian" (Several Concepts in the Military Administration of a New Era), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.24.

[31] See, for example, Yang Chongchun, "Zhengque Fahui Chengshi Zhengfu Guanli Jingji de Zhineng" (Perform Properly the Function of Administering the Economy by a Municipal Government), Ibid., No.12, 1986, p.1.

[32] Deng Xiaoping, "Deng Xiaoping on the Reform of the Political Structure", Ibid., No.1, 1987, p.1.

[33] Bo Yibo, "Bo Yibo Tongzhi zai Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli Xuehui Choubeizu Diyici Huiyi shang de Jianghua" (Bo Yibo's Speech at the First Meeting of the Preparatory Group for the Chinese Association of Public Administration), Ibid., No.1, 1985, p.3.

[34] Tian Jiyun, "Xingzheng Gaige shi zai bi xing" (It Is Imperative to Carry Out the Administrative Reform), Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.2.

[35] Jiao Shanmin, "Zhongguo Renshi Zhidu de Gaige" (The Reform of China's Personnel System), Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.3.

were therefore more influential. Among the contributing institutions were municipal government,[36] the bureau of personnel of municipal government,[37] and the general office of provincial government.[38]

The fact that many of the contributing practitioners were identified by their positions and that some of the contributors were simply state organs has several implications. First, it is an indication that the central authorities who controlled the journal intended to use the publication as a tool to demonstrate that the bureaucrats' voice, especially the top bureaucrats' voice, was heard. In doing so, the top leadership hoped that a certain degree of cooperation in the process of reforms by the bureaucrats at the lower levels could be expected and that the bureaucratic resistance to administrative changes could be reduced.

Second, in revealing some authors' positions, the journal was attempting to illustrate that many powerful government officials supported administrative reform. However, it might be an indication that they were working hard to influence the process of reform by giving their opinions on reform. In so doing, bureaucrats hoped that they could protect their interests in the face of inevitable change.

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[36] Zhonggong Jiangmen Shiwei, Jiangmenshi Renmin Zhengfu, "Gaibian Zhengfu Jingji Guanli Zhineng, Tansuo Xinxing Zhengqi Guanxi Moshi" (Change the Government's Function in Administering the Economy and Establish a New Model of the Relationship Between the Government and Enterprises), Ibid., No.8, 1986, p.6.

[37] Zhonggong Ningbo Shiwei Zuzhibu, Ningboshi Renshiju, "Gaige Ganbu Xuanyong Fangfa de Tansuo" (A Search in the Reform of the Selection of Cadres), Ibid., No.3, 1987, p.13.

[38] Shanxisheng Renmin Zhengfu Bangongting, "Xinzhou Diqu Shixing Wujiehe Yange Kongzhi Xingzheng Shiye Bianzhi" (Practice "Five-in-one" in the Xinzhou Prefecture and Control the Nomenclature in the Administration Strictly), Ibid., No.9, 1987, p.34.

The journal may also have tried to emphasize the importance of certain opinions by disclosing the identity of their authors. Doing so could add more weight to these opinions which would serve as guidelines for changes in other government agencies. Since bureaucrats might be more receptive to opinions expressed by their colleagues, especially by their important colleagues, than to orders from the Centre, the journal assisted the process of policy implementation.

In contrast, few contributing intellectuals were identified by their positions. (The journal made public the positions held by only nine of the 128 contributing intellectuals.) Four of the nine authors worked in military academies where two were vice-presidents.[39] The editors probably disclosed these four authors' positions out of respect for the armed forces rather than for the academic community. The remaining five authors include a vice-president of a provincial academy of social sciences,[40] a research fellow from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,[41] an associate chairman of a department at a college,[42] a university professor,[43] and a member of the executive council of an academic association.[44]

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[39] Liu Bingyao, "Junshi Rencai Qunti de Lixiang Jiegou" (An Ideal Structure of Military Personnel), ibid., No.11, 1986, p.7; Ma Shengru, "Xin Shiqi Jundui Guanli Gongzuo de Tantao" (A Discussion on the Military Administration in the New Era), Ibid., No.1, 1987, p.33.

Why were so few intellectuals identified by position? A possible explanation is the journal's attitude toward intellectuals. The journal, as property of an academic association -- CAPA, was controlled by high-ranking government officials. It was no wonder that the journal held a more respectful attitude toward bureaucrats than scholars. This attitude also resulted from the journal's perception of the status held by the two different groups of contributors. The editors had different standards in deciding whether they should publish contributors' positions. They were cautious and did not want to offend powerful bureaucrats as they were aware that not publishing an official's title could be interpreted as the editors' lack of respect for a leader of the government. Meanwhile, they knew that scholars seldom showed their anger at the journal for its concealing their titles. Scholars were satisfied simply "to be published." Self-effacement among Chinese intellectuals is part of Chinese culture. And this trait was reinforced by political campaigns under the Communist rule. Two consequences followed. One was that the Chinese intellectuals have learned to keep a low profile. The other was that the society in general tended to belittle their worth. For publishers, this meant that it was considered acceptible to publish intellectuals' works without exposing their full identity.

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[40] Lu Kuihong, "Lun Lingdao Jiushi Fuwu" (On Leadership As Service), Ibid., No.3, 1986, p.1.

[41] Luo Yuanzheng, "Guojia Jingji Zhineng yu Xingzheng Guanli" (The State's Economic Function and the Public Administration), Ibid., No.10, 1986, p.4.

[42] Xu Sihe, "Dangqian Xingzheng Guanlixue Yanjiu de Zhongxin ying shi Wushi" (The Focus of Current Study of Public Administration Should be the Practice), Ibid., No.9, 1987, p.23.

[43] Zhou Shiqiu, "Xi Kan Xingzheng Guanlixue Baihuayuan zhong Yiduo Qipa" (A Wonderful Flower in the Study of Public Administration), Ibid., No.6, 1987, inside backcover.

[44] Pan Debing, "Ruhe Lijie Shehui Zhuyi Tiaojian xia de Tizhi Gaige" (Understand the Structural Reform Under Socialism), Ibid., No.5, 1987, p.1.

Also, the journal could be deliberately playing down the importance of intellectuals' opinions by not revealing their positions. Although intellectuals were encouraged by Deng and his associates to advise on administrative reforms, it was not clear whether their views would be taken seriously by the leadership.

Contributors' interest

Not only were the two groups of contributors treated differently by Chinese Public Administration, the subjects of their articles also revealed their different interests. Table III summarizes the practitioners' interest as illustrated by the number of the articles they contributed to the journal in

TABLE III

INTELLECTUALS' & PRACTITIONERS' INTEREST

	1985		1986		1987		Total	
	I	P	I	P	I	P	I	P
STR	0% (0)	43.8% (7)	9.3% (4)	25.7% (18)	9.9% (7)	11.4% (10)	8.5% (11)	20.1% (35)
PER	6.7% (1)	6.3% (1)	16.3% (7)	30% (21)	14.1% (10)	36.4% (32)	14% (18)	31% (54)
FIN	33.3% (5)	25% (4)	9.3% (4)	5.7% (4)	0% (0)	11% (1)	7% (9)	5.2% (9)
ADM	0% (0)	0% (0)	7% (3)	2.9% (2)	5.6% (4)	1.1% (1)	5.4% (7)	1.7% (3)
SUP	0% (0)	0% (0)	2.3% (1)	0% (0)	5.6% (4)	1.1% (1)	3.9% (5)	0.6% (1)
URB	6.7% (1)	6.3% (1)	0% (0)	5.7% (4)	5.6% (4)	11.4% (10)	3.9% (5)	8.6% (15)
OTH	53.3% (8)	18.8% (3)	55.8% (24)	30% (21)	59.2% (42)	37.5% (33)	57.4% (74)	32.8% (57)
TL	100% (15)	100% (16)	100% (43)	100% (70)	100% (71)	100% (88)	100% (129)	100% (174)

STR -- Structure
PER -- Personnel
FIN -- Finance
ADM -- Administrative law
SUP -- Supervision
URB -- Urban administration
OTH -- Others
TL -- Total

Note: Some percentage totals actually exceed 100 percent because of rounding.

that period. The key areas probed were personnel management, structural change, urban administration, financial management, administrative law, and the control of administration. The table also includes a category under which I calculated the number of the articles on a variety of issues such as association news, the discipline of public administration, the decision-making process, the art of the leadership, the psychology of administration, and other issues, such as administration in the army and the system of public security.

I placed all these articles in the category of "other" because I want to highlight administrative reform changes. The administration in the army and the system of public security was very different from public administration in general, especially in Communist-ruled China. Other issues such as the decision making process and the art of leadership were not among the main concerns of reforms. Most importantly, I need to look at certain major issues which I feel are vital to the administrative reforms in post-Mao China and to establish the authors' main interests.

The practitioners were very interested in personnel management. Fifty-four articles contributed by them were devoted to personnel management. Such subjects as structural change, urban administration, financial management, administrative law, and supervision of the administration were discussed in thirty-five, fourteen, nine, three, and one article respectively.

Why did the issue of personnel raise so much interest among practitioners? Although it is widely accepted that personnel is an essential part of public administration, China's long tradition of rule of man has certainly made the staffing of the administrative apparatus a prominent issue. When many problems used to be solved through informal connections rather than formal administrative procedures, the role of people rather than procedures was greatly underscored. As a result, faced with imminent changes within the administrative system, government officials attempted to influence changes when they were still at the discussion stage.

It is also conceivable that bureaucrats were concerned about changes in personnel policies, as their positions, power and privileges were at stake. One way of protecting their interests was to make sure that personnel changes proceeded in a direction that reduced the possible damage to the minimal level. Therefore, the education and training of incumbent government officials was emphasized. This was said to be "an important means for improving the cadres' qualifications (suzhi)."[45] There was also a suggestion that to recruit government officials based on contract (xuanpin hetongzhi) instead of assignment by the Party was problematic because it might undermine morale.[46]. Several personnel cadres argued that the new personnel policy stressing knowledge and expertise has sent many professionals (zhuanye jishu ganbu) to leading positions at various levels of management hierarchy. This group of new administrators were said to be weak in providing leadership, technically-oriented, and with little experience in mobilizing and motivating their subordinates, etc.[47]

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[45] Jiao Shanmin, "The Reform of China's Personnel System," Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.4.

Although the practitioners' focus on personnel matters was not obvious in 1985, it became prominent in the following two years. Only one out of the sixteen articles which appeared in the journal in 1985 and could be identified as contributed by practitioners was devoted to the issue of personnel. Instead, the issue of structural change, covered by seven articles, attracted most of their attention.

However, practitioners soon focused their discussion on personnel in both 1986 and 1987. Twenty-one out of seventy articles written by them in 1986 deliberated on the matter of personnel. In other words, 30% of their articles were devoted to this subject. The percentage became even higher in the following year when thirty-two articles, namely 36.4% of the eighty-eight articles contributed by the practitioners, discussed this subject.

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[46] He Shuxin and Ye Gaochao, "Dangzheng Jiguan Ganbu Shixing Xuanpin Hetongzhi Cunzai de Maodun" (The Contradictions in the Experiment with the Selection of Party and Government Cadres Based on Contract), Ibid., No.4, 1986, pp.17-18.

[47] Chen Anmin, Zhu Jialin and Zhu Xinguo, "Zhuanye Jishu Ganbu Zoushang Lingdao Gangwei Mianlin de xin Keti" (The New Tasks for Professionals Who have Assumed Leadership), Ibid., No.12, 1986, pp.17-19.

One might also notice that urban administration received increasing attention among this group of contributors. They wrote one, four, and ten articles on the topic in each of the three years during that period. This might reflect the fact that China's post-Mao leadership was deviating from Mao's "peasantry mentality" and switching its focus from the countryside to urban areas as municipalities were required to function as hubs of economic activities for the surrounding rural areas.[48] On the other hand, to refashion the administrative machinery in the urban areas was a mixed blessing for government officials. A key issue was that many cadres in municipal governments were considered superfluous and needed to be reassigned to other positions, often outside of the government.[49] When a government position meant power and privilege, bureaucrats' concerns were not groundless.

Practitioners said little about administrative law and supervision. During the 1985-1987 period, the journal published only three articles on administrative law written by practitioners. In addition, a single article written by a practitioner and devoted to the issue of supervision appeared in the journal for that period. The practitioners' reluctance to discuss administrative law and supervision was not difficult to understand. Used to rule of man, they knew little about and had no interest in administrative law and means of supervision over the administration. Even the PRC Constitution and the Organizational Law of the State Council do not specify clearly the definition and legal status of administrative law as well as the procedures for its establishment.[50] Also, human factors such as "informal connections" (renqing) in Chinese politics has made it very difficult to perform supervisory function effectively.[51] Therefore, bureaucrats were not enthusiastic about discussing the topic.

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[48] See, for example, Wang Dianguo, "Lue Lun Shiguanxian xin Tizhi" (On the New System of Cities Administering the Counties), Ibid., No.11, 1986, pp.5-6.

[49] Zhou Yan, "Zhongdeng Chengshi Jigou Gaige Shidian Qingkuang Diaocha Baogao" (A Report of Investigation on the Structural Reform in Medium-sized Cities), Ibid., No.5, 1987, pp.8-11.

Bureaucrats were already threatened by Deng's administrative reforms. They did not want more trouble by suggesting that they be bound by administrative law and controls. Indeed, the lack of administrative law and other effective ways of supervision was a main condition for cadres' "unhealthy tendencies" such as making personal profits by means of public office in post-Mao China.[52]

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[50] Gu Xueting, "Shilun Xingzheng Fagui" (On Administrative Laws), Ibid., No.5, 1986, p.9.

[51] Sun Youhai and Zhang Jianhua, "Tantan Huifu Queli Guojia Xingzheng Jiancha Tizhi de Jige Wenti" (Several Issues in Restoring the State's System of Administrative Supervision), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.2.

[52] Jiang Mingan, "Jianquan Xingzhengfa, Wanshan Shehuizhuyi Fazhi" (Improve Administrative Law and the Socialist Legal System), Ibid., No.2, 1987, p.11.

Moreover, the CCP has been the single most powerful institution that supervises the administrative apparatus since the founding of the People's Republic. If bureaucrats proposed an institution other that the CCP in supervising the nation's administrative apparatus, they could be taken as challenging the Party's authority. Therefore, the single article on supervision written by two officials from the State Council was circumspect in its elaboration. The two authors argued that the Party's agencies of disciplinary inspection should not take over the supervisory function supposedly performed by the government. Nonetheless, they also claimed that "When necessary, the Party's agencies of disciplinary inspection and the agencies of administrative supervision may cooperate closely and carry out joint investigation.[53]

As illustrated by Table IV, the intellectual contributors were more interested in administrative law and the issue of supervision. In the period, they wrote seven articles on administrative law and five articles on the issue of supervision, 5.4 per cent and 3.9 per cent of their articles. In comparison, only 1.7 per cent and 0.6 per cent of the practitioners' articles touched these two topics. Intellectuals' interest in these two topics increased during the period. While they did not write anything in regard to administrative law and the issue of supervision in 1985, they began to show their interest the following year with three articles on administrative law and one article on supervision appearing in the journal. Obviously encouraged by a favourable political climate, the intellectuals wrote even more on these two topics in 1987. The journal published four articles on administrative law and five articles on the issue of supervision.

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[53] Sun Youhai and Zhang Jianhua, "Several Issues in Restoring the State's System of Administrative Supervision," Ibid., No.2, 1987, pp.3-4.

Intellectuals' greater enthusiasm in these two areas is not hard to explain. Under Communist rule, Chinese intellectuals, as "outsiders," suffered at the hands of government officials. To prevent further persecution, the outsiders felt that more attention should be given to administrative law. China must stop allowing a leading cadre's words to substitute for law and bureaucratic power to suppress law.[54]

Despite past political persecution, intellectuals never lost their sense of mission. Every time when there was an opportunity, there were always some from the academic community who, serving as spokesmen on behalf of the society, risked their careers or even their lives to criticize the Communist authorities. The post-Mao reforms led by Deng provided them with another such opportunity. Prompted by their sense of mission, the intellectuals examined the administrative system to find out how it could be reformed to facilitate the nation's modernization. Many scholars faulted rule of man for problems in Mao's China. They believed that a key to the promotion of economy and the improvement of administration, which were the main contents of Deng's reform, was by means of law.[55]

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[54] Wu Shuzhi, "Jianquan Minzhu Fazhi shi Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige de Shouyao Renwu" (To Improve the Legal System of Democracy Is a Main Task of the Reform of the Political Structure), Ibid., No.9, 1987, p.3.

Many Chinese intellectuals were exposed to foreign political systems. Some of them knew such countries as the United States, Great Britain, and Japan and thus compared the People's Republic with such nations. Chinese intellectuals understood that certain structural elements keep administrative systems in those countries running more efficiently than the Chinese one. One of those elements, as some Chinese scholars pointed out, was the restraint of bureaucratic power. For example, governments in Great Britain, West Germany, France, and the United States established ethical codes for administrators. Incumbent government officials are not allowed to take any positions in private companies. Nor could they use public office for private gains. In addition to such codes, other means of restraint including an aggressive news media and various agencies of supervision are active.[56]

It should be remembered that intellectuals, like the practitioners, were also interested in the personnel matter. Eighteen out of the 129 articles written by the intellectuals for the journal during the three year period were on personnel management. Other subjects received less attention from this group of contributors. The reform of structure, financing, and urban reforms were covered in eleven, nine, and five articles by them respectively.

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[55] Ibid., pp.1-2.

[56] Liu Guangming, "Guowai Xingzheng Guanli zhong de Zhiye Daode Guifan" (Professional Ethical Codes in Public Administration Abroad), Ibid., No.11, 1987, pp.43-44.

There were, however, differences between the journal's two contributing groups' discussions on the topic of personnel. They seemed to have different motivations. The government officials intended to avoid being thrown out of the administrative system in the reforms. Only in this way can they continue to enjoy their power and privilege while sitting in public office. Therefore, their discussions were often motivated by the need to upgrade incumbent cadres' knowledge level.[57] In contrast, the intellectuals were looking forward to new opportunities whereby they could move into government positions so as to improve their status, both political and economic, and to put their beliefs into practice. This was part of the game that they were playing with the Communist leadership, whereby they hoped to replace revolutionary cadres in order to transform the system in accordance with their beliefs. With this purpose in their mind, they urged the leadership to recruit talented people[58] and argued that administrators' recruitment through examination (Kaorenzhi) rather than by appointment (Weirenzhi) is a "fundamental experience" (Jiben Jingnian) in successful reform.[59]

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[57] See, for example, Liao Shuzhong, "Qiantan Xingzheng Ganbu Peixun" (On the Training of Administrative Cadres), Ibid., No.2, 1986, p.12.

Not surprisingly, the two groups had different priorities. Practitioners did not like radical changes and favoured much of the status quo. They proposed such ideas as "always upholding the principle of the Party being in charge of cadres,"[60] "strengthening the education and training of incumbent cadres,"[61] and "reducing the recruitment of college graduates into the administrative system" because most of them were not specialized in public administration.[62] Intellectuals stressed that the old, closed system of recruiting administrators should be replaced by an open one, based on merit. They publicized an experiment in the City of Qingdao in which several high-ranking government officials were recruited through a process open to the public and based on merit.[63] Opposing to tinkering, they suggested that the current administrative structure be reformed in order to facilitate a new system of personnel management.[64]

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[58] Dong Jing, "Lingdaozhe yao you Yongren de Qiliang" (Leadership Should Have the Calibre to Employ Talented People), Ibid., No.3, 1986, p.30.

[59] Tang Daiwang, "Ganbu Zhidu Gaige ying cong Kaorenzhi Rushou" (The Reform of the Cadre System Should Start With Recruitment Through Examination), Ibid., No.12, 1986, p.14.

[60] Fu Guang, "Renshi Zhidu Gaige Qianyi" (A Brief Discussion on the System of Personnel), Ibid., No.9, 1986, p.8.

[61] Jiao Shanmin, "Zhongguo Renshi Zhidu de Gaige" (The Reform of China's Personnel System), Ibid., No.3, 1985, p.4.

[62] The proposal was that the new recruits should basically come from among high school graduates and that those to be assigned to positions at or above the middle level should be trained at institutes of public administration first. See Zheng Shishen, "Ganyu Ganbu Duiwu Zhengzhang de Hongguan Kongzhi" (On Macro-control Over the Growth of the Army of Cadres), Ibid., No.5, 1987, p.13.

Intellectuals also argued that structural reforms of administration should not be carried out in isolation. They should be advanced in concert with reforms in other areas,[65] for example, in the economy and political realms.[66] In order to administer the economy well, administrative supervision must be strengthened in addition to scientific policy making and flexible but effective policy implementation.[67]

Two other points were noteworthy. The journal ran few articles on financial management in the second half of the three year period. This could reflect a switch of focus among the top leadership in administrative reforms. The promotion of economy asks for a system's better performance in administering the economy. However, to administer the economy better asks for changes in other areas of the administrative system. In the meantime, as administrative reforms proceeded, it became clear for the society that they involved more than financial management. Other areas such as administrative law and supervision demanded further exploration. To put it simply, as time was passing by, both the state leadership and people in the society seemed to have perceived the complexity of administrative reforms. The journal ran more articles on reform in urban administration in the second half of the three year period, a further indication that the leadership was taking a more sophisticated approach to urban administration. But two questions arose. Could the ruling Party, trained in Mao's "peasantry mentality" and therefore not familiar with urban administrative affairs in a modernizing society, direct the administrative reforms successfully? Would the CCP, realizing that many intellectuals exposed to Western models of urban administration and engaged in the game of cooperation with the Communist authorities, still turn to them for help in the process?

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[63] Lu Zhenyu, "Qingdaoshi Gongkai Xuanpin Lingdao Ganbu de Diaocha yu Sikao" (An Investigation of and Some Thoughts on the Recruitment of Leading Cadres Through Open Selection in the City of Qingdao), Ibid., No.8, 1987, pp.22-24.

[64] Pan Debing, "Ganyu Pinrenzhi de Kexingxing Fenxi ji qi Qiantu Yuce" (On the Feasibility and Prospect of a System of Recruitment Through Selection), Ibid., No.10, 1986, pp.15-18.

[65] Diao Tianding, "Jingjian Jigou de Lishi Jingnian Zhide Zhuyi" (The Historical Experiences in Streamlining the Administrative Structure Merit Our Attention), Ibid., No.5, 1986, p.5.

[66] Xu Zhengyou and Zhang Jinbiao, "Lun Chengshi Zhengfu Jigou de Kexue Shezhi" (On the Scientific Establishment of the Structure in Municipal Governments), Ibid., No.6, 1987, p.16.

[67] Luo Yuanzheng, "Guojia Jingji Zhineng yu Xingzheng Guanli" (The State's Economic Function and Administration), Ibid., No.4, 1986, p.6 & p.31.

Conclusion

A review of Chinese Public Administration between 1985 and 1987 reveals several interesting points which are helpful for an understanding of the administrative reforms in post-Mao China. The journal was to serve as a principal forum for discussing administrative reforms. However, as it was subordinate to the State Council, the central bureaucracy of the nation, the journal has been turned into a publication mainly representing official opinion on reforms. Several consequences follow. In terms of the journal's focus, there are more articles about the successes of current policies than about theory. In terms of the journal's two groups of contributors, the practitioners received more coverage than the intellectuals.

Meanwhile, though toeing the official line, the two groups of contributors had different interest in their discussions. The government officials were more concerned with limited personnel changes and how to reduce their negative impacts. In contrast, the scholars tended to want to see more radical change in the system of personnel management so that they could have more opportunities to be incorporated into the system. More importantly, they were more enthusiastic in pushing for administrative law and means of supervision over the bureaucracy so that bureaucratic abuse of power could be curbed.

It has become quite clear that Chinese intellectuals, though encouraged to participate in the administrative reforms, their role was restrained. It was against this background that the post-Mao China's administrative system began to undergo organizational change, which is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter Five: Institutional Change for Efficiency

This chapter reviews institutional change in post-Mao China's administrative reform. The first part of the chapter examines several elements of administrative reform, including the staffing, structure and supervision of administration. The second part of this chapter probes several dilemmas of institutional change. Although changes often yielded encouraging results, the difficulties in refashioning the administrative system also created problems for the further implementation of the reformist policies. The chapter also examines the problem of the behavioural gap.

Developing a merit system

A principal aspect of reform is efforts to develop a "merit bureaucracy." The emphasis on merit is not surprising for several reasons. First, it fits the Chinese tradition of "going to school in order to become a government official." Second, it is now supported by younger, better-educated politicians and cadres because they could be promoted more quickly. Third, it opens the door for intellectuals to be incorporated into the system.

Interest in a merit system in China echoes Woodrow Wilson's argument: "A technically schooled civil service will presently have become indispensable."[1] But it remains to be seen whether the increasing weight of merit in China's public administration will result in "noetic authority,"[2] which might challenge the CCP's political authority.

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[1] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, Vol.LVI, December 1941, p.500.

Two important steps have been taken in order to develop a merit system. One was to add more technical requirements to administrators' qualifications. The other was to reduce political interference in government.

For decades a guiding principle for Chinese personnel management was to be "red and expert." This caricature embodied Mao's ideological approach to administration and stressed ideological loyalty to the Party. Deng and his entourage established new standards for cadres which emphasized expert knowledge. Song Renqiong, Director of the Department of Organization of the Party's Central Committee, said in 1980 that "socialist four modernizations urgently require that our army of cadres gradually become younger and more professional."[3] In 1981, the Department expressed a commitment to making "our army of cadres younger, more knowledgeable and more professional."[4]

Opposition to greater technical expertise in staffing the administration was noteworthy even at the apex of power. Wei Guoqing, a member of the Politburo and Director of the General

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[2] Cited in Ralph C. Chandler and Jack C. Plano, The Public Administration Dictionary (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), p.23.

[3] RMRB, July 19, 1980.

[4] Ibid., January 29, 1981.

Political Department of the PLA claimed that "in order to make the army of cadres younger, more knowledgeable and more professional, we must first of all emphasize their being more revolutionary."[5] At the time, this lonely voice was largely ignored. But it revealed tensions among leading politicians. Wei's remarks reinforced opposition to a merit system in public administration because of his influence.

A month after Wei's speech, an editorial in Renmin Ribao asserted that cadres should be younger, more knowledgeable and more professional.[6] Inconsistency in policy-making certainly was not a rare occurrence in the PRC. Establishing a merit system in Chinese public administration required double efforts. It took another several months for the authorities to settle the issue.

In June 1981, a commentator in Renmin Ribao made it explicit that "the primary task of the organizational work this year is to enable leading bodies at various levels to move toward being more revolutionized, younger, more knowledgeable and more professional."[7] The four criteria for rating cadres were finally established not so much for maintaining a balance between "red" and "expert" as for silencing ideological diehards. This view was attested to by developments in the months to come. A merit system began to take shape.

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[5] Ibid., February 4, 1981.

[6] Ibid., March 11, 1981.

[7] Ibid., June 26, 1981.

The standard of education within the Party and among cadres was low. At the outset of reform a mere four per cent of Party members, namely about 1.6 million, were college-educated.[8] Approximately one tenth of the Party members were illiterate.[9] Only six per cent of the eight hundred and ten thousand leading cadres at various levels of state institutions (guojia jiguan), Party and mass organizations, enterprises and shiye danwei had college education.[10] Approximately eleven per cent of the county leaders,[11] fourteen per cent of bureau heads in provinces,[12] and twenty per cent of provincial leaders,[13] had a college background. Although China is an agricultural country, only 3.6 per cent of the leading cadres in charge of agriculture at provincial, prefectural and county levels had formal training in the area.[14]

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[8] RMRB, November 20, 1984.

[9] RMRB, March 15, 1985.

[10] Li Rui, "Xin Xingshi xia de Yongren zhi Dao" (A Principle of Personnel Management Under New Circumstances), Hongqi, No.7, 1985; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.4, 1985, p.110. Li was formerly a Deputy Head of the Department of Organization of the CCP's Central Committee. Shiye danwei means economically non-independent accounting units that engage in education or medical and health work, etc.. See Jianming Shehui Kexue Cidian (Concise Dictionary of Social Sciences) (Shanghai: 1984), p.566.

[11] RMRB, October 5, 1984.

[12] You Chunmei, "Woguo Dangqian Xingzheng Gaige de Lilun he Shijian" (Theories and Practices of Current Administrative Reform in Our Country), Xinhua Wenzhai, No.4, 1986, p.8.

[13] RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 8, 1985.

The adjustment of leadership in 1983 and 1984 yielded results in the adoption of a merit system. By 1985, forty-five per cent of county leaders had received college education,[15] as had forty-four per cent of bureau heads in provinces and sixty per cent of provincial leaders.[16] At the central level, seventy-one per cent of the heads in the eighty-one units directly under the State Council now had a college background.[17]

Several factors contributed to this accomplishment. First was pressure from the central leadership. Aware of the difficulties in switching to a merit system, Hu Yaobang suggested that work teams be sent to provinces to help them with the job.[18] Consequently in 1983 "such teams were sent to about one third of the provinces, with another third being given strong 'central guidance' on whom to include and exclude in forming the new leadership."[19]

Second, many old cadres were cajoled into retirement, reducing the illiteracy and semi-literacy rate among cadres.

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[14] RMRB, September 24, 1980.

[15] Ibid., December 5, 1984.

[16] See You Chunmei, Xinhua Wenzhai, No.4, 1986, p.8, and RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 8, 1985.

[17] RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 14, 1985.

[18] Beijing Review, Vol.25, No.44, November 1, 1982, p.16.

[19] Los Angeles times, April 14, 1983.

Ages for retirement were also set. For instance, a minister should not exceed sixty-five while a vice-minister or a head or a deputy head of a bureau in a ministry should not go beyond sixty.[20] According to Hu, more than 1.1 million of old cadres "withdrew from the front line" in response to the call for rejuvenation.[21] To persuade these veterans to quit, or in Deng Xiaoping's words, "to absorb a number of veteran comrades,"[22] two kinds of institutions were set up -- commissions for discipline inspection and advisory commissions. The latter, as it turned out later, became "houses" for pensioners, into which septuagenarians and octogenarians agreed to fade out without jeopardizing their perks.

Many cadres with better education were promoted and placed in leading positions, expediting the movement toward a merit system. Wang Zhaohua, Deputy Head of the Department of Organization of the CCP's Central Committee, estimated that twenty per cent of the cadres, namely 4.2 million, attended colleges. He urged that they enjoy the full confidence of the Party and be entrusted with important tasks.[23] To echo Wang's call, governments at various levels sent many college-educated cadres to the leadership core. An associate professor and expert in ship-building was assigned to the Vice-Governorship of Hubei Province. Two thirds of the members of the Party's Provincial Standing Committee in Guangdong had college education.[24] Five of the twelve members of the Party's Municipal Standing Committee in Shanghai were senior engineers.[25] Eighty per cent of the 126 cadres sent to provincial leadership in 1984 were college educated.[26] Altogether, eighty thousand "more knowledgeable and professional" young and middle-aged cadres were promoted to leading posts at or above the county level.[27]

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[20] RMRB, March 9, 1982.

[21] RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 8, 1985.

[22] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.362.

[23] Wang Zhaohua, "Jiakuai Ganbu 'Sihua' de Jincheng" (Expedite the Process of Realizing the "Four Criteria" in the Army of Cadres), Liaowang, No.10, 1983; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.10, 1983, p.47.

"Crash programs" were established to reeducate cadres for modernization. This would conform to the old pattern of being "red and expert" and neutralize disputes among political leaders on personnel management. In addition, it would help alleviate resentment among bureaucrats. In 1983, the Party decided that the principal leading members of the Party and government must attend Party schools for further education.[28]

This resolution relaxed many incumbents because they could now go to Party schools to meet the four criteria and thereby retain their posts. In Hunan Province more than fifty "relatively young" leading cadres at provincial and prefectural levels with "relatively low educational background" were sent to the Provincial Party School for extended study. Among them were two provincial Party secretaries and a member of the Party's Provincial Standing Committee.[29] Hubei Province sent more than four hundred leading cadres of the Party and government at various levels to eight universities for extension courses.[30] Heilongjiang Province even boasted of enrolling one ninth of its nine hundred thousand cadres in systematic educational program in about one year since 1983.[31] Across the nation more than 3.7 million cadres underwent training between 1979 and 1983.[32] Figures provided by Jiao Shanming, Vice-Minister of Labour and Personnel, revealed that approximately 1.5 million of them were trained either in 1,854 institutions of secondary or higher learning or in 8,677 newly-established cadre schools. Another two million took extension courses.[33]

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[24] Ming Pao, March 22, 1983.

[25] Ibid., March 20, 1983.

[26] RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 8, 1985.

[27] RMRB, February 11, 1985.

[28] RMRB, May 20, 1983.

Seminars on modern management were held. The Provincial Government of Anhui sponsored a colloquium entitled "Science of Leadership and Decision-making" in 1983. Topics included:

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[29] Ibid., March 23, 1983.

[30] Ibid., March 12, 1983.

[31] GMRB, December 16, 1984.

[32] RMRB, July 22, 1983.

[33] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 16, 1985.

"Intelligence Investment and Talent Education," "Predictions and Decision-making" and "Current Situation and Tendency of Management," etc..[34] The same year witnessed the opening of a seminar for mayors and vice-mayors. Sixty mayors and vice-mayors attended the first term and took courses on administration, efficiency, leadership, think tanks and decision-making, municipal planning and construction.[35] By 1985, more than one hundred thousand leading cadres at or above prefectural/municipal level went to such seminars. The participants included more than two hundred and sixty mayors, more than one thousand bureau heads in ministries or committees under the State Council, and more than two hundred ministers and vice-ministers.[36]

Foreign aid was enlisted to educate cadres. The urgent need for qualified managers and administrators gave birth to the National Centre for Industrial Science and Technology Management Development at Dalian in 1980. It was a joint Sino-U.S. project aimed at introducing Chinese officials to Western management techniques. By 1983, the Centre had produced seven hundred graduates, most of whom were factory directors or managers.[37] A graduate class commencing in April

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[34] RMRB, November 2, 1983.

[35] Ming Pao, August 23, 1983.

[36] RMRB (Overseas Edition), September 29, 1985.

[37] China Reconstructs, Vol.XXXIII, No.1, January 1984, pp.60-61.

1984 was geared to the needs of senior administrators, admitting chairmen of economic planning committees in municipal and provincial governments and officials at the bureau level from industrial ministries of the Central Government.[38] Among those who were trained at the Centre, one was appointed Vice-Minister of the Coal Industry and another assumed the vice-governorship of Shanxi Province. Wang Zhaoguo, Director of the General Office of the CCP's Central Committee, also participated in the programme in 1980 when he was a vice-director of the Second Automobile Factory in Hubei.[39] Measures to upgrade the technical and managerial capabilities of government officials were supplemented by efforts to eliminate incompetent Party cadres from administration.

Hua Guofeng's resignation from the post of premier in favour of Zhao Ziyang in September 1980 was a major step toward reducing the Party's influence in government.[40] Tony Saich regards it as "the culmination of the general trend to ensure that leading Party and state posts were not held by the same person."[41] In Deng Xiaoping's words, this and related changes would "facilitate the establishment of an effective work system at the various levels of government from top to bottom, and promote a better exercise of government functions and powers."[42] The parallel hierarchy was separated and the Party was shrinking in size. For example, a provincial Party committee used to have approximately ten secretaries supervise various government departments. It normally set up more than ten Party agencies for the same purpose. Both numbers were halved by reducing Party interference in government.[43]

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[38] Ming Pao, August 29, 1983.

[39] China Daily, November 7, 1984.

[40] The move also signals the decline of Hua's political clout. See Dorothy Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy Making: Reform, Readjustment, and the Opposition," Asian Survey, December 1982, pp.1238-1275.

The Party gave up some of its functions and some of its organizations withdrew from administrative affairs. For instance, the Party and the Government in Shijiazhuang Prefecture of Hebei Province ended the practice of holding joint meetings and issuing joint documents. Government reports were no longer submitted to the Party's Standing Committee for discussion.[44] Government officials obtained autonomy vis-a-vis the Party and can now make decisions based on professional knowledge, not merely political dictates.

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[41] Tony Saich, China: Politics and Government (Hong Kong: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1981), p.224. It should also be pointed out that Hua's resignation was meant to pave the way for Zhao Ziyang, one of Deng's protege, to take over the premiership.

[42] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p,303.

[43] Yang Baikui, "Reform in Party-Government Relations in China Since 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, CPC," ZZXYJ, No.6, 1986, p.10.

[44] Hebei Ribao, October 21, 1982; in FYBKZL (ZGZZ), No.10, 1982, p.68.

The 1982 constitutions of both the State and the Party strengthened the status of government officials, paving the way for administration "equipped with a specialized competence," as predicted by Marshal and Gladys Dimock.[45] The Constitution of the PRC stipulates for the system of overall responsibility by chief executives at various levels.[46] The Constitution of the CCP provides that the Party "must see to it that the legislative, judicial and administrative organs of the State ... work actively and with initiative, independently, responsibly and in harmony."[47] The primary Party organizations in government offices "should not lead the work of these offices."[48] These clauses, if implemented faithfully, should lead to a less political and more professional administration. The abolition of people's communes was a significant step in this direction.

People's communes served as local governments at the grassroots level since 1958 when the Politburo of the CPC adopted a resolution on their establishment. As a new form of organization, they originally "grew out of ad hoc decision" and were swiftly copied throughout the country.[49] Yet it took much longer to admit officially the disadvantages of political interference in government.[50] In 1983 the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council announced a commitment to separate government administration from commune management.[51] Altogether, 92,586 township and town governments were established across the nation.[52]

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[45] Marshal Edward Dimock and Gladys Ogden Dimock, Public Administration, 4th Ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1969), p.604.

[46] "Constitution of the PRC," Articles 86 & 105, Beijing Review, Vol.25, No.52, December 27, 1982, pp.23 & 26.

[47] "Constitution of the CPC," General Programme, Beijing Review, Vol,25, No.38, September 20, 1982, p.10.

[48] Ibid., Article 33, p.18.

Staffing procedures also changed. The commune cadres were mostly handpicked in political campaigns as beneficiaries of patronage.[53] Their administrative skills were questionable. But the demise of people's communes undercut old staffing practices. The leaders of township governments were now to be recruited through open competition and on a contract basis.

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[49] Harry Harding, Organizing China, p.179.

[50] See RMRB, November 7, 1983.

[51] Wu Yue & Wu Weisheng, "Viewing the Dual Character of the Township and Village Relation From the Historical Development of Township Power and Village Government," ZZXYJ, No.2, 1986, p.45. Actually the restoration of township governments started in some areas as early as 1981. See Li Sanyuan, "The Process Aimed at Perfection in the Township Regime Building in the Suburbs of Beijing (Summary)," Ibid., No.5, 1986, p.61. For a description of the development of grassroots governments in the countryside since 1949 see also Yang Xuemin, "The Historical Experience Concerning the Building of People's Political Power at Grassroots Levels in China's Countryside," Ibid., No.1, 1986, pp.30-34.

[52] "Dangqian Xiangzhen Zhengquan Jianshe xu Jiejue de Jige Wenti" (Several Problems That Need to be Resolved in Current Construction of Township and Town Governments), ZGXZGL, No.2, 1985, p.26.

[53] Li Sanyuan, p.61.

They could no longer hold an "iron rice-bowl."[54] Only those with satisfactory performance would be renewed. The days of assuming public office without having necessary knowledge were numbered. Recruitment of government officials was now more likely to be based on professional competence and administrative ability rather than ideological loyalty.

The readjustment of the Party-government relationship also occurred in the cities. Enterprises were shaken up. In October 1984, the CCP decided to carry out the system of overall responsibility by directors.[55] Professionals were formally included into the administrative leadership at enterprises or factories. These professionals are chief engineers, chief economic managers and chief accountants. What is more noteworthy, the leadership list is ranked in new order, with the professionals ranked ahead of their political bosses.[56] Leadership is now shared among political bosses, administrators and professionals. In the following year similar decisions on overall responsibility by chief administrators were made with regard to research institutes,[57] hospitals and schools.[58]

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[54] RMRB, May 25, 1984. An "iron rice-bowl" alludes to the jobs provided by the state. Once you are employed, a life-long job is guaranteed. Once you become a cadre, you can only be promoted if no serious error is made.

[55] "Decision on the Reform of Economic Structure," RMRB, October 21, 1984.

[56] Ibid.

[57] GMRB, March 20, 1985.

In some areas more radical measures were taken to bar Party interference. The Shenzhen University abolished full-time positions for all three major Party departments.[59] A highway engineering company of the Ministry of Communications even eliminated a full-time position for the Party branch secretary.[60] In hundreds of newly-established collectively-owned enterprises in the capital city of Anhui Province, the post for the secretary of a Party's branch was abolished.[61]

To reduce further political interference in government, Zhao Ziyang proposed at the CCP's Thirteenth National Congress that the separation of Party and government was "the key to reforming the political structure." He suggested that relations between the Party, the people's congresses, governments, and other organizations be "rationalized" and gradually "institutionalized." Moreover, he proposed "the Party committee at a given level" should not "designate a full--time secretary or member of its standing committee, who holds no government post, to take charge of government work."[62]

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[58] Ibid., May 8, 1985; May 29, 1985.

[59] Ibid., November 22, 1986. The three major Party departments are the Propaganda Department, the Organization Department and the Department of the United Front Work.

[60] RMRB (Overseas Edition), October 3, 1987.

[61] Ibid., October 12, 1986.

The efforts to bring about a merit system achieved some success. But a price was paid. The strengthening of the administration was done at the expense of other institutions. Though commissions for discipline inspection and advisory commissions were employed to buffer the shock caused by the new personnel policy, these measures were probably not enough.[63] For some people, to work in a commission for discipline inspection could offend other cadres, who belonged to a powerful informal network. For others a post in an advisory commission could mean limited access to power and reduced perquisites. Therefore, the people's congress became a third institution to accommodate would-be retirees. For example, nine of the twenty Vice-Chairmen of the Sixth National People's Congress were in their seventies. The average age of the nation's top twenty-one legislators was seventy-four, and the oldest of them was already ninety-three.[64] As a result, the effectiveness of these institutions was seriously undermined.

The "four criteria" prompted the emergence of the

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[62] Zhao Ziyang, "Advance Along the Road of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics," Beijing Review, Vol.30, No.45, November 9-15, 1987, p.38. It should be pointed out that whether and to what degree these proposals will be put into practice after Zhao's political demise remains to be seen.

[63] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.392.

[64] Tao Jun, "Pushi Liujie Renda" (An analysis of the Sixth National People's Congress), Zheng Ming, No.7, 1983, pp.51-53.

"princes' faction." The children of high officials had "red" family backgrounds, superior education, and better connections. They advanced rapidly in their careers. Whether their promotions were driven by merit or nepotism is an open question.

In addition, although a certain percentage of aged cadres with inadequate educational background were put on the shelf, many other cadres, not particularly old and poorly-educated, remained. Various "crash programmes," aimed at appeasing the change-resistant cadres, turned them into "better-educated" government officials. But are they competent?

Reduced political interference in government affairs through separating the Party from government certainly contributed to a merit system. The move, however, also weakened political supervision over administration. If other means of supervision did not fill the void, an administrative bureaucracy, assigned to manage the modernization programme, but left unsupervised, might impair the drive for prosperity.

On the whole, more better-qualified administrative staff were recruited and promoted. As a new generation of government officials, they would learn to manage the nation's modernization more efficiently. Their efforts, however, had to fit in an environment, where administrative power would have to be diluted.

Diluting administrative power

Coincident with the establishment of a merit system in administration were efforts to dilute administrative power. This constitutes a second theme in institutional change. Like the merit system, the dilution of power was also designed to achieve administrative efficiency.

Deng stressed the dilution of administrative power. But China's tradition favoured a centralized administration. CCP ideology upholds democratic centralism with emphasis placed on centralism. Bureaucrats, of course, did not appreciate what Franz Schurmann calls "Decentralization I," because it meant a loss of power. On the other hand, the reformist politicians thought that the dilution of administrative power would help to lift the nation out of poverty. They believed that the dilution of administrative power, if in the form of "Decentralization II" as described by Schurmann,[65] would improve administrative efficiency by making bureaucracy responsive to local needs.

The formal structure of authority through which administrative work is subdivided and defined was reshaped in order to disperse administrative power. People's communes were reorganized. The township Party committees take care of the Party affairs. The township governments perform administrative responsibilities and the people's communes are in charge of production. This organizational restructuring tried to reduce the Party's intervention in administration and arbitrary bureaucratic interference in economic activities.

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[65] According to Franz Schurmann, "Decentralization I" refers to the transferring of decision-making power "all the way down to the production units." "Decentralization II" means that decision-making power is "only transferred down to some level of regional administration." See Franz Schurmann, pp.175-6.

The revamping also took place in the urban areas. Since the authorities decided on the reform of economic structure in October 1984, many government bureaus were converted into companies in order to separate administration from enterprises and cut down bureaucratic interference with economic activities.[66] Jiangmen City of Guangdong Province was chosen as a "trial point" by the State Commission on Economic Restructuring and the Provincial Government for reorganization experiment. Prior to the end of 1984 the city had five industrial administrative bureaus (in charge of mechanics, electronics, chemical engineering, light industry and second light industry) and five administrative companies (in charge of textile industry, sugar refining and papermaking, metallurgical industry, building materials, and medicine), which were subordinate to bureaus. These administrative agencies were transformed into service companies, providing economic and technical service and responsible for their own losses and profits. As a result, the four-layered administrative hierarchy, composed of municipal government, economic commissions, bureaus and administrative companies, became two-layered. Bureaucratic meddling in enterprises was reduced and enterprises gained management autonomy.[67]

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[66] In fact the experimentation of reorganizing administrative bureaus into business companies occurred in early 1983. For example, Changzhou City in Jiangsu Province eliminated all its six industrial bureaus and established in their place eleven business companies. See RMRB, April 16, 1983. As well, Guangzhou City in Guangdong Province transformed ten bureaus into business companies. See Ming Pao, June 30, 1983.

Some cities opted to reorganize administrative companies. For example, all forty-five administrative industrial companies in Wuhan City of Hubei Province were transformed to a degree. They were either reshaped into enterprises, deprived of certain administrative functions or readied for a move in this direction.[68] Shanghai began to reorganize its administrative agencies in 1986.[69] By the end of the year it had dismantled sixty-eight of its seventy-seven administrative industrial companies.[70]

Provinces were also gaining more autonomy. In July 1979 the Central Government empowered Guangdong and Fujian provinces to set up four Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen,

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[67] The Jiangmen Municipal Party Committee and the Jiangmen Municipal People's Government, "Gaibian Zhengfu Jingji Guanli Zhineng, Tansuo Xinxing Zhengqi Guanxi Moshi" (Change Government Functions in Economic Management And Explore New Models in the Relationship Between Government and Enterprises), ZGXZGL, No.8, 1986, pp.6-9.

[68] Xiong Chaohua et al., "Investigations of the Reform Practice in Grade-two Companies in Wuhan," ZZXYJ, No.5, 1986, pp.72-75.

[69] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 3, 1986.

[70] GMRB, February 9, 1987.

Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen.[71] According to Gu Mu, a member of the State Council in charge of Special Economic Zones, one of the vital characteristics of these zones is that they practise a managerial system different from the rest of the nation and that they enjoy more autonomy in decision-making.[72] The autonomy of the Shekou Industrial District in Shenzhen could serve as an example of how the administrative direction in these Special Economic Zones was made more adaptive to markets. The Administrative Committee of the Shekou Industrial District was granted authority in directing production and construction of the whole area. It could strike bargains on its own according to the special policies and demands of enterprises, without wasting time and energy on seeking approval from each level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The thirteen corporations in the industrial district also enjoyed similar autonomy. They were not required to report details to the higher administrative body for endorsement.[73] All of them were delegated power over personnel, finance and management.[74]

In July 1979 the Central Government also laid down the principle of "specific policies and flexible measures" for Guangdong's and Fujian's administrative activities. This meant that the two provincial governments had more management autonomy. Instead of having papers travelling slowly up to the Centre to receive approval, many projects of cooperation with foreign businessmen, overseas Chinese, and compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao were undertaken by the provincial authorities. Consequently, as the Governor of Guangdong said, the provincial economy was booming.[75]

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[71] Liaowang (Overseas Edition), No.7, February 18, 1985, p.15.

[72] RMRB, April 23, 1984.

[73] Ibid., April 2, 1984.

[74] Ibid., April 21, 1984.

Guangdong and Fujian have benefited from decentralization but not without controversy. Some senior cadres, disputed the merit of delegation of power and the resultant lax state control over society. They flatly alleged that without the "Five-Star Red Flag," Shenzhen City was anything but socialist.[76] Others concluded that Guangdong Province had restored capitalism and its governor had degenerated into a "capitalist roader." Differences among politicians over decentralization brought more discord into Deng's modernization plans.[77]

Provinces also gained more autonomy through interprovincial coordination and horizontal links among themselves. In 1983, the central authorities began to consider the establishment of economic zones as a means for granting more power to provinces. Under discussion were the Shanghai Economic Zone, the Pearl River Delta Economic Zone, the Southwest Economic Zone and the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan Economic Zone.[78] According to Wang Lin, Director of the Planning Office of the Shanghai Economic Zone under the State Council, "the economic zone might better be called an economic network" for strengthening economic ties and coordinating economic activities within the network.[79] Zhao Ziyang, while speaking on the economic zone, said explicitly that "plans of each place and each department must be unified into a regional plan with no change in the subordination of the enterprises to the cities."[80] How to coordinate economic activities within the network was a big challenge for the administration, especially when the network was trans-regional and went beyond the boundaries of administrative jurisdictions.

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[75] Ibid., April 4, 1984.

[76] Luo Bin, "Dangnei Zhenglun yu Deng Xiaoping Waixun" (Dispute within The Party and Deng Xiaoping's Tour Outside of Beijing), Zheng Ming, March 1984, p.7.

[77] Luo Bin, "Chen Yun he Deng Xiaoping de Fenqi" (Differences Between Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping), Zheng Ming, June 1984, pp.26-28.

The Shanghai Economic Zone, established in January 1983, initially included four cities in Jiangsu Province, five cities in Zhejiang Province, and fifty-five counties.[81] More than seventeen hundred trans-regional economic and technical agreements or letters of intent were hammered out at its first meeting of coordination.[82]

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[78] Ming Pao, August 8, 1983.

[79] Beijing Review, Vol.27, No.16, April 16, 1984, pp.16-17.

[80] Ming Pao, August 20, 1983.

[81] The Shanghai Zone was expanded at the end of 1984 to include Shanghai municipality and the whole of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi provinces, covering forty-nine cities and three hundred and one counties. See China Daily, December 18, 1984.

The smaller Pearl River Delta Economic Zone comprised eight cities and twenty-four counties in the Delta area and covered about 46,000 square kilometres.[83] There was, however, a major difference between the two zones. The Delta Zone was located entirely within Guangdong Province. The Provincial Working Group for the Delta Zone was placed under the Governor's direct leadership.[84] As a result, administrative coordination was much easier. But the Guangdong case is an exception.

In 1984, a five-day meeting on coordination of economic activities by three provinces (Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou), an autonomous region (Guangxi) and a city (Chongqing) marked another effort by the Central Government to grant regions more autonomy. The meeting was prompted by Hu Yaobang when he inspected Guizhou Province.[85] The gathering sought to bring about trans-regional economic cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, rotation of the presidency (lunliu zuozhuang) and unanimity. At its conclusion 228 bilateral or multilateral agreements were signed. The participants also decided to meet annually and to establish a standing coordinating body in Chongqing.[86]

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[82] Liaowang (Overseas Edition), No.37, September 16, 1985, p.25.

[83] Ibid., March 22, 1984.

[84] Ibid., November 26, 1983.

[85] GMRB, April 20, 1984.

Local administrative bodies also gained power. For example, officials of municipal governments were urged to extend their powers of organizing and coordinating the economy.[87] By early 1986, six economic zones had emerged, all of which had big or medium-size cities as their hubs. Thus, Shanghai served as a central link for the Shanghai Economic Zone (or the East China Economic Zone); Shenyang and Dalian -- for the North-East China Economic Zone; Chongqing -- for the South-West China Economic Zone; Tianjin -- for the North China Economic Zone; Guangzhou -- for the South China Zone (or the Pearl River Economic Zone; Changzhi -- for the Central Plains Economic Zone.[88]

Changes also took place at the central level. In 1983, the Ministry of Textile Industry stopped operating textile plants. It has since left the management of the industry to local governments and enterprises. The State Council called on other ministries to follow suit.[89] However, it took a long time to achieve this goal. For example, the Ministry of Machine-Building Industry did not abdicate all its sixty-two enterprises to local governments until May 1985.[90] Slowly, more and more centrally-run enterprises were handed over to the local authorities as they obtained autonomy to respond to market forces.

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[86] RMRB, April 20, 1984.

[87] Ibid., July 27, 1984.

[88] Liaowang (Overseas Edition), No.13, March 31, 1986, p.11.

[89] RMRB, February 17, 1983.

Changes in the structure of administration also means that national economic planning is no longer monopolized by government bureaucrats. In 1983, a State Council circular made it public that the range of commodities strictly controlled by state planning (including manufactured goods and farm and sideline produce) would be gradually cut back. At the same time, goods sold and purchased at negotiated prices would grow in variety.[91] The State began to relax its control through administrative planning over economy. In 1984, China's planned economy was officially renamed as a planned commodity economy so that adequate importance could be given to "commodity production, the law of value and the regulatory role of the market."[92]

In January 1985 Zhao Ziyang declared that the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing would be removed from most farm produce including grain and cotton. In addition, farmers were told to arrange their production according to markets.[93] These views were confirmed in the No.1 Circular of the Party's Central Committee, which announced the abolition of state purchase quotas on most of the agricultural produce.[94]

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[90] Ibid., June 8, 1985.

[91] Ibid., February 27, 1983.

[92] Ibid., October 21, 1984.

[93] Ibid., January 31, 1985.

Industrial products covered by mandatory planning of the State Planning Commission were reduced to sixty from more than three hundred. In 1984 two hundred fifty-six materials came under state monopoly for purchase and distribution. By the end of 1987, only twenty-six of them remained there. Meanwhile, markets of technology, finance, material, and labour were emerging across the nation. Overall, only half of the national economy was regulated through state planning in 1987, down from one hundred per cent in 1978.[95]

The move to dilute centralized control led to changes in the the recruitment of administrative personnel. The previous practice of appointing cadres on the basis of political criteria was challenged. The staffing of the administration had to have other considerations and be done through other ways. One of them was recruitment on contract basis. As described earlier, many township administrators were hired through open competition. The control of personnel by the higher level shrank. There were similar cases in the urban areas, which, though, proceeded with more caution.

The Shekou Industrial District of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone began to fill administrative positions through open competition in 1981. Applicants had to pass oral and written exams, go through brief training and then be interviewed by employers.[96] The practice was soon extended to the entire province. According to Ren Zhongyi, First Secretary of the Party's Provincial Committee in Guangdong, by 1983 the staffing of the Party and government bureaucracies in the province was accomplished through election, appointment, recommendation, examination and contractual appointment.[97] The new process decentralized personnel management.

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[94] Ibid., March 25, 1985.

[95] RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 9, 1987.

As reform proceeded, decentralization in personnel management continued. In May 1984, the State Council issued new regulations, granting more freedom to state-owned industrial enterprises. The decision entitled "Provisional Regulations on Greater Freedom for State-owned Industrial Enterprises," was based on an experiment which allowed enterprises to manage themselves. The exploratory venture was first conducted in Sichuan Province in October 1978 and expanded to more than six thousand enterprises in 1980.[98] As a result of this new policy, enterprises hire workers on the basis of examination and recruit technicians and managerial personnel directly. The factory director appoints or dismisses cadres under him; his deputies, however, are subject to approval from above.[99]

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[96] Ming Pao, March 28, 1983.

[97] RMRB, June 10, 1983.

[98] Beijing Review, Vol.24, No.14, April 6, 1981.

[99] RMRB, May 12, 1984. See also China Daily, May 15, 1984.

In 1984, the Secretariat of the CCP's Central Committee decided to delegate its power over personnel management and to reduce the number of leading cadres under direct central control. The Party's Central Committee would be in direct charge of only the main leading cadres one level below.[100]

Many municipal governments followed suit and decentralized personnel management. In the process they employed various means. For example, Chongqing City of Sichuan Province developed four avenues of recruitment, three of which required open competition. The staffing of township and town governments and some enterprises assumed contractual form. Scientific, cultural and medical care institutions employed their technical personnel through contracts (pinging). Cadres in the Party and government agencies and some other public institutions and enterprises were selected for a fixed term, during which certain goals were to be reached.[101] In July 1986, Shenzhen City appointed several leading cadres at the bureau level through public advertisement and open competition.[102] Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan Province, went a step farther by announcing that it would advertise for all new positions in the Party and government bureaucracies.[103] Success was achieved at the higher levels as well. Jilin Province began to invite applications for government positions in early 1985. By the middle of 1986 about 6,300 people out of more than 80,000 applicants were employed as state cadres.[104] As a result of delegation of power in personnel management, the number of cadres directly controlled by the Party was reduced by two thirds.[105]

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[100] RMRB, July 20, 1984.

[101] RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 14, 1986.

[102] RMRB (Overseas Edition), July 15, 1986.

[103] Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (hereafter ZGQNB), December 19, 1986.

Political cadres probably suffered the most from these changes. Chongqing was the first city to test China's market-oriented reform. After establishing new management systems in 1984, it was factory directors and managers, not the Party secretaries, that assumed full responsibilities, including the power to decide on workers' bonuses.[106] In Dalian City of Liaoning Province, Party committees in factories and enterprises were told to hand over to directors or managers the power of production, management and administration.[107]

Further changes were proposed at the CCP's Thirteenth Congress in October 1987. Zhao Ziyang suggested that a system of public service be established and that public servants be divided into two categories -- political and professional. The Party will "recommend" candidates in the first category and "supervise and manage" only Party members in the second category. Public servants in professional work will be "managed in accordance with the law governing public servants." Their evaluation will be based "manly on their work results." "Their rights to training, wages, welfare and retirement will be guaranteed by law."[108]

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[104] Ibid., May 2, 1986.

[105] RMRB (Overseas Edition), October 11, 1987.

[106] China Daily, October 27, 1984.

[107] RMRB, October 28, 1984.

Zhao's proposals, in John Burns' words, meant "a net loss of control over individuals by the Party."[109] The role for professionals and experts in personnel administration could be expanded. But opposition to these proposals from territorial Party committees and from conservative elements within the Party was inevitable.

The delegation of administrative power has brought about several consequences in China's public administration. Positively, decentralized administration has meant less rigid central control, less bureaucratic muddling and more response by the state to the needs of society. In other words, administrative effectiveness has been enhanced. An example was the revival of the tertiary sector and the resultant invigoration of urban life.[110] But decentralization was never easy. A major problem was the so-called "clogging in the middle." The top level of administration wanted to delegate power. The enterprises at the bottom welcomed the decision. The bureaucrats in between, however, had little interest in implementing the policy of decentralization. They paid it lip service.[111]

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[108] Zhao Ziyang, Beijing Review, November 9-15, 1987, p.40.

[109] John P. Burns, "Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress Proposals," China Quarterly, December 1989, pp.769-770.

[110] See Li Rongxia, "Tertiary Industry Takes Off in China," Beijing Review, Vol.30, No.5-6, February 9, 1987, pp.18-9.

Decentralization meant fewer revenues for the Centre from those increasingly affluent provinces that benefited from reform. As a result, the central government had to negotiate with local governments over revenue-sharing arrangements "from a progressively weaker position."[112] Fluctuating revenues became a serious consequence of Deng's reforms.

And since Deng's reform was "top down," the dilution of administrative power meant that the management from the Centre of the modernization programme will face more difficulties. These include clashes of interest between the Centre and the regions and between administrative agencies and enterprises. Also, conflicts between the "Communist coalition" composed of heavy industry, inland provinces, and central ministries on the one side, and the groups consisting of light industry, coastal provinces, and local governments which benefited much from recent reforms on the other,[113] are likely to continue. This is dangerous for a reform plan which was initiated from the Centre and whose success requires the cooperation of bureaucrats at various levels.

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[111] See RMRB, April 19, May 17, and June 7, 1984.

[112] Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, "Introduction: The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China: Causes, Content, and Consequences," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp.25-6.

On the whole, China's public administration has become less centralized, less controlled but also less compliant. To continue with the modernization programme, efforts must be made to bring the bureaucrats into line. A third theme has thus emerged.

Disciplining the bureaucrats

The nationwide lawlessness during the "Cultural Revolution" drove China to the brink of collapse. Disorder was unchecked in administrative agencies. Decentralization aggravated this problem. To prevent chaos from recurring and to ensure faithful implementation of Deng's reforms, bureaucrats need greater consciousness of the importance of law. This was a major reason why the concept of "equality before the law" appeared on the front page of daily newspapers soon after reform was inaugurated.

In addition to "equality before the law," Deng intended to eliminate cadres' "political and economic prerogatives not provided for by law," to improve the legal system which "has not received anywhere near the attention it deserves," and to achieve law compliance without external interference.[114] However, Chinese history has had more to do with rule of man, which has been reinforced by Communist ideologies. Bureaucrats have never liked having their hands bound by laws, rules and regulations.

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[113] Susan L. Shirk, "The Politics of Industrial Reform," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, p.204.

Effective control of bureaucrats may require centralized power. A centralized legal structure can be instrumental in maintaining or even maximizing what Ferenc Feher criticizes as "the dictatorship over needs,"[115] which include the needs of individuals and groups for a competitive market process. Moreover, the legal system operates through vertical hierarchies while a decentralized administrative structure stresses horizontal links. The former imposes unilateral binding rules, the latter prefers coordination and cooperation.

An effective legal system can prevent bureaucrats from abusing their power. But to establish such a system requires trained personnel, a fact which has been ignored for decades. A poorly trained, jealous and insecure legal bureaucracy can harm reformist urges.

Administrative law, which is also necessary to discipline the bureaucrats, could be a two-pronged strategy. As noted by Fritz Morstein Marx, administrative law has two implications.

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[114] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.315.

[115] Ferenc Feher, "The Dictatorship Over Needs," Telos, No.35, 1978, pp. 31-42.

It can mean "a crippling interference with the legal system, withdrawing administrative power from judicial control and allowing such power to accuse, to try, and to judge the harried individual all at once." Or it can suggest "resourcefulness in keeping government agencies responsible by injecting canons of fairness into the administrative process without impairing the effective exercise of lawful authority for the common good."[116] Since China's reform was launched against the backdrop of lawlessness during the "Cultural Revolution," Deng and his associates ignored the possibility that bureaucrats might use the legal system for their own purpose and saw only the advantage of restoring laws, rules and regulations to restrain government officials.

Deng's efforts to establish an effective legal system to prevent bureaucrats from abusing their power were demonstrated in three fields: legislation, supervision and legal aid service. Since 1979 the Chinese authorities have tried to strengthen the legislature so that all Chinese "citizens have laws to abide by."[117] That year witnessed the revision of the Organic Law of the People's Courts, the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, and the Organic law of the Local

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[116] Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p.140.

[117] Beijing Review, Vol.22, No.27, July 6, 1979, p.32.

People's Congresses and the Local People's Governments.[118] The new Organic Law of the People's Courts states that it "protects citizens' legitimate private property, personal rights, democratic rights and other rights."[119] It stipulates that no privileges should be allowed in court cases.[120] It strengthens procedures for gaining redress should convictions wrongly occur.[121] All these additions in the new law protect citizens against bureaucratic abuse of power.

The new Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates has a similar intent. Article Six reads that the procuratorate protects citizens' right to file charges against state cadres who have breached the law and investigates the legal responsibilities of those who have infringed citizens' personal, democratic and other rights.[122] Moreover, the new law states that the procuratorial work should allow no privileges and no interference by any other administrative agencies, organizations or individuals.[123] With an independent procuratorate keeping an eye on the administrative bureaucracy, government officials may be forced to have second thoughts about pursuing personal gain at the expense of the public interest.

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[118] For full texts of these laws see the Bureau of Establishment of the Ministry of Labour and Personnel, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzhi Fagui Xuanbian (A Selected Collection of the Organic Laws of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Jinji Kexue Chubanshe, 1985).

[119] Ibid., p.96.

[120] Ibid., p.97.

[121] Ibid., p.99.

[122] Ibid., p.114.

[123] Ibid.

The new Organic Law of the local People's Congresses and the local People's Governments, on the other hand, was designed to strengthen local legislatures. Standing committees were established in people's congresses at and above the county level.[124] The people's congresses of the provinces and their equivalents were also empowered to institute and promulgate local laws and regulations in accordance with specific circumstances and actual needs in their jurisdictions.[125] More democratic elections for people's congresses and local governments were established For example, direct elections for people's congresses were extended to the county level.[126] More than one nominee for each deputy's position was mandated. To allow for changes, preliminary elections were also suggested.[127] These new rules can curtail the power of the executive branch by subjecting it to legislative restraint. Stronger legislatures may behave more independently.

Two other organic laws were revised in 1982 -- the Organic Law of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the

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[124] Ibid., p.133.

[125] Ibid., p.134.

[126] Ibid., p.133.

[127] Ibid., p.137.

Organic Law of the State Council. The new Organic Law of the NPC was another step in revitalizing the legislature, which had been labelled a "rubber stamp." A delegation or a group of over thirty deputies was now empowered to propose a motion.[128] A group of over three delegations or more than one tenth of the deputies to the NPC were empowered to recall members of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the President and Vice-Presidents of the PRC, members of the State Council and Central Military Commission, the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.[129] A delegation or a group of over thirty deputies was also empowered to address inquiries to the State Council and its ministries and commissions.[130] During its sessions over ten members of the Standing Committee of the NPC were empowered to address inquiries to the State Council and its ministries and commissions.[131] If these legislative powers are used, high-ranking government officials will probably become more accountable.

Government accountability, as a goal, was also reflected in the new Organic Law of the State Council, Article Two of which specifies that the State Council comprises the Premier, the Vice-Premiers, the State Councillors, the ministers in charge of ministries, the ministers in charge of commissions, the Auditor-General, and the Secretary-General.[132] The revenue and expenditure of government agencies at different levels as well as those of the state financial and monetary organizations and those of state-owned enterprises and undertakings are subject to official audit.

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[128] Ibid., p.65.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid.

[131] Ibid., p.68.

The new Organic Law of the State Council intended to make the government more accountable in its policy-making. The previous Organic Law, adopted in 1954, described the State Council as an institution issuing decisions and orders without sending them first to the legislature for discussion.[133] The new organic law established that the State Council may also enact administrative rules and regulations and submit proposals to the NPC or its Standing Committee.[134] It became harder for the highest executive body of the PRC to act wilfully and to ignore the legislature, which in theory is elected by the people and represents their will.

The State Council began to rely on administrative rules and regulations for policy-implementation. Between 1979 and 1984, it laid down five hundred and seventy-four administrative rules and regulations.[135] Many of them dealt with the nation's economic development and were used as tools for economic management. Some of these regulations delegated decision-making power to state-owned enterprises, replaced profit delivery with tax payments there, and refashioned enterprises' management systems. Other regulations aimed to promote commodity production, to employ economic levers in regulating the economy, and to advance a new system of economic contracts.[136] To further this development, the State Council reestablished the Bureau of Legal System in 1986 by merging the Bureau of Legal System under the State Council's General Office and the Centre for Economic Laws and Regulations under the State Council.[137] The year 1987 saw the enactment of eighty-two administrative rules and regulations issued or approved by the State Council.[138] Rule-making and rule-implementation were substituting for ideological exhortation and mass movement as the major means of policy-implementation.

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[132] Ibid., p.77.

[133] Ibid., p.75.

[134] Ibid., p.77.

[135] Liaowang (Overseas Edition), April 8, 1985, p.20.

The implementation of laws and regulations requires effective supervision at various levels. The first was legislative supervision. As described earlier, members of the legislature can now influence bureaucratic behaviour by questioning government officials' decisions and actions. For example, at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC in September 1980, deputies challenged the feasibility of the Baoshan Iron and Steel Complex in Shanghai, the largest and most expensive single industrial project ever undertaken in China. They called the responsible minister to account for the plant's debatable design and high cost.[139] But such legislative efforts are still not a norm.

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[136] Ibid., No.41, October 14, 1985, pp.23-25; No.4, January 27, 1986, pp.8-9.

[137] RMRB (Overseas Edition), June 5, 1986.

[138] "1987 Nian Guowuyuan Fabu Pizhun Fabu de Xingzheng Fagui Mulu" (A List of Administrative Rules and Regulations Issued by the State Council in 1987), Part I & II, ZGXZGL, No.1, 1988, pp.41-42; No.2, 1988, p.48.

A likely explanation for the legislature's inaction is the Party's annoyance at the legislature's attempt to gain power. This was demonstrated in a 1986 Party document, which bluntly stated that, prior to making decisions, the standing committee of a people's congress must ask for the Party's endorsement.[140]

Another kind of supervision over bureaucracy was political. A 100-member Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was reestablished in December 1978 "to guarantee implementation of the Party's political line," "to enforce Party rules and regulations and develop a good Party style."[141] Twenty months later, the main tasks of commissions for discipline inspection at the central and local levels were redefined in the Party's new Constitution. These commissions were to uphold the Party's Constitution, to change Party styles, and to check on the implementation of the Party's policies and decisions.[142] As a result, these political watchdogs could play a more prominent role in preventing Party members from abusing their status.

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[139] RMRB, September 5, 1980.

[140] Zhang Youyu, "Guanyu Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige he Difang Renda Changweihui Gongzuo de Wenti" (Issues on the Reform of Political structure and the Work of the Standing Committees of Local People's Congresses), ZZXYJ, No.2, 1987, p.5.

[141] Beijing Review, Vol.21, No.52, December 29, 1978, p.16.

Since most government officials are Party members and are therefore subject to supervision by the Party's commissions for discipline inspection, such political control over administrative behaviour is significant. From 1982 to 1986, over 650,000 Party members were disciplined, including more than 151,000 people, who were expelled from the Party. As regards senior cadres, seventy-four at the provincial/army level and six hundred and thirty-five at the prefectural/division level were punished in 1985 and 1986.[143]

In addition to legislative and political supervision, there is also administrative supervision. In 1983, the State Council set up its Auditing Administration. Within a year, more than 2,800 auditing offices were created above the county level. They reviewed the financial affairs of more than 6,700 departments and enterprises across the country and ferreted out a total of 1.9 billion yuan.[144] By the end of 1987, more than 340,000 units were audited. This produced 5.8 billion yuan for state revenue.[145]

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[142] Ibid., Vol.25, No.38, September 20, 1982, p.20.

[143] RMRB (Overseas Edition), November 5, 1987.

[144] China Daily, December 19, 1984.

The new auditing practice was far from satisfactory. An urgent problem was shortage of personnel. According to a 1985 research paper, China had only 24,000 qualified auditors. Medium-size cities had only fifty to sixty auditors on average, while a county often had only five or six. In the field of capital construction alone, each auditor had to investigate at the same time four large or medium projects and seventeen construction companies.[146]

Administrative supervision was also provided by the Ministry of Supervision, which was reestablished in June 1987.[147] But it was born defective. When Zhao Ziyang proposed to set up this new ministry in 1986, several members of the NPC's Standing Committee suggested that the office be erected at the commission rather than the ministerial level. This proposal tried to give the supervisory body a higher status than ministries and provinces, enabling it to oversee their work more effectively.[148] Such a view was rejected. As a result, the Ministry of Supervision had difficulty exercising its authority to inspect, to investigate and to undertake administrative discipline.

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[145] RMRB (Overseas Edition), May 16, 1988.

[146] Policy Research Centre of the State Auditing Administration, "Jiaqiang Shenji Gongzuo, Wei Hongguan Guanli Fuwu" (Strengthen the Auditing Work and Serve the Macro-Management), ZGXZGL, No.4/5, 1985, pp.37-8.

[147] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 21, 1987.

[148] Ibid., November 29, 1986.

Another problem was insufficient personnel. The institution was slow in coming. It took six months to effect the decision to set up the Ministry of Supervision. It took almost a year to set up bureaus of supervision in central ministries.[149] Moreover, the supervisory agencies were unequal to such tasks as inspection, investigation, hearing cases against government officials, examination of administrative appointments and administrative discipline.[150] Yet the Ministry of Supervision decided to concentrate its energy on looking at external economic activities. According to Minister Wei Jianxing, state cadres' activities in dealing with foreign businessmen was to be the focal point of their work.[151] The emphasis on supervising foreign trade could well be an expedient tactic due to insufficient staff. But the scrutiny of only one aspect of government activity weakens the overall effectiveness of the supervisory agency.

Dual leadership also caused problems. The agencies of supervision established in other administrative ministries must report to the leaders of both the ministries and the Ministry of Supervision. Dual leadership was designed to ensure central control by the Ministry of Supervision over supervisory work. In reality dual leadership undermined the effectiveness of supervision because of the likely interference from other ministries, which could undermine the investigative work, taking advantage of their status as the leaders of the supervisory agency.

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[149] Ibid., May 28, 1988.

[150] Ibid., November 28, 1986.

[151] Ibid., August 21, 1987.

To discipline the bureaucrats, a legal aid service was also established. This took place outside of the administrative system but had consequences for it. In 1979, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee decided to revive the system of legal defence and reinstall legal advisory offices so that trials could proceed in public and the accused would have a right to defence. Before long a lawyer's association was in place with the head of the Law Department at Beijing University as its chairman.[152] Legal aid was thus available to ordinary citizens.

But the legal service was inadequate. Too few lawyers were available. In 1984, one billion Chinese were served by approximately 18,500 full- and part-time lawyers. In twenty-nine provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, only 2,600 legal advice centres or legal offices existed.[153]

Dependence on the state rendered lawyers susceptible to political influence. Lawyers were state cadres. Legal aid offices operated under the jurisdiction of Party committees and governments at various levels. Though officially receiving no state funding, these offices sometimes got government subsidies.[154] As long as lawyers were on the government payroll and their offices sustained by governmental financial support, legal advisors dared not confront the authorities forcefully when a case involved government officials or agencies. Nor could these lawyers make vigorous efforts to represent their clients fairly when they had been mistreated by bureaucrats.

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[152] Beijing Review, Vol.22, No.21, May 25, 1979., p.7.

[153] GMRB, February 13, 1985.

Missions set for legal service tended to be less confrontational to the state. Emphasizing the importance of the legal system, Deng Xiaoping claims that the relations among enterprises, between enterprises and the state and between enterprises and individuals should be defined by law. Contradictions between them should also be resolved by law.[155] His statement ignored relations between the state and individuals. As a result, the legal aid offices were mainly concerned with spreading knowledge about the law, helping ex-inmates start a new life, inspecting business contracts and mediating civil and economic disputes.[156] Protection of individuals against bureaucratic abuse of power was not a priority. By the same token, when asked about the significance of legal aid, Vice-Minister of Justice Zhu Jianming underscored legal counsellors' function of "epidemic prevention" in the nation's economic life. He was silent about their important role in helping citizens find redress against state officials.[157]

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[154] China Daily, January 29, 1985.

[155] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.158.

[156] China Daily, January 29, 1985.

Legal advice centres spurred the nation's market-oriented economy by solving disputes.[158] But two questions remained. First, can market regulation be boosted by a legal service dependent on the state, officers of which are leery of the invisible hand that was chopping away their power and privilege? Second, will such a legal service charge government officials?

On the whole, one should admit that efforts were made to improve legislation, supervision and legal aid service. However, many moves in this direction were slow. They often remained only on paper or were taken half-heartedly. On occasion, new laws and regulations, designed to restrain bureaucrats, were distorted into tightened control of society. Bureaucratic abuse of power remained a threat, both to citizens and to the viability of Deng's modernization programme. An examination of the difficulties in the process of institutional change helps explain these problems.

Difficulties in institutional change

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[157] Liaowang (Overseas Edition), No.27, July 8, 1985, pp.27-8.

[158] See Liaowang (Overseas Edition), No.16, April 22, 1985, pp.18-19; Beijing Review, Vol.28, No.44, November 4, 1985, pp.9-10.

Difficulties in the process of institutional change were various. They range from China's tradition of emphasizing morality and the CCP's ideological constraints to divergence among politicians, policy differences among intellectuals and bureaucratic opposition. Deng's experimental approach also accounts for some difficulties.

A principal trait from administration in traditional China was rule by morality. It did not receive any serious challenge after the founding of the PRC. Actually rule by morality was reinforced by the CCP's ideological indoctrination.

An emphasis on rule by morality or ideology in administration is part of Chinese culture and social structure. In George Foster's terms, these legacies from dynastic China established cultural, social and psychological barriers to institutional change.[159] To overcome these barriers required great efforts, especially when they were reinforced by the Party's ideology.

The CCP successfully used ideology to unify and transform Chinese society. But ideology does not always exert benign influences. "When carried to the point of frenzy, indoctrination leads to excessive doctrinal rigidity; and this hinders the ruling elite in orienting itself to, and solving, the problems of an increasingly complex industrial society."[160] The "Cultural Revolution" in China demonstrated both excessive doctrinal rigidity and the ruling elite's failure to lead the nation toward greater industrialization. An important lesson, which Deng learned from the ten years' disaster, was to reduce the role of ideology. Nonetheless, as long as the Party is ideological, there must be a place for those who prefer "red" to "expert," favour central control, and place the Party and government above the law. Their existence made doctrinal rigidity a threat to institutional changes that deviated from Marxism. In Andrea Sanjian's words, orthodox Marxism-Leninism "does impose distinct limitations."[161]

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[159] See George M. Foster, Traditional Cultures: and the Impact of Technological Change (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1962), pp.64-142.

Differences within the Party are inevitable. They can contribute to inconsistent policy-making and undermine institutional change. Chapter Three mentioned disagreement among politicians. Their differences on the degree and even the nature of reform had a negative impact on academic development and institutional change. Political leaders had difficulty making decisions on institutional change because of their disagreements. As a result, policies on institutional change were slow in coming and were often compromises. Second, even if politicians made mutual concessions so that they could temporarily settle on certain institutional changes, their differences by no means disappeared. Instead, their conflicting views clashed with one another again, giving rise to new policies intended to modify, erase or reverse moves effected by previous decisions.

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[160] Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House, 1965), p.354.

[161] Andrea Stevenson Sanjian, "Constraints on Modernization: The case of Administrative Theory in the U.S.S.R.," Comparative Politics, January 1986, p.206.

A variety of scholastic opinions on administrative reform was often used by politicians of different views for their own purpose. As seen from the previous chapter, intellectuals focused on different issues in administrative reform. Some stressed administrators' knowledge and expertise. Others called for restraints on the ruling elite and challenged the state establishment. These views, though academic, could be used by factions within the leadership to strengthen their arguments, to intensify the policy debates, to delay decisions on institutional change, and, if decisions were made, to overturn them and push change in different directions.

Indeed, proposals to make government accountable became an excuse for conservative politicians to argue for status quo because of the alleged threat to the entire political system. At best, however, intellectuals' different ideas, backed by different factions, meant inconsistent institutional change. As might be anticipated, this inconsistency was assisted by bureaucrats' opposition to changes infringed on their interests.

Anthony Downs suggests two reasons for bureaucratic resistance to change. One is "sunk cost" which means "an enormous previous investment in time, effort, and money." The other is officials' self-interest, which motivates them "to oppose any changes that cause net reductions in things they personally value."[162] Consequently, bureaucratic opposition to institutional change is inevitable. As Downs claims:

> a.Each official's resistance to a given change will be greater ... the "deeper" the layers in his goal structure affected by the change.
> b.The more officials affected, the greater will be the resistance to significant change.[163]

Institutional change in Chinese administrative reform involves such deep "layers" as ultimate goals, social conduct goals, basic political goals and basic personal goals.[164] In other words, institutional change in Chinese administrative reform has touched bureaucrats' deeper beliefs. Institutional change also assumed nation-wide dimensions, involved millions of officials and thus raised enormous bureaucratic opposition.

Several factors contribute to the authorities' experimental approach to institutional change. First, as China groped for a better system of management, no other Communist country provided a ready example for China, even though the CCP sent delegations to Yugoslavia and Hungary in 1978 and

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[162] Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), pp.195-196.

[163] Ibid., p.196.

[164] For layers in an individual official's goal structure see Anthony Downs, pp.85-87.

1979.[165] Administrative reform had to be carried out in uncharted water, through step-by-step exploration. Second, differences within political leadership made it impossible to draw a comprehensive blueprint for administrative reform. As a result, institutional change was effected on a piecemeal basis and experimentally. Third, although public administration emerged as a discipline, it was still underdeveloped in drafting systematic programmes for administrative reform. The belated birth of public administration as a discipline led to superficial analyses of administrative reform.

The slogan that "practice is the sole criterion of truth" was two-pronged. It helped break the cult of Mao and pave the way for institutional change incompatible with his beliefs. On the other hand, the maxim justified a blind experiment and denied prior theoretical deliberations. Experimental approach became a logical outcome. A problem with this approach was that, when faced with opposition, an experiment could be proclaimed a failure, discontinued and, in some cases, even replaced by a different experiment. Institutional change became inconsistent because of this experimental approach.

In brief, the above-mentioned elements have rendered it difficult to effect coherent institutional change in administrative reform. In Kenneth Liberthal's terms, "incompatibility of different components of the reform package,"[166] characterized the recent development in post-Mao China.

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[165] Yu Guangyuan, Lun Gaige, p.2.

Conclusion

Three major themes emerged in the process of institutional change -- the development of a merit system, the dilution of administrative power and the disciplining of bureaucrats. These policies sought to achieve an efficient and ethical administration. Efforts to achieve a merit system and to dilute administrative power were much more successful than those that tried to control bureaucrats. China's problems in achieving institutional change were caused by various factors. Legacies from imperial China and ideology were constraints. Politicians often clashed with one another, resulting in inconsistent policy. Intellectuals also differed among themselves and their reform proposals therefore varied. And because of "sunk cost" and self-interest, bureaucrats were reluctant to accept radical changes. The authorities' experimental approach often led to piecemeal and conflicting changes.

To aggravate this situation, bureaucrats at various levels of the administrative hierarchy, who were the party most concerned with changes, took advantage of this confusion to serve their own interests. They want to survive and yearn for privileges and perquisites.

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[166] Kenneth Liberthal, "China's Political Reform: A Net Assessment," ANNALS, AAPSS, November 1984, pp.19-33.

Chapter Six: Unethical Bureaucratic Behaviour

Modern Chinese administrative reform -- with its emphasis on merit, delegation of administrative power and the control of administration -- aimed to achieve an efficient and ethical administration. But it also threatened many officials. A merit system imperiled poorly educated officials, decentralization reduced the power of many officials and enhanced controls shackled them.

This chapter examines the new environment for Chinese bureaucrats. It asks two questions: What has taken place in this new environment? Did the officials have other options for survival in the face of change? The chapter then explores bureaucratic corruption.

New Environment

B. Guy Peters suggests that "three types of culture -- societal, political, and administrative -- influence the conduct of public administration."[1] Deng's reforms changed most dimensions of Chinese public administration. They brought about "money fetishism" in societal culture, ideological confusion and political experimentation in political culture, and lack of deterrence, growing informal organization, and widespread formalities in administrative culture.

Deng's reforms stressed economic progress and higher standards of living. In order to reach these goals, Deng suggested a pattern in which "some people will become prosperous first, and others later."[2] He also advocated the implementation of "economic levers" and the use of material inducements. Material wealth and goods are replacing ideology as incentives in people's daily work.

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[1] B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 2nd Ed., (New York: Longman Inc., 1984), pp.39-40.

In this environment, prosperity was unevenly distributed. Party and government officials, for example, were told to "get rich after other people."[3] Deng argued that one should give people the power to earn money in order to bring their initiative into play.[4] On the other hand, the authorities attempted to make the cadres believe a discredited Mao who claimed that a Party member must not "place his personal interest first" and that he should "be more concerned about the Party and the masses than about any private person, and more concerned about others than about himself."[5]

The change in political atmosphere was puzzling. Before Deng's reform, making money was taboo. Most Chinese knew Karl Marx's remark that "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt."[6] Deng's reforms are deviations from this orthodoxy. The bureaucrats are bewildered by this political about-face. They are in a quandary: they must abandon a prejudice against wealth when they serve their clientele and also stick to the anti-capitalist structures.

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[2] "An Interview with Deng Xiaoping," Time, November 4, 1985, p.35.

[3] RMRB, March 30, 1985.

[4] "An Interview with Deng Xiaoping," Time, November 4, 1985, p.35.

[5] Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol.2, p.198 & p.33.

Post-Mao China is searching for a better administrative system to assist in the nation's modernization. No other Communist country provides a clear model. Deng's reforms have to find their own ways.

This experimental approach to reform is manifested in two ways. One was to establish shidian (experiment units). For example, Deng suggested in 1980 that "experiments ... be carried out first at a few chosen points" for administrative reform at the grassroots level.[7] The other was "groping one's way through the river by feeling out the stones." Deng admitted in 1984 that "we shall... try new solutions as new problems arise."[8] Deng's experimental approach illustrates his caution. It also reveals his inability to anticipate the problems in implementing his policies, which in turn means that corresponding rules and regulations often follow only when unanticipated problems reach an alarming point.

Bureaucrats' resistance to administrative reform was also unanticipated. When the problems became obvious, their solution might take much longer and more effort. For instance, to separate government from direct economic management was designed to prevent administrative interference in economic activities but led instead to thousands of new companies run by government agencies and officials. Rules banning the cadres' involvement in commercial business were so belated and ineffective that many of these companies remained well and alive even at the end of 1988.[9] This unanticipated problem is discussed later in the chapter.

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[6] Karl Marx, Capital, in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p.315.

[7] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.340.

[8] Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues, p.57.

As examined in Chapter Two, the CCP stressed ideology and mass campaigns as controls over the Chinese bureaucracy. Chinese authorities traditionally regarded ideological indoctrination as "the most important device" in overseeing bureaucratic performance.[10] Once in a while the nation's leaders have turned to punitive actions. These actions are most likely to take place during political campaigns.

Deng's reform eliminated the conventional Chinese controls over bureaucrats. He downplayed ideology's role and emphasized material incentives. He ignored the discussion of how to nurture appropriate ethic among government officials. In addition, Deng blamed political campaigns for economic stagnation.[11] Yet how to establish alternative punitive measures for restraining bureaucrats remained an unresolved question. Deng's reforms created a environment where bureaucrats face few obstacles to their pursuit of personal gain.

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[9] RMRB, March 7, 1989.

[10] Harry Harding, Organizing China, p.17.

[11] Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works, p.165.

Informal networks, or guanxi as known in China, have been Chinese bureaucrats' response to uncertainty in Chinese politics. Deng's reform has increased a sense of uncertainty among government officials, whose futures suddenly look bleak. Informal connections are more important for their survival than before.

Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott have listed three functions of informal organizations: to increase control over the environment, to increase job security and to strengthen group solidarity.[12] Informal organizations both within and without Chinese administrative structure have proved useful in the past and will permit government officials to adapt to the new environment, thereby securing their jobs and allowing them to benefit from change.

New webs of guanxi are easily knit in post-Mao China. Lax ideological control, a bureaucrat's desire not just for survival but also for more material goods, and lack of sufficient supervision over the bureaucracy contribute to the growth of informal organizations. To get in by the "back door," through guanxi, is common occurrence in Deng's era.

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[12] Peter M. Blau & W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp.92-3.

Ritualism has been part of the PRC's administrative style. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Chinese authorities turned to rituals for social transformation and political consolidation. Although social transformation and political consolidation are no longer the primary goals in post-Mao China, rituals are still important.

Rituals are found everywhere and grew more and more complicated. They lead to more formalities in the day-to-day operation of administration. All kinds of formalities are concocted so that one could appear to be participating in modernizations while remaining apathetic. Wearing Western-style suits is an example. Formalities also illustrate the lack of managerial skills in government and the system's lack of response to society. Both are caused by the regime's unpreparedness for modernization and cadres' unwillingness to serve the public. As a result, rituals can no longer be "regarded as both substance and form," as claimed by Kenneth Jowitt.[13] Rituals in post-Mao China reflect the system's ignorance of the complexity of modernization and its indifference to public demands.

Options of survival

Bureaucracy is known for its resistance to change. Ralph C. Chandler and Jack C. Plano write that modern bureaucracy is primarily perceived as "government agencies that are characterized by day-to-day policy-implementation, routine, complex procedures, specialization of duties, rights of authority and status, and resistance to change."[14] Bureaucrats' resistance to change is even more obvious when it involves the machinery of government. As S.C. Dube maintains: "by and large the bureaucracy resists innovations in its structural arrangement."[15]

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[13] See Chapter Two.

How do Chinese bureaucrats resist change? One way is to oppose change directly and overtly. As Anthony Downs observes:

> All officials tend to oppose changes that:
> a.Cause a net reduction in the amount of resources under their own control.
> b.Decrease the number, scope, or relative importance of the social functions entrusted to them.[16]

But two factors militate against visible bureaucratic opposition. First, the Party maintains a tight, though somewhat attenuated, control over state bureaucracy. Through numerous Party branches penetrating the administrative body, the CCP has insured an obedient administration. This was demonstrated in the Party's categorical rejection of the idea that all two million Party branches across the country should be abrogated.[17]

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[14] Ralph C. Chandler and Jack C. Plano, The Public Administration Dictionary (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1982), p.155.

[15] S.C. Dube, "Bureaucracy and Nation Building in Transitional Societies," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Changes (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), p.407.

[16] Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), p.274.

Second, previous political campaigns have left an indelible impression on bureaucrats' minds. The experiences of 700,000 "rightists," who opposed the Party in the "Hundred Flowers" period in 1957, is ingrained in bureaucratic memory. Few cadres have the courage to directly oppose the Party.

Another option for bureaucratic survival is adjustment. But adjustment can be positive or negative. Positive adjustment means adjustment which allows bureaucrats to survive while also serving the purposes of change. Negative adjustment seeks to ensure officials' survival regardless of the consequences for change.

Herbert Kaufman claims that organizational adjustment:

> suggests organizational change matched to change in the environment in a fashion that compensates for the new conditions and keeps the organization running as well as or better than it did before.[18]

Kaufman's version of adjustment is positive because it works in two ways: bureaucrats can manage to survive through compensation and the organization can run as well or even better after change.

Positive adjustment is not easy for at least three reasons: contradictory judgments, deficient decision making and imperfect implementation.[19] Herbert Kaufman explains this through reliance on Herbert Simon's theory of "bounded rationality."[20] With "bounded rationality" though, bureaucrats are very much conscious of their survival. Actually, a more important factor impeding positive adjustment is that bureaucrats are more concerned with their own survival than with the organization's performance. They will pursue both only if the two objectives are inseparable, which is not the case in Communist regimes, where public institutions "often fail to elicit identification from those who work within them."[21]

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[17] Luo Bin, "Yao Wenyuan shi Dashou Dengtai le" (Hatchet Men Like Yao Wenyuan Went up on the Stage), Zheng Ming, December 1986, p.10.

[18] Herbert Kaufman, Time, Chance, and Organizations: Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1985), p.46.

Paying "lip service" to structural rearrangement, as described by Dube,[22] is a negative adjustment. Bureaucrats support change only to survive. Instead of improving organizational performance, they adjust their behaviour only to maintain or upgrade their status. Through negative adjustment bureaucrats can achieve three goals. They can match their behaviour to change and pretend to support the change. Second, adjustment can be conducted in a fashion that compensates for loss caused by new conditions. More importantly, bureaucrats threatened by change can manage to survive in a perilous environment.

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[19] Ibid., pp.47-54.

[20] Herbert Simon, Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organization, 3rd Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p.xxxi.

[21] Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," APSR, Vol. 68, No.3, September 1974, P.1180.

[22] S.C. Dube, p.407.

Negative adjustment can be employed in the new environment, where materialism is now overtly pursued and where ethical standards are very vague. Policies are in flux and often unclear, a fact which gives bureaucrats plenty of leeway in policy-implementation. Supervision over the bureaucracy is ineffective, which means that wrongdoings by government officials can go on undeterred and undisturbed. Informal organizations are so powerful that they can override formal decisions. Finally, formalities help those who are pretending to conform to reform policies. Negative adjustments thrive in such an environment.

Tactics of survival

Government officials did not simply accept Deng's administrative reform. They rose to the occasion with their skills of survival. In other words, as a Chinese saying goes, "You have your policies, and I have my ways of getting around them."[23] Civil servants learned several tricks including diploma mania, business company mania and discriminatory law enforcement.

As the authorities pushed forward with a merit system, the educational background of each official drew more attention and became a measure of professionalization. An important indicator of a cadre's professional competence was his diploma. Did he attend a college or a university? Did he graduate? Since an affirmative answer could mean that the person may remain in position with good chances of promotion, bureaucrats resorted to tricks to make sure that the answer was positive.

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[23] Cited in Deng Xiaoping, Fundamental Issues in Present-day China, p.103.

They often turned deaf ears to the new requirement of "four criteria" and declined to meet the demand for better education. But overt disobedience was risky. Protection from a "back-stage boss" was important. His informal network could provide useful contacts, which would help to tide over the difficulty. It was time for actions. Doing nothing was no less than suicide. Therefore, bureaucrats turned to their "back-stage bosses" and other useful contacts for help in trying to appear better-educated.

"Background inflation" was employed. A certain number of bureaucrats were sent to study at the accelerated courses (shucheng ban) or continuation schools (buxi xuexiao) for several weeks or months in the 1950s or 1960s. The purpose was to raise the educational level of cadres from worker and peasant families. After spending some time there, they would increase their literacy. Some of them, if hard-working, could even reach the level of secondary schools.[24] However, their formal education was limited. Most of these "worker and peasant cadres" could have difficulties being judged as well-educated and knowledgeable. To upgrade their qualifications and to meet new standards, they inflated the school they attended. The Handan municipality in Hebei Province set up in 1962 a spare-time cultural continuation school, which lasted only one term. Thirty cadres enrolled in the programme and no diplomas were awarded. Twenty-two years later, when diplomas were needed, they were issued retroactively. Interestingly, the school was "upgraded" and renamed "Handan City Cadres' Spare-time University," which was said to run a three year programme. Second, 107 certificates were distributed.[25]

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[24] The China Hand Book Editorial Committee, Education and Science (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983), p.15.

Many cadres simply forged diplomas. There were cases in which bureaucrats told their contacts in colleges and universities to sign their certificates even though they never attended an institute of higher education.[26] Other cadres went to study at hastily organized "cadres' college programme" to get badly needed diplomas.[27] Another way of getting an easy diploma was to fabricate a record of independent study (zixue) and thus wangle the certificate. Quite a few provincial governments recklessly issued this kind of diploma. This was done in the name of the Commission on Higher Education

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[25] RMRB, January 19, 1985.

[26] GMRB, April 23, 1985.

[27] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 10, 1985.

Examinations Through Independent Study so that many office-holders wanting to instantly upgrade their educational background could get by. The ploy was brought to light shortly.[28] But the damage to the administrative reform was already done.

Some bureaucrats also managed to obtain diplomas by having their government agencies purchase them. For example, a government agency provided a school with money. The bureaucrat would spend some time at the school, which would offer a guarantee of good teaching and learning and a certificate at the end of the course.[29] The deal was identical with a mercantile transaction between two parties. One party was willing to pay a high price for a piece of paper which its cadres wanted badly for their advancement. The other party needed money for which it sold certificates. This tactic explained why some universities in Shaanxi Province accepted even those with an elementary educational background as long as their work units could afford the tuition, which was as high as 2,300 yuan.[30]

Diploma mania compromised efforts to introduce a merit system and made professionalization of the administrative staff less successful. Many office-holders with an instant diploma from an institute of higher education were poorly qualified. As a result, they made a hash of public administration, which was supposed to become technically more capable in order to manage modernization properly. To avoid poor administration by these ill-qualified cadres, Shenzhen City in Guangdong Province declined to recruit those who were awarded a diploma from TV universities, universities for workers and staff members, correspondence universities and spare-time universities.[31] But the Shenzhen case was an exception.

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[28] GMRB, August 24, 1985.

[29] Ibid., May 16, 1985.

[30] Ibid., August 6, 1985.

As previously indicated, diploma mania was developed by bureaucrats for survival. Business company mania, on the other hand, was aimed at raising bureaucrats' status. When the authorities revitalized market forces through decentralization, government officials toed the line. They did not want to risk errors. They could adopt dilatory tactics by doing nothing. But they could not stall forever. Formalities might come to their rescue when the officers just did something in name but not in reality. The informal "back-stage boss" and other contacts might also lend themselves to the scheme by standing behind. Therefore, bureaucrats decided to organize business companies. By doing so, they claimed that they were responding to the Centre's call to delegate power and separate government from enterprises so that market forces could be freed. They could also prevent their power from slipping away by changing their identities and disguising themselves as entrepreneurs. Business company mania erupted.

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[31] Xiangshi, "Wenping Chao yu Yeji Daxue" (The Diploma Mania and Unaccredited Universities), Zheng Ming, July 1985, pp.22-23.

The cadres got involved in business companies in different ways. Some worked as consultants for companies. For example, the Nanning Bicycle Factory in Nanning, the capital city of the Guangxi Autonomous Region, formed a consultative group in 1985, whose members included the Chairman of the city's Economic Commission and other leading cadres from the Public Security Bureau, the Procuratorate and the People's Court.[32] These powerful officials seldom met. They merely provided their names and connections, which the enterprise they "worked" for could take full advantage of to access crucial officials and materials in short supply. This meant a sizable profit for the enterprise and a handsome commission for the consultants. The Anshan Municipal Women's Federation of Liaoning Province established a Beilei Trade Company, which had a former Deputy Manager of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company and the Party Secretary of the Mining Company as its consultants. Their connections played an essential role in earning a profit of over 52,000 yuan by the Beilei Company.[33] There was little doubt about the influence, if not the power, held by these consultants, though administrative power was formally delegated to these newly created companies.

Token investment was another way of engaging in business companies. Cadres made small investments and thus became shareholders. It was thus possible for them to share in profits. Since the summer of 1984 many government officials in Weihai City of Shandong Province established enterprises and invested about 500,000 yuan. The bulk of the capital for these enterprises -- about 3 million yuan -- was gathered through misappropriation of public funds and loans from banks. The cadres/shareholders effectively exploited their positions and connections and quickly netted a profit of over 400,000 yuan within several months.[34] One hundred and nine cadres in Yingkou City of Liaoning Province opened a Light Industrial Product Co., Ltd. and became its shareholders by contributing 32,700 yuan at an interest rate of thirty per cent. They made 320,000 yuan in six months or 3,000 yuan each.[35]

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[32] RMRB, February 12, 1985.

[33] Ibid., March 2, 1985.

Bureaucrats also created "shadow" companies. A branch of the China Industrial and Commercial Bank in Shijiazhuang, the capital city of Hebei Province, created an industrial and commercial service company in June 1984. In the name of the company, officials of the branch offered public funds as loans to other enterprises wanting money. The shadow company (or the real bank branch) lent nearly 6 million yuan at the rate of six per cent and made over 32,000 yuan, which was distributed among the branch officers.[36] The Municipal Metallurgical

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[34] Ibid., March 1, 1985.

[35] Ibid., March 2, 1985.

[36] Ibid., March 4, 1985.

Industrial Company in Kunming also started in September 1984 a shadow company called the Kunming Metallurgical and Economical Technical Resources Development Company. Only three people worked in the new company. They were the manager, the accountant and the teller. In fact it was the Supply and Marketing Section of the Metallurgical Industrial Company that was acting on behalf of the shadow company. The cadres at the Metallurgical Industrial Company provided goods in short supply to the Resources Development Company at the government list price and then resold them through the shadow company to other buyers at higher prices. In December, 1984 the bureaucrats at the Metallurgical Industrial Company made a profit of 560,000 yuan through the shadow company. The whole business involved was providing 2,458 tons of steel ingots to the Resources Development Company at four hundred and twenty-two yuan per ton and then selling them at six hundred and fifty yuan per ton.[37]

Some cadres simply "commercialized" their government agencies and formed companies. A Deputy Secretary of the County's Party Committee in Hebei Province urged the leading cadres at and above the township level to do more commercial business. As a result, the County's Party Committee opened a restaurant serving the well-known Tianjin-style steamed stuffed buns. The County's People's Congress ran a trade company.[38] These were not rare occurrences. Similar cases took place elsewhere and at a higher level in the country. For example, the Political Department of the PLA's Navy set up the Zhonghai Economic and Trade Development Company.[39] The Wusong District Government of Shanghai City organized the Wusong District Economic Development Company, the board of which was chaired by a Deputy Head of the District. In addition, twelve leading cadres in the District Government were sitting in the board of fifteen members.[40]

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[37] Ibid., March 8, 1985.

Business company mania was pervasive. For example, 456 Party and government officials in Siyang County of Jiangsu Province were involved in commercial business.[41] Various Party and government agencies in Cangzhou Prefecture of Hebei Province established 150 industrial and commercial enterprises in June and July 1984.[42] Jilin Province tracked down 694 enterprises set up by Party and government agencies or officials.[43] Chen Yun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Party's Politburo and First Secretary of the Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, reported that at the national level, within one year since September, 1984 more than 20,000 companies were established by Party, government and military institutions, Party and government officials and cadres' children. The figure could be even doubled or tripled because Chen's statistics are based on investigations in some over ten jurisdictions (i.e., provinces and centrally administered municipalities.)[44]

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[38] Ibid., April 2, 1985.

[39] Ibid., February 13, 1985.

[40] Jingji Ribao, January 31, 1985; in Zheng Ming, April 1985, p.50.

[41] RMRB, March 12, 1985.

[42] Ibid., February 26, 1985.

[43] Ibid., February 14, 1985.

Business company mania started amidst calls for delegation of administrative power by separating enterprises from the government. The establishment of corporations was supposed to shake off bureaucratic yokes and boost the economy. Many cadres disliked the move but felt that it was unwise to oppose it openly. They pretended to be responding to the authorities' call for decentralization and less administrative control. They set up business companies, however, not so much for delegation of power as for their own benefit. They attempted to profit by exploiting their positions and connections in the public service. As a result, there was a blurring of government and enterprises. Before the reform, government agencies directed business enterprises. After the dilution of administrative power, officials gained a dual identity -- officials and entrepreneurs.

To keep the bureaucracy legally accountable, the role of rules and regulations has been stressed by Chinese leaders. Government officials repeated these commitments. However, they were reluctant to enforce such laws, rules and regulations many of which would bind them. Meanwhile, bureaucrats were enthusiastic in using some other laws, rules and regulations that could be interpreted to their advantage and help them to regain their control. Whenever there was such a possibility, they enforced laws discriminatorily.

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[44] Ibid., (Overseas Edition), September 27, 1985.

As long as government officials placed the Party above law on the excuse that both had equal weight,[45] informal "back-stage bosses" and other contacts within the Party remained powerful actors. They were pleased that their proteges still listened to them. The former would protect the latter if they were charged with violations of the law. On the other hand, sure of their mentors' support, bureaucrats were able to ignore policies that might bind them. They were interested in those measures that allowed them to maintain their status. Seizing every opportunity, they tried hard to enforce law discriminatorily.

Chinese bureaucrats liked to keep things under control. They wanted their subordinates and citizens to be obedient. Some new laws, rules and regulations provided them with useful weapons for punishing those who were not cooperative. For example, Sun Zhonglin, the Editor-in-chief of Market Weekly in Liaoning Province, was taken into custody because his newspaper exposed bureaucratic malpractice. The Heping

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[45] An argument suggesting that both the Party and law should have equal weight was that law is supreme, and so is the Party. See RMRB (Overseas Edition), April 6 and 9, 1986.

District People's Procuratorate charged Sun with graft, alleging that Sun, a state cadre, should not have accepted 600 yuan as an author's remuneration. He was released after a long detention.[46] Similar cases occurred in which journalists were mistreated by government officials. In May 1987 more than 200 journalists flocked to Northeast China to cover an enormous forest fire. Bureaucrats drew up "security regulations" in order to prevent accounts of bureaucratic mishandling of the disaster. They accused newspapers of unfounded reporting and threatened them with libel charges.[47] Rule of law became a handy pretext for many government officials to hit their critics.

Bureaucrats had little interest in administrative reforms which endangered their power. They often resented reformers. Rules and regulations could lend themselves to the bureaucrats' scheme to tamper with reformist policies. For instance, many farmers signed contracts to take full responsibility for production. Cadres, whose duty was to ensure the implementation of policy, were obliged to help concerned parties comply with the agreements. Instead, some cadres thought that individual farmers/contractors should not be allowed to reap large profits. These officers simply cooked up excuses and tore up the legal document.[48]

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[46] RMRB, February 28, 1985.

[47] Minzhu yu Fazhi, September 1987; in Jiushi Niandai, December 1987, pp.74-77.

Through the misinterpretation of laws, rules and regulations, bureaucrats smeared many reformers. As Wen Yuankai said, since the end of 1985 many of reformers were "hit by arrows and fell off the horse."[49] For example, the Municipal Metallurgical Research Institute in Wuhan was well known for its reformist achievements. Some people lodged a complaint against the institute. As a result, an investigative team was sent there with the result that the director was suspended for eight months until he was cleared of fabricated accusations.[50] Due to his enthusiasm for reform, the director of Dong Feng Pharmaceutical Factory in Jilin Province faced false charges against him five times.[51] The director and general engineer of Changsha Auto-engine Factory was investigated and interrogated for seven months. He was falsely charged with corruption.[52] An engineer in Shanxi Province was even sentenced to two years in prison because he had contracted to counsel a coal mine on prospecting. His legitimate payment was judged to be graft.[53]

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[48] RMRB, May 4, 1985.

[49] Ye Nu, "Wen Yuankai Tan Gaige de Kunjing he Qianjing" (Wen Yuankai on the Difficulties and Prospect of the Reform), Dongxiang, January 1987, pp.42-43.

[50] GMRB, October 4, 1986.

[51] Ibid., August 20, 1986.

[52] Ibid., September 23, 1986.

[53] Ibid., December 3, 1986.

Bureaucrats' attacks on reformers were effective. The danger presented by bureaucratic abuse of rules and regulations prompted the call for procuratorial organs and commissions for discipline inspection to be more discreet in their handling of cases.[54] This was, however, another indication that these agencies were quite discriminatory in their approach.

Indeed, it was fair to state that officials in the judiciary, who are supposed to be impartial, were too discreet when they heard cases against government officials who had influential "back-stage bosses" or powerful informal connections. A worker in Funing County Farm Machinery Company of Hebei Province exposed his superior's misbehaviour. The unmasked cadre's wife shouted abuses against the worker in the street. When the latter lodged complaints, nothing happened.[55] Ye Zhifeng, Deputy Chief of a section in the State Economic Commission, was arrested on charges of divulging confidential information to, and accepting bribes from, foreign businessmen.[56] Although Ye's offence was more serious than her accomplice's, she received a lighter sentence because her father was Ye Fei, Vice-Chairman of the NPC.[57] Yu Tiemin,

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[54] Ibid., October 3, 1986.

[55] RMRB, June 1, 1985.

[56] GMRB, April 15, 1986.

[57] Luo Bing, "Sha Hu An de Sharen Miekou Zhi Yi" (Death Penalty -- Doing Away with a Witness?), Zheng Ming, May 1986, pp.8-12.

Deputy Director of the General Office of the Shanghai City's Party Committee was informed against in 1982. The procuratorial organs did not touch him for fear of offending his boss, Shanghai City's Party Secretary Chen Guodong.[58] Yu was brought to justice three years later, after Chen stepped down.[59]

The Jinjiang false drugs case is infamous. Many factories in Jinjiang Prefecture of Fujian Province produced large amounts of false drugs in the early 1980s. The unlawful operation went on for three years before it was disclosed. It took another two years for the authorities to end the illegal activities. A major reason for the slow investigation was weak law enforcement. As a reporter of Renmin Ribao pointed out, the judicial departments in the area had to adjust their actions to the interests of local leaders who had a financial interest in the fake pharmaceuticals.[60]

Reform corruption

The corruption that occurred in course of institutional change was a specific version of political corruption. The latter is a common phenomenon in all cultures and is described by Carl J. Friedrich as "deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, namely, that of private gain at public expense."[61] My idea "reform corruption," on the other hand, notes the emergence of the phenomenon at a specific period. Reform does not _necessarily_ cause corruption. But corruption can be easily triggered by basic reforms.

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[58] Wei Wu, "Yu Tiemin Shouhui An Neimu" (The Inside Story of Yu Tiemin's Accepting Bribery), Guangjiaojing, November 1986, pp.24-26.

[59] GMRB, July 9, 1986.

[60] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 6, 1985. For further information on the case see ibid., July 13, 1985; July 14, 1985; July 20, 1985; August 5, 1985.

Reform corruption seeks to restore lost bureaucratic status. Profiting from reformist policies, some members of the non-elite earn ten times as much as an average bureaucrat. Emphasis on market forces has given birth to quite a few _wanyuanhu_, namely "ten thousand yuan households."[62] Reports on the new rich began to surface in the news media. In some cases, their wealth was compared directly with the income of government officials. Peasants in Northern China's Taihang Mountains could now afford tractors which cost 5,000 yuan.[63] A "poor villager" bought a colour TV set for 1,500 yuan, the equivalent of an ordinary cadre's annual salary.[64] The average annual per capita income in Liuzhuang village of Central China's Henan Province in 1983 exceeded the county head's earnings,[65] the annual family incomes in this village ranging between around 4,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan.[66] A woman worker in Northeastern China's Heilongjiang Province set up the area's first household-run chicken farm in 1981, making a profit of 50,000 yuan in 1984.[67]

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[61] Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Pathology," _The Political Quarterly_, Vol.37, January-March 1966, p.74.

[62] According to China's State Statistics Bureau the average annual per capita income for peasants in 1986 amounts to 428 yuan. See _RMRB_ (Overseas Edition), February 22, 1987.

[63] _China Reconstructs_, Vol.XXXIII, No.7, July 1984, p.15.

[64] Ibid.

Civil servants' incomes grew very slowly. On July 1, 1985 a new wage system was put in effect. The new scheme, termed "structural wage system" (jiegou gongzizhi), comprises basic wages (jichu gongzi), duty wages (zhiwu gongzi), service allowances (gongling jintie), and bonuses (jiangli gongzi). It was reported that Chinese bureaucrats would receive "the largest pay increase since the founding of the PRC in 1949."[68] Actually, the average real monthly increase for a cadre amounts to only 18 yuan.[69] This paltry raise lags behind the incomes of businessmen who have benefited from market-oriented reform. A county head's monthly salary of 122 yuan, as suggested in the new wage system, may be attractive to many cadres with university educational background, whose salary scale starts at 57 yuan per month.[70] However, this pales in comparison with the dazzling incomes of the "nouveaux riche."

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[65] Ibid., Vol.XXXIII, No.10, October 1984, p.48.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid., Vol.XXXIV, No.7, July 1985, p.25.

[68] RMRB (Overseas Edition), July 6, 1985.

[69] Jiushi Niandai, September 1985, p.67.

[70] Ibid.

Reform then has clearly disfavoured bureaucrats, by generating a group of affluent entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, corruption is an option. Corruption in certain forms such as gift-taking may not jeopardize their position. These activities, though "officially criticized under the label 'back-doorism'," "do not generally receive the same serious censure and penalties as acts in the corrupt category."[71] Thus corruption can reinstate a bureaucrat's status without costing him his job.

Reform corruption redistributes between elite and non-elite benefits generated by reform. Foster's notion of "limited good"[72] still feeds into the government officials' psyches. The Hainan auto racket, which was brought to light in August 1985, has provided the public with a peep into the contemporary corruption. Many officials there were involved in business company mania. In little over a year the island officials imported 89,000 motor vehicles, more than ten thousand of which were resold at a huge profit.[73] It was estimated that the resale of each vehicle would bring a price from four times to nine times the original import price.[74]

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[71] Dorothy J. Solinger, Chinese Business Under Socialism: The Politics of Domestic Commerce 1949-1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.127.

[72] George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," American Anthropologist, Vol.67, No.2, April 1965, PP.293-315.

[73] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 1, 1985.

[74] Zheng Ming, September 1985, p.34.

The proceeds were not reserved exclusively for businessmen. Various schemes were developed to enable government officials to split spoils. State banks extorted an unreasonably high "acknowledgement fee" or service charge for loans granted to Hainan vehicle buyers. For a twenty million yuan's loan, a bank requested a share of the resale profits totalling half a million.[75] Officials of another bank simply established a company (jointly operated by the bank and a business company), provided a loan of more than 3 million yuan to the firm and earned a profit of more than a million.[76] An import license was vital for auto importation and since the Hainan authorities issued the document, government officials took full advantage of their powers and became involved in reselling licenses for profit. The Department of Organization under the island's Party Committee gave out import licenses for 100 vehicles and received 1 million yuan in return.[77] Imposing a duty was another way of slicing the gains of the auto trade. To clear a vehicle for shipment off the island, Bureaus of Industry and Commerce on the island imposed a duty of between 4 and 5 per cent of its price. As a result, these institutions collected a total of twenty million yuan. Ninety per cent of this amount was withheld as funds for local industry or went into the bureaucrats' pockets as bonus.[78] In addition, a multitude of schemes for petty fleecing under a variety of pretexts helped government officials reap profits. Overnight parking, for example, cost two yuan per car and where there was a night watchman, the charge jumped to more than ten yuan. Though the island functioned only as a transfer station, vehicle registration for mainland-bound cars was compulsory. Applications for a license plate thus generated a fortune for the Motor Vehicle Administrative Office under the local Bureau for Public Security. Officials also enriched themselves through road tolls and car insurance.[79]

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[75] RMRB (Overseas Edition), August 1, 1985.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

Reform corruption performs a function of redistribution of wealth or spoils. Steven J. Staats suggests two models of corruption exist in the former Soviet Union. The first assists in "adjusting a poorly-articulated administrative structure."[80] The second helps "to introduce market (albeit, black-market) attributes into the command system."[81] The Hainan case presents a third model, in which corruption redistributes the benefits of reform. Reform ushered in elements of market regulation, which surprised a bureaucracy accustomed to a command system. Bureaucrats were banned from engaging in commercial business and had to develop business company mania to profit from the reforms. Under Deng's reform, corruption was a "safe" way for bureaucrats to prosper without either challenging the reform or violating the rules and regulations flagrantly.

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Steven J. Staats, "Corruption in the Soviet System," Problems of Communism, January-February 1972, p.42.

[81] Ibid., p.43.

Reform corruption also lubricates an administrative apparatus resistant to changes. Friedrich writes that

> the operation of corruption often exhibits the following traits: (a)violation of the criminal law, through bribes and other related activities, (b)making unworkable governmental machinery work, (c)securing the adoption of proposals otherwise lost, (d)helping, through the foregoing, to adapt an existing regime to changes in the social structure and its values, interests and beliefs.[82]

Events in China during the past years demonstrate that corruption has set in motion, albeit sluggishly and grudgingly, many administrative agencies hostile to reform. Gradually, corruption may cause a resistant bureaucracy to compromise with new values and beliefs. Reform corruption thus helps disarm bureaucratic resistance to reform.

Chinese news media often disclose cases in which bribery has been needed to make an obstinate bureaucracy act. A railway station in Hunan Province, for example, refused to provide service without bribery.[83] While two hundred yuan was needed to persuade a vice-mayor of Jinshi City in Hunan to write to the Provincial Textile Industrial Company on behalf of a factory in the city, his intervention got the factory its needed five tons of material.[84] Since the early 1980s one of the most curious ways of greasing China's creaking administrative machinery has to do with the use of a flower, brought to Japan from South Africa during the Meiji Restoration and given an elegant name kunshiran.[85] The plant was introduced to China in the early 1930s, has undergone a meteoric rise in value, and was catapulted into fame by Deng's reform.

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[82] Carl J. Fridrich, p.76.

[83] RMRB, February 8, 1985.

Kunshiran was brought to the awareness of hundreds of thousands of Chinese through an article in the journal Wenhui Yuekan.[86] Months later, a report in Renmin Ribao attested to the authenticity of the flower's story.[87] Kunshiran was used as a "gift to establish connections" with government officials in order to get them to start the bureaucratic machinery working. For example, the Municipal Trolleybus Company and a steel mill of Anshan City in Liaoning Province contracted out expensive projects to a production brigade because they were bribed with dozens of the potted flowers. As the need to buy off bureaucrats became urgent, the price of these plants skyrocketed to about sixty thousand yuan a piece.[88] Security guards were ultimately hired to protect the flower. The municipal government of Anshan opened an office in charge of kunshiran and assigned the bureau of public security to investigate cases involving kunshiran.[89]

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[84] Ibid., March 7, 1985.

[85] It is a Kaffir lily. The literal Chinese translation means a "gentleman's orchid."

[86] See Zhang Xinxin, "Fengkuang de Junzilan" (Crazy Kunshiran), Wenhui Yuekan, September 1983, pp.2-10.

[87] RMRB, June 16, 1984.

Reform corruption develops because reform is seldom followed by corresponding rules and regulations. Deng noticed a linkage between his reform and "unhealthy tendencies."[90] His comment ignores the fact that the lack of rules and regulations corresponding to reform furthered the spreading of corruption. He also fails to point out that, by developing the tactic of discriminatory law enforcement, many cadres simply put rules and regulations to their own use.

As soon as the policy to "pay full attention to economic levers," to "separate government from enterprise functions" and to "establish various forms of economic responsibility system" was announced,[91] the lack of regulations enabled bureaucrats to establish companies. This attracted attention from the top and resulted in a 1984 decision by the Party's Central Committee and the State Council to stop the new corruption. In 1985 the seriousness of the problem prompted the Party Committee of Beijing City to reaffirm the decree forbidding the Party's and government's leading members from being involved with commercial business.[92]

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[88] Ibid.. RMRB ran a notice of correction nine months later, on March 14, 1985, stating that some of the facts in the report of June 16, 1984, were unfounded. The existence of the kunshiran trade remained, however, unchallenged.

[89] Zheng Ming, August 1984, p.35.

[90] RMRB, March 9, 1985.

[91] See "Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Reform of Economic Structure."

The case of the Guangyu Company under the Ministry of Astronautics Industry is an example. The scandal implicated a former minister, a vice-minister, five officials at the bureau level and involved more than $41 million.[93] Without being authorized to engage in commercial business with foreigners, the company entered into negotiations in 1984 with a French corporation for the importation of 180,000 colour TVs. To gain the required permission from the responsible state institution, the company bought an expired document at a high price, attempting to effect the import with the help of the invalid document. The principals fraudulently obtained a loan in foreign currency so that the contract could be concluded. These practices were not disclosed until 1985. In other words, the Guangyu Company remained active at least three months after the Centre ordered to ban business companies run by government officials. Faced with the difficulty of ending business company mania, the authorities issued ten rules in 1986 aimed at stopping cadres from establishing businesses.[94]

Why did Deng's reforms lead to reform corruption? An answer can be found in several characteristics of his reforms. These include a tempting environment, inadequate supervision, inappropriate incentives, and an improper example of management.

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[92] RMRB, February 13, 1985.

[93] RMRB (Overseas Edition), February 7, 1986.

[94] Ibid., February 6, 1986.

1. A tempting environment.

Summarizing the literature on bureaucratic corruption, Harry Harding concludes that corruption is likely to occur either when penalties are weak and/or when motivation is high.[95] Deng's reform took place in an environment where government officials had little fear of punishment but great opportunity to pursue personal gain.

Deng's reforms placed Chinese bureaucrats in new circumstances in a society increasingly characterized by material gain. Few measures prevented the cadres from profiting through public office.

Indeed, the ideological confusion caused by Deng's reforms undermined the bureaucratic behavioural code. The phraseology and tone of many new policies contradicted the doctrine which the CCP has hitherto upheld. Deng's approach to modernization eroded the Party's ideological position and the role of ideology, which once provided guidelines for cadres' behaviour. Without the ideological shield, cadres were exposed to a tempting environment.

2. Inadequate supervision.

Deng's reforms exacerbated the general problem of a lack of deterrents. The importance of both ideological education and political campaigns was declining and neither device could now be used to curb bureaucratic corruption. Although efforts have been made to establish in their places ceratin rules and regulations to discipline the increasingly disobedient cadres, such measures were rendered ineffective by informal organizations and sabotage through formalities.

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[95] Harry Harding, Organizing China, p.7.

Having found no other way to end corruption, the Chinese authorities tried again to "kill the chicken in order to frighten the monkey." To punish someone as a warning to others comprises only part of deterrence. To discipline a bureaucrat after he becomes corrupt is a belated, though necessary, action. To make things worse, political campaigns no longer yielded satisfactory results as they had in the past. Deng's denunciation of political campaigns, or a "storming approach" to development as defined by Lowell Dittmer,[96] has made them less intimidating. In addition, growing informal organizations and widespread formalities led to the perfunctory and superficial implementation of these campaigns.

Discriminatory law enforcement often rendered new laws, rules and regulations intended to keep bureaucrats under control a mere scrap of paper. The Party and government officials, who violated the law, often received light penalties thanks to their strengthened informal organizations.

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[96] Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch 1949-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p.210.8

3. Inappropriate incentives.

Edward Banfield notices that incentives other than money or other material incentives "usually bulk larger" in government than in business. They include job security, the satisfaction of participating in important affairs, sharing the charisma that attaches to an elite corps or to a leader, and power and glory.[97] In other words, job satisfaction, to use a modern term, appeals to government officials more than material enjoyment. In a Communist and less affluent society, a position in government and the accompanying social status and privileges are especially attractive. For decades, government bureaucracy has been an avenue for upward mobility.

Deng claimed that the power to earn money brought out individual initiative.[98] His view puzzled millions of government officials who used to thought otherwise. They must now change their beliefs and more seriously consider an individual's interests, including their own.

Decentralization of administrative power means an increasing role for markets thus appreciating material stimuli and depreciating non-material ones. Bureaucrats began to pursue material ends and this made them more susceptible to corruption. Late in 1984, Jin Deqin, the former President of the Bank of China, raised salaries among his subordinates without authorization, issued bonuses and awarded each of them two wool suits.[99] His calculation was that such benefits would motivate his cadres. Jin's resignation in early 1985 makes it appear that there was official disapproval of his incentives.

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[97] Edward C. Banfield, "Corruption As a Feature of Governmental Organization," The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.XVIII, No.3, December 1975, p.596.

[98] "An Interview with Deng Xiaoping," Time, November 4, 1985, p.35.

The vexing problem of incentive has something to do with what Franz Schurmann calls "Decentralization I," a transfer of decision-making power "all the way down to the production unit,"[100] which results in shrinking power for some administrators. Decentralization I is likely to make non-material incentives such as proximity to power less glamorous for bureaucrats. Numerous reports in China's news media attested to their reluctance to delegate power.

When non-material incentives were losing their attractiveness and material incentives were put to use, it was easy for government officials to figure out how to motivate the bureaucratic machinery. The emphasis on material incentives has given corruption a chance to develop, either as a consolation for dispirited cadres or as a source for motivation.

4. An improper example of management.

It is widely accepted in liberal democracies that there are important differences between public and business management. In this vein, Graham T. Allison, Jr. concludes that "public and private management are at least as different as they are similar, and that the differences are more important than the similarities."[101] A basic difference is the goal of management.

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[99] Zheng Ming, April 1985, p.11.

[100] Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp.175-6.

James W. Fesler suggests that "the distinctions between public and private business administration flow from whether profit is or is not the principal objective."[102] Many other scholars in public administration concur with this view.[103] The Chinese authorities in post-Mao era seem to have ignored this distinction between the two.

The bulk of the enterprises in China are to be "publicly-owned." But by granting them more autonomy, by limiting the state's role in their activities, and by emphasizing their profitability, Deng's reforms made public institutions much more like private companies. This change, to a certain degree, is similar to privatization, which, according to E.S. Savas,

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[101] Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Public and Private Management: Are They Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Particulars?" in Robert T. Golembiewski and Frank Gibson, eds., Readings in Public Administration: Institutions, Processes, Behaviour, Policy, Fourth Edition, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1983), p.4 and p.15.

[102] James W. Fesler, Public Administration: Theory and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p.12.

[103] See, for example, Thomas Vocino and Jack Rabin, Contemporary Public Administration (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Inc., 1981), p.10; Hal G. Rainey, Robert W. Backoff, Charles H. Levine, "Comparing Public and Private Organizations," Public Administration Review, Vol.36, No.2, March/April 1976, p.239; Marshal and Gladys Dimock, Public Administration, Fourth Edition, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p.52.

"is the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets."[104] In the process of his modified version of privatization Deng and his associates were carried away by the magic of profit as the goal of an organization and decided to ask government agencies and other institutions in the public sector to follow the example.

Government institutions and public organizations were urged to use economic levers in their management. The authorities have called for a reform of the wage system in the public sector "in accordance with the principle of linking wages with responsibilities and achievements."[105] This guideline is identical to that applied to enterprises, which are independent economic entities. However, for government and other public institutions, this measure can be disastrous. For instance, doctors overcharged for their service and prescribed expensive electric blankets in order to maximize their income,[106] reducing medical service to a matter of secondary importance. By the same token, teachers were told to vacate their offices which were to be used as hotel rooms. In addition to teaching, they cleaned those rooms.[107] And business company mania indicated how government officials were misled by the official emphasis on profitability.

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[104] E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1987), p.3.

[105] See "Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure."

[106] GMRB, May 24, 1985.

[107] GMRB, June 7, 1985.

Government officials were distracted from the goal of public administration -- providing service. Rapid growth of the business sector led to a belief in profit in the public sector. The sudden success of some businesses intoxicated government officials and made them neglect their duties. Their performance paled in comparison with the achievements of entrepreneurs. As the role of government officials in public life receded in importance, they became oblivious to their responsibilities and sometimes pursued personal gain. It should be pointed out that many bureaucrats wanted to follow enterprises' example. Efforts to establish a merit system gave a face-lift to China's public administration. Diploma mania, however, did not bring bureaucratic competence to a high level. Many officers, who remained in position or were promoted, had questionable qualifications in terms of knowledge and expertise. Their performance was below par. Even those, who received higher education, often lacked administrative skills because management was not taught during their school years. Inadequate training in public administration has had an evil consequence: methods which have been proven effective in the profit-oriented business sector, were applied blindly to the public sector, which concerns itself principally with providing service. As profit was emphasized in government agencies, service to the public declined, management of public affairs became muddled, and corruption erupted.

Conclusion

Administrative reform endangered the status of civil servants. Bureaucrats were thus forced to survive in a new environment. On the one hand, they knew they must rise to the new challenge, bringing into play their skills of survival. On the other hand, new circumstances also brought about money fetishism, ideological confusion, political experimentation, a lack of deterrents, growing informal organization, and ritualism.

Civil servants turned to "negative adjustment," which enabled them to survive in a perilous environment but also helped to compensate for their loss in the new conditions. Bureaucrats relied upon standard tactics. In response to efforts to establish a merit system, to dilute administrative power, and to discipline them, civil servants launched into diploma mania, business company mania and discriminatory law enforcement.

The motive behind this behaviour was bureaucrats' concern about their own benefits, which they deemed more important than the public interest. Party cadres and government officials used public office to pursue private gain. Administrative reform led to "reform corruption."

Reform corruption restores bureaucratic status, redistributes the benefits of reforms between elite and non-elite, and lubricates a stubborn administrative apparatus. But it also hurt reform. Bureaucratic malpractice in the course of reform ran counter to the purpose of administrative reform -- to build up an able and accountable public administration in order to facilitate modernization. As a result, the gulf widened between efficiency and ethics of the nation's administrative institutions as they managed reform.

Conclusion: Implications of the Behavioural Gap

Reform corruption is an alarming example of the unforeseen consequences of Deng's administrative reform. Though designed to facilitate modernization, many administrative reforms created problems. Is a behavioural gap is inevitable in the process of modernization?

When Deng decided to catch up economically to the advanced countries, he also concluded that the Chinese administrative system demanded to be reformed. Deng had to deal, however, with a "behavioural gap," a term which refers to a disequilibrium between efforts to achieve efficient administration and efforts to achieve ethical administration.

Prior to Deng's "second revolution," China was run by a bureaucracy, which, though technically incompetent, was ethical and met the Party's expectations an agent of revolutionary transformation and consolidation. But Deng's "second revolution" demanded major administrative changes.

Deng's reforms were complicated by the regime's insufficient attention to administrative problems and theories. He wanted to upgrade the administration but he had few clear ideas about how to do so. He solicited advice but his mobilization of intellectuals was inconsistent and only partly successful.

Bureaucrats tenaciously resisted change and Deng's reform had to confront "internal" opposition. Cadres at various levels resorted to negative adjustment in order to maintain or upgrade their status. The desire to achieve an able but also accountable administration was only a dream. Administrative reform led to reform corruption.

Deng's efforts to realize both efficiency and ethics in administrative reform went against his expectations. He wanted to remould the administrative structure so that it would serve modernization. But what was revealed was a bureaucracy deeply concerned with its own status and little interested in modernization. The behavioural gap took its toll on Deng's modernization programme.

Why is there the behavioural gap despite Deng's efforts to refashion the administrative system? Answers are found in China's cultural heritage, the CCP's ideological constraints, the PRC's organization, and Deng's failure to realize or to overcome the several problems of change.

Chinese culture emphasizes that government officials are a cut above ordinary people. Quite often, bureaucrats act in pursuit of personal gains and in defiance of the law. It has been a commonplace that "the magistrates are free to burn down houses, while the common people are forbidden even to light lamps." To prevent the public's resentment from exploding, dynastic China turned to a handful of qingguan. Likewise, Communist China resorted to political campaigns when the situation could spin out of control. However, despite the punishments handed down by the qingguan or handed over at the end of political campaigns, government officials considered themselves above the people and even above the law. This part of Chinese culture, strengthened through the formation of a new class with monopoly over administration,[1] remains largely intact.

Deng's reforms made no serious efforts to alter this aspect of China's heritage. He did not dare to deal resolutely with the issue of bureaucratic ethics for fear of inciting more opposition from cadres. By denouncing political campaigns, Deng actually made bureaucrats less worried about possible punishments for their misbehaviour. Consequently, the seeds of trouble for Deng were sown at the outset. How could he expect bureaucrats to renounce their power and privileges themselves? How could Deng transform a bureaucracy and at the same time rely on it for his modernization programmes? Faced with a reluctant bureaucracy, post-Mao China's leadership is struggling with the demands imposed by modernization.

Deng is fighting on two fronts -- with a resistant bureaucracy and with elements in the Party. His opponents always refer to orthodoxy and highlight his deviations from conventional CCP doctrines. Deng was often on the defensive, attempting to prove that he had not abandoned the Party's course.

Ideology is a continuing problem for Deng because he did not have either a mind or the mettle to uproot the theoretical basis of the Party. Although his approach to modernization was different from Mao's, Deng spared no effort emphasizing the indispensable role of the Party, which is strictly ideological.

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[1] For the concept of a "new class," see Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1957)

The PRC's organizational pattern is characterized by the Party's control over the state. Although Deng's administrative reform was intended to modify this pattern, the results of his efforts are not encouraging. Deng thought that to reduce the Party's involvement in government affairs would upgrade the administration's efficiency. This move, however, jeopardized the Party's political control over the state bureaucracy. The Party's lessened administrative duties also made it less attractive to well-educated men and women, who now seek association with government not the CCP. Consequently, the Party was shrinking in appeal and power. Deng's attempt to modify the PRC's organizational pattern met with mighty resistance from the Party.

It was not until reform was advanced that Deng realized how difficult it was to change existing values and institutions. Harding claims that more difficulties with reform surfaced at the later stage because Deng and his associates tackled the less controversial problems first, putting aside the more difficult ones.[2] Moreover, Deng's overconfidence and his underestimation of his opposition also accounted for his belated recognition of the obstacles to reform. By the time his awareness was raised, his problems were severe.

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[2] Harry Harding, Second Revolution, p. 94.

The Chinese people have witnessed civil servants' adjustments to change. They see reform corruption in their daily lives. Compliments to Deng were replaced by complaints about his reforms. Taking advantage of this change in public attitudes, hardliners charged that Deng's reforms were serious blunders.[3] On the other end of the political spectrum, radical intellectuals claimed that Deng has had neither the capability nor the determination to push through administrative reform.[4] Inevitably, a failed modernization scheme shook public's confidence in Deng's regime.

Analysis of behavioural gap offers several important implications. First, the relationship between Party and state administration demands redefinitions. The Party apparatus, instead of providing either a system of political supervision or a focus of accountability, is now parasitic. Deng's reforms stressed a reduced role of ideology and political campaigns. This move, however, led to the eventual unveiling of the ugly side of ideology and political campaigns. These two weapons indispensable for CCP's political supervision of the government bureaucracy were denounced during the 1989 Chinese democracy movement. A large poster at People's University claimed that the political campaigns were "the nation-destroying living hells" and that numerous "filthy exchanges have been carried out under the banner of sacred ideology!"[5] Ideology and political campaigns could no longer be used again by the Party to supervise the bureaucracy.

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[3] See Luo Bin, Zheng Ming, March 1984, p.7.

[4] See Fang Lizhi, Jiushi Niandai, February 1987, pp.52-54.

As the Party fails to perform its supervisory function, Party members anxiously pursue material benefits at public expense. Reform corruption appeals to the once privileged Party and government cadres. Their profiteering through public office is now so common that a new term guandao -- the activities of Party and government officials in reselling goods at a profit -- has been added to the Chinese vocabulary. Corruption is widely resented. Its elimination was a major theme in student demonstrations during the spring of 1989. They blame the profiteering officials for "suck[ing] the lifeblood out of the people."[6]

As the Party apparatus has become parasitic, its relationship with state administration needs to be redefined. Political supervision provided by the CCP is not only ineffective but counterproductive. The Party's involvement in administrative affairs no longer contributes to better government.

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[5] Han Minzhu, Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.43.

[6] Han Minzhu, p.28.

Second, the civil service needs to be depoliticized. Deng and his associates tried to establish an efficient civil service. Meanwhile, they insist on politicizing the bureaucracy, claiming that there is no place in China for a neutral civil service. Nonetheless, a depoliticized civil service has the following advantages. It contributes to the professionalization of administration because professional standards will not be compromised by political requirements. It allows civil servants to focus on their performance rather than to worry about political and organizational errors. Depoliticization of bureaucracy also creates an administrative environment where professional ethical codes of behaviour rather than the "four cardinal principles" will serve as guidelines for bureaucrats in their work.

More importantly, a depoliticized civil service can keep the government running at times of political crisis. For several weeks in the spring of 1989, "the government of the world's most populous country has lost its power to govern and control the nation."[7] Bureaucrats' politically motivated disobedience was demonstrable. In the spring of 1989, many Party and government officials joined local residents in demanding political change. On May 17, when more than one million people flooded the streets in Beijing to support the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square, the marchers included teachers, workers, doctors and nurses and many government cadres from banks, customs, state and Party organs.[8] These cadres defied the top leadership and backed the students.

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[7] Globe and Mail, May 24, 1989.

In addition to the disagreement within the leadership, another factor contributing to near anarchy during that period was a lack of a neutral state bureaucracy, which can keep the government running while the politicians come and go. Post-Mao China has a state bureaucracy which is half-professionalized and poorly controlled. The administrative apparatus stopped running temporarily when entangled in fierce political struggle.

External supervision of the administrative apparatus needs to be established. Due to the decline of political supervision exercised internally by the Party, through parallel hierarchy, there is a rising demand for external supervision of the administrative apparatus, supervision that comes from outside the state or the Party. The events in the spring of 1989 were illustrative. Students, no longer trusting the government, broke the reverence for government officials and asked for the release of high-ranking cadres' income.[9] They also requested a face-to-face dialogue with the nation's leaders.[10] Journalists seemed to be forming a more coherent group to exercise external supervision of the administrative apparatus. They took to the streets to protest the false and biased reporting of the student protests.

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[8] RMRB (Overseas Edition), May 18, 1989.

[9] Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, for example, was forced to disclose his monthly income as a grade-twelve cadre in front of millions of television viewers. See Time, May 15, 1989, p.43.

[10] RMRB (Overseas Edition), May 15, 1989.

> China's two main agencies -- Xinhua News Agency and China News Agency -- and major national papers such as the People's Daily and the Guangming Daily functioned ... as public bulletin boards of protest, releasing or publishing a selected portion of the numerous appeals sent by Chinese citizens and organizations to the papers and to Party and government offices.[11]

The new degree of candour in the Chinese press lasted only for three days. However, it indicated that the nation's news media can play a more active role in identifying public problems and holding government officials accountable.

The National People's Congress could become an institution exercising external supervision of government bureaucracy. China's legislature has been impotent and unable to exercise its supervisory function. As Deng launched administrative reform, restrained measures were taken to strengthen the legislature so that it can check the executive. As Kevin O'Brien observed, "highly circumscribed oversight began."[12] During the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement there were efforts by a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC to call an emergency session to resolve the political crisis. His attempt, though failed, suggested that the NPC could play some more important roles in Chinese politics and that one of these is legislative supervision of the executive body.

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[11] Han Minzhu, p.237.

[12] Kevin J. O'Brien, Reform Without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.167.

Several scenarios can be created if the Chinese leaders decide to tackle the problem of behavioural gap. They may reinforce the politicization of government administration in order to regain their control over state bureaucrats. Or they may depoliticize administration as a solution to the behavioural gap. A gradual and limited depoliticization of the bureaucracy is also possible if the Chinese leadership chooses a path of compromise, attempting to maintain the Party's status and at the same time proceeding with modernization.

The reinforced politicization of government bureaucracy is tantamount to a return to the Maoist system. It also suggests the cancellation of economic modernization as the CCP's primary political goal. What can result at best is an ethical but inefficient administration. Richard Lowenthal argued that the tendency to institutionalize revolution is irreconcilable with the requirement of economic modernization.[13] Mao attempted to raise cadres' revolutionary commitment in order to promote economic development. However, China's modernization did not materialize while he was alive. Moreover, the CCP's legitimacy as the ruling party declined sharply. Learning this lesson from Mao, Deng took a different approach to modernization in his programme of catching up to the Western industrialized nations. A return to the Maoist system would mean a further delay of China's modernization and a further decline of the regime's legitimacy. To backtrack could lead to the collapse of Communism in China.

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[13] Richard Lowenthal, "The Post-Revolutionary Phase in China and Russia," Studies in Comparative Communism, Autumn 1983, pp.191-201.

Although the Li Peng government placed on hold many of the reformist policies, a return to the Maoist system is unlikely. Deng's reforms unleashed many new social forces which cannot agree to a return to Maoist days. China has been exposed to a variety of views and values which cannot easily be erased from its consciousness. Few will therefore accept the Maoist practices one of which is a politicized government bureaucracy.

Nor is it likely that China will renounce the Party's leadership in the foreseeable future. A total abandonment of the Party's monopoly of administration as a solution to the behavioural gap is implausible for several reasons. To divest Communists of their "privileges of administration," as Djilas pointed out, "would mean that Communists were being deprived of their monopoly over property, ideology, and government." This would lead to "the end of Communist monopolism and totalitarianism."[14] The Chinese case is no exception. Depoliticization of state bureaucracy can mean not only the end of Communism in China but also a totally corrupted bureaucracy as no other institution is powerful enough to supervise it. The CCP, though with reduced power and appeal as a result of Deng's reforms, continues to grow in size in the past decade. It remains the single most powerful and most organized political force in China.

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[14] See Milovan Djilas.

In addition, Deng's reforms were not designed to rid the Party of its monopoly of administration. Barrett McCormick claimed that Deng's reforms have not eradicated a principal foundation of China's Leninist regime -- one-party rulership. The reforms may somewhat decrease the autonomy of the state, but they "are nonetheless intended to increase its capacity to rule."[15]

Another possible scenario is that the CCP reformers will attempt to depoliticize the administrative apparatus gradually, in a limited way. A proposal at the Party's Thirteenth Congress to divide civil servants into two groups -- political and professional -- is a step in this direction.[16] This change might reduce the CCP's interference with state administration. In the meantime, a partial depoliticization of administration still enables the Party to maintain some control over government bureaucracy. Moreover, a civil service, though depoliticized in a restrained way, makes it easier to recruit an intellectual elite and to use their knowledge and expertise in tackling the problem of administrative efficiency. In the process, the Party broadens the Party's base and restores its legitimacy.

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[15] Barrett L. McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.3.

[16] The crackdown in June 1989 could have slowed down this process of depoliticization. However, the discussion in ZGXZGL of the proposed civil service continues, which is an indication that a limited depoliticization of government bureaucracy will be likely to proceed.

At the later stages of the pro-democracy movement in the spring of 1989, cooperation between the Party reformers and intellectuals was obvious. "Students aligned themselves with Zhao Ziyang's faction."[17] Zhao and his supporters used the institutions they directly controlled, such as the Research Institute for Economic Restructuring which he "had loaded with bright young economists and analysts," to rally support.[18]

Although the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square temporarily ended the latest round of Deng's game of cooptation with intellectuals, a new game will begin. China's intellectuals have not lost their sense of mission. Nor does the CCP intend to abandon its modernization programme, which requires cooperation of intellectuals.

There is another reason why a limited depoliticization of state administration can help to address the issue of behavioural gap. Hong Yung Lee suggests that Deng's reforms have resulted in the CCP cadres being transformed from revolutionary fighters into technocrats. They are less rigid ideologically and approach the problems in state administration more from a technical standpoint than from a political point of view. Their managerial perspective and pragmatic economic orientation make it easier for them to respect knowledge and expertise. Lee also believes that China will move toward a society of "political authoritarianism" and "social pluralism."[19] As social pluralism develops, multiple restraints on government officials will be acceptable. Consequently, both administrative efficiency and ethical bureaucratic behaviour can be achieved.

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[17] Han Minzhu, p.207.

[18] Ibid., p.248.

How far can the CCP allow the administrative apparatus to be depoliticized? The answer depends on several factors. If initial steps in a limited depoliticization of government bureaucracy succeed in upgrading the state's administrative efficiency and bureaucratic behaviour, the process will continue. If the behavioural gap persists but no viable alternative to the problem is presented, the leadership may have to go along with this option. If Deng and other veterans fade from China's political arena and are replaced by a new, more pragmatic leadership, the opposition to an able and accountable neutral civil service will weaken.

Meanwhile, developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are important. These countries face similar problems of modernization and must improve administrative efficiency and ethics in order to manage national development.

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[19] Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.423.

Whether these countries can balance efforts to achieve an efficient administration and efforts to achieve an ethical administration is an open question. Even if foreign experiences favour a gradual and limited depoliticization of civil service, one should be reminded of various cultural, historical and political differences among countries. The behavioural gap poses a complex problem for modern China.

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